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INTRODUCTION 
Talking to a friend, when I had barely begun the research that eventually 
led to the writing of this thesis, I tried to explain the case in favour of my 
intuition that a person is, and must be, an embodied being. Her immediate 
reply, "but that is obvious, isn't it? ... at 
least, to any person who is not 
philosophically minded... ", unsettled me: if it was so straightforwardly 
plain that people are embodied beings, then I was embarking upon a 
redundant project. "Yes... ", I unconvincingly agreed, as one does when 
one is not interested in justifying philosophy to a pretentiously chatty taxi- 
driver. As I returned home, though, it was clearer to me that the necessary 
embodiment of people was not as obvious a thesis as my friend had first 
thought. 
It is a common element of many religions, not least the Christian tradition 
of the Western world, that there is life after death, a life devoid of the 
imperfections inherent to our present embodied state. What happens in 
death, then, is that the body truly dies, but the spiritual side of the person 
persists in a more perfect and enjoyable environment. This belief is 
supplemented in the Christian tradition with the idea that, at the end of the 
(material) world, the body resuscitates and joins the soul, the beginning of 
a painless and joyful existence. This resuscitated body, though, is not the 
dead body, by then decomposed and turned into dust, but a body not 
subject to the shortcomings of its material nature, that is, a 'non-material 
body'. This is certainly paradoxical, even self-contradictory. A believer 
would quickly appeal to the consequences of the original sin in an attempt 
to make the aura of self-contradiction vanish, but we need not enter into 
theological arguments. 
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The philosophical work required to ground these religious truths was 
undertaken by the Christian Philosophy of the Middle Ages. However, its 
influence in later philosophical developments is only limited. It was a 
modem philosopher (perhaps the first modem philosopher), Descartes, 
who made this duality of substances, mind and body, available to us. 
(Curse or blessing? ) Although certain parts of his work support a close 
connection between the mind and the body, it is the neat dualism of other 
passages, together with his identification of the person as an immaterial 
substance, that continue to be the starting point for present-day 
discussions of the nature of persons. In a way, Descartes provided the 
guide-lines and the framework for the subsequent philosophy of personal 
identity. 
Materialist philosophers, on the other hand, have insisted on the material 
character of persons, but their accounts have been triggered by a desire to 
counter-attack the Cartesian position. Thus, they have argued that people 
are essentially material, and that their alleged mental properties, such as 
pains, desires and beliefs (that is, the Cartesian mind without the 
substantialist connotation), are reducible to material properties. Some 
have even maintained that talk of persons and personal identity is 
altogether mistaken, and should be replaced by talk of bodies and the 
relations (of causality, resemblance, etc) between the different stages of 
those bodies. 
As a matter of fact, there is no consensus among people (philosophers or 
non-philosophers) about the relationship between embodiment and 
persons: some will argue that possession of a body is not a necessary 
condition of personhood; others will reply that they cannot conceive the 
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idea of, or understand what is meant by, disembodied persons. The 
positions defended by philosophers may be complicated by technical 
nuances, ranging from substantial dualism, to property dualism, or to 
reductionist materialism, among others. But that they have felt obliged to 
argue in one way or another is enough to show that the necessity-of- 
embodiment thesis is not plainly obvious. 
Having thus justified the need for research into the necessity-of- 
embodiment thesis, I would like now to outline the standpoint from which 
the argument develops. After what has been said about Descartes's 
influence on subsequent accounts of personal identity, it may seem foolish 
to claim that the current project originates independently of the Cartesian 
model. Yet, one of its underlying themes strives to overcome the mind- 
body dichotomy. In order to do so, a new characterization of the body is 
required, one on which the necessity-of-embodiment thesis can firmly 
stand: in particular, a mechanistic conception of the body will have to be 
resisted. On the other hand, an assault on the view of the person as a sum 
of mental and bodily properties will follow, placing the person on an 
altogether different level, and thereby ensuring that no reductionist 
account succeeds. 
The second main theme of the argument incorporates the subjective- 
objective dichotomy. Approaches to personal identity are twofold: on the 
one hand, it is maintained that the person is understood better from a first- 
person point of view, that is, as a subjective 'I'; on the other hand, it is also 
maintained that the correct approach is a third-person viewpoint, that is, 
that the person is better seen as an individual, member of a class. 
Furthermore, these two viewpoints present themselves as openly opposed 
and mutually exclusive: consideration of the person as a member of an 
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objective class will result in a failure to fully comprehend his irreducible 
subjective nature. Thus, they appear to be irreconcilable positions. 
Nevertheless, an attempt will be made at reconciling, or bridging, these 
standpoints. The latter is, in fact, what gives rise to the structure of this 
thesis. Therefore, the proposal of a non-mechanistic account of the body, 
as well as of a non-reductionist view of the person, are intermediate stages 
in the process of overcoming the first-person/third-person, or 
subjective/objective, dichotomy. 
The investigation into the nature of the person could be understood in 
either of two ways, depending on whether 'person' refers to an individual, 
or to a kind. This work is primarily concerned with the latter view, that is, 
the analysis of the necessary conditions that a person qua kind must fulfil: 
eg, being a subject and being embodied. Nevertheless, the individual/kind 
distinction is important because if 'person' referred to an individual, 
different considerations to the ones offered here would be needed, 
especially an analysis of the identity conditions of particulars. 
An objection that could be posed against the line followed in this work is 
that it is not sufficient to overcome Cartesianism. A Cartesian theorist 
could argue that the Cartesian Pure Ego could continue to exist after death 
as an individual disembodied Ego. The Cartesian theorist could even 
argue that the individual disembodied Ego would not, and need not, count 
as a member of the kind person (one of the necessary conditions of the 
person qua kind being the possession of a body), insisting that all that is 
required is that it exist as an individual Ego. Therefore, the Cartesian 
theorist could conclude that this work fails to successfully refute the idea 
that disembodied individual Egos can exist. 
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A conclusive answer to the objection in the last paragraph is not provided 
here, for as has been suggested, this thesis is primarily concerned with the 
necessary conditions of the person qua kind. However, the Cartesian 
argument proposed above should not be allowed to go unchallenged. If, 
as it is argued, the disembodied individual Ego is not a person, an account 
of what it is is required. The Cartesian theorist cannot simply say that the 
disembodied individual Ego is not a person; on the contrary, he must be 
pressed for a more detailed account. Once such an account is provided (or 
an attempt is made to provide it), it may turn out that the Cartesian view 
that disembodied Egos can exist an individuals is not so coherent as was 
first thought. 
Before starting the exposition, the chapter-by-chapter structure of the 
argument, without entering into details, will be briefly advanced. Chapter 
1 introduces certain methodological considerations that will relate to the 
general topic of personal identity. Chapter 2 is a criticism of the 
possibility of disembodied persons, and in particular, of the view that 
disembodied people can be perceivers of, and agents upon, the world. 
Some general aspects of the nature of perception and agency, which will 
reappear in later chapters, will be put forward: especially, the relation 
between perceivers/agents and the world. Chapter 3 is the presentation 
of the second main theme in the argument, the subjective and objective 
approaches to the problem of personal identity. After rejecting Nagel's 
own project for unifying both approaches, the guide-lines of a successful 
unification are outlined. The rest of this work is, in fact, a more detailed 
elucidation of those guide-lines. 
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Thus, Chapter 4 is a rejection of a mechanistic conception of the body, as 
well as an analysis of other aspects of the objective viewpoint, like the 
'person-as-a-natural-kind' thesis. In Chapters 5 and 6, there is a shift 
from the objective to the subjective viewpoint. Chapter 5 is a criticism of 
three accounts in which the subjective side of the person is either reduced 
or denied altogether. In the course of criticizing those views, a more 
positive account of the status of the person as subject is developed, an 
account that takes Kant as the starting point. Chapter 6 is the elaboration 
of those Kantian insights into a non-reductionist account of the person, 
supplementing Kant's formal conditions of personhood with some material 
conditions. It also includes a tentative analysis of the relation between a 
person, understood in non-reductionist terms, and his material body. 
Nonetheless, such a relationship is not taken too seriously, since the 
material body resembles the rejected mechanistic conception of the body 
too much. 
Chapter 7 is the beginning of the reconciliation of the subjective/objective 
dichotomy. After having denied that a person is a material body, a 
definition of embodiment in non-mechanistic terms is proposed, paying 
attention to the relation between a person and the external world: a person 
is embodied because of the sensory and intentional links to the 
environment. Chapter 8 attempts to specify in some detail what those 
sensory links are; that is, it attempts to make clear what the connection is 
between the person-as-perceiver and the world. Chapter 9 is a central 
chapter, for it argues, on the one hand, that the sensory (perceiver) relation 
to the world is not sufficient to explain the place of the person in the 
world, and on the other hand, that the perceiver and the agent sides of the 
person are closely interdependent. After refuting the idea that this duality 
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of perceiver and agent somehow threatens the unity of the person, the 
stage is set for the final chapter. Thus, Chapter 10 is an analysis of the 
relation between the person-as-agent and the world, by defending the 
necessity-of-embodiment thesis in connection with the primacy of bodily 
action. It contains a detailed exposition of different views in Action 
Theory (perhaps too detailed, it may be argued), but it serves the aim of 
showing the deficient account of the body present in them. 
Note 
The notes to the main text, which have been reduced to the minimum so as 
not to interrupt the normal flow of reading, will be found at the end of the 
whole document. 
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Chapter 1 
DISEMBODIED EXISTENCE AND POSSIBILITY 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
Some philosophers defend the possibility of disembodied persons 1; others 
deny it. Among the former, some affirm that disembodied existence is not 
de facto true; others insist that there are disembodied persons. There are, 
then, three different positions: 
i. those who maintain that disembodied existence is possible, 
although it is not true; 
11. those who affirm that disembodied existence is possible, and 
true; 
111. those who deny the possibility of disembodied existence. 
This chapter will discuss what is meant by saying that disembodied 
existence is possible. What counts as possible? What is the relationship 
between the following concepts: conceivable, intelligible, nonsensical, 
self-contradictory, inconsistent, incoherent? Is possibility the same as 
conceivability? Is possibility simply the lack of self-contradiction? Many 
questions of personal identity are addressed by imagining thought- 
experiments, which are supposed to be possible situations; but, are they 
really possible? 
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1.2. TWO CRITERIA OF POSSIBILITY 
1.2.1. Imagination 
First of all, a few quotations: 
"each of us can quite intelligibly conceive of his or her individual 
survival of bodily death. The effort of imagination is not even great. 
One has simply to think of oneself as having thoughts and memories as 
at present, visual and auditory experiences largely as at present, even, 
perhaps - though this involves certain complications - some quasi- 
tactual and organic sensations as at present, whilst (a) having no 
perceptions of a body related to one's experiences as one's own body 
is, and (b) having no power of initiating changes in the physical 
condition of the world, such as one at present does with one's hands, 
shoulders, feet and vocal chords. " (Strawson, 1990: 115) 
"Consider a family called Brown who live in what is supposed to be a 
perfectly normal semi-detached home. Imagine that things of an 
unusual nature start happening. [... ] One day the father, Mr. Brown, 
conjectures that the house may be haunted by a poltergeist. After he 
discusses this with the family, to the amusement of some members and 
the wonderment of others, one of the children begins to receive 
premonitions of what is going to happen. She says that a person, an 
invisible person, P, has 'talked' to her. She then qualifies this and says 
that the person has not really 'talked' to her but rather 'let her know' 
like 'thoughts popping into her head'. " (Gillet, 1986: 377-8) 
"Let us suppose that one day I fall asleep in my armchair. [... ] When I 
'wake up' this time, it is not like waking up on other occasions. 
Though I feel just as I usually do..., part of my experience... is absent... 
I have, I believe, become a disembodied spirit. " (Harrison, 1973-4: 44- 
5) 
The argument underlying the above passages runs as follows: 
(1) if something is imaginable, then it is possible; 
(2) we can think of (imagine) a person living in a disembodied 
state; 
(3) therefore, disembodied persons are possible. 
9 
In the critical analysis of this argument, it will be claimed that the first 
premise is false (and, therefore, the conclusion does not follow): there is 
no straight road from the ability to imagine to possibility. 
1.2.2. Intelligibility 
Intelligibility is an alternative criterion of possibility. Armstrong 
(1968: 19), for instance, distinguishes between empirical and logical 
possibility. Disembodied existence, he says, is logically, although not 
empirically, possible. He puts forward two reasons to support this 
assertion: first, the claim that there are disembodied persons seems to 
make sense; second, it is not self-contradictory. Therefore, he concludes, 
there is no logical obstacle: disembodied persons are a logical possibility. 
Penelhum (1970: 10ff) distinguishes between senseless and unintelligible. 
When somebody says that something lacks sense, he is simply making an 
autobiographical remark; what he is trying to say is 'I don't understand 
what that means'. On the other hand, when somebody affirms that 
something is unintelligible, he is putting forward a logical assertion. 'What 
you are saying is unintelligible' means 'what you are saying is incoherent'. 
(It is assumed here that 'incoherent' and 'inconsistent' are interchangeable. ) 
A further difference between both concepts is that an accusation of 
unintelligibility requires logical proof, while one of senselessnes does not. 
In the latter, a personal incapacity is recognized, and no further 
explanation is needed; in the former, however, a logical argument is 
required in order to show that something more than personal incapacity is 
being affirmed. 
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Penelhum goes on to describe three cases where unintelligibility or 
incoherence can occur: one, when a belief has concealed contradictions; 
two, when the notions being used to express a certain belief have been 
previously discarded; three, when the notions have not been explicitly 
discarded, but are ruled out by other discarded notions. (Finally, 
Penelhum's last remark - that the belief in round squares is too obvious to 
be considered unintelligible - will be ignored. ) 
1.3. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF BOTH CRITERIA 
1.3.1. Self-contradiction and intelligibility 
1. Armstrong claims that 'disembodied existence' is logically possible, that 
is, intelligible. He obtains this conclusion from the following 
considerations: it seems to make sense and it is not self-contradictory. 
However, intelligibility cannot be equated with those two conditions. 
First, intelligibility is not the same as the appearance of sense. Something 
can appear to make sense and yet be completely unintelligible. More 
specifically, something can have a familiar structure or a recognizable 
form, and fail to be intelligible: perhaps there is grammatical structure, but 
the words together have no meaning, or perhaps the words have an 
independent meaning, but lack any meaning when considered as a whole. 
For example, 'the sahj coldt and we that cult' seems to have a familiar 
form, but the words have no meaning: it is simply something that has just 
this moment been made up; alternatively, 'the book is the devil in disguise', 
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when taken literally, has no meaning, because there are no devils that can 
take the appearance of a book. 
Second, unintelligible is different from self-contradictory. 'A round 
square' is something self-contradictory: we attach sense to the different 
words and see that their meaning is mutually exclusive (if something is 
square, it cannot be described as round); it is also unintelligible. 
However, the gibberish made up above is not self-contradictory: it is 
simply unintelligible, it lacks any meaning at all. Therefore, self- 
contradiction and unintelligibility cannot be identified. 
From this dual consideration, it follows that something can have the 
appearance of sense and not be self-contradictory, and, nonetheless, be 
unintelligible. If, as it is outlined here, intelligibility is the criterion for 
possibility, then 'disembodied existence' is not possible, since it does not 
comply with the intelligibility condition. Now, what does intelligibility as 
the criterion of possibility amount to? Let us examine two other accounts. 
2. Penelhum's criterion of possibility is lack of incoherence or self- 
contradiction. As it has been explained above, though, self-contradiction 
is not the same as impossibility. Although something self-contradictory is 
impossible (like round squares), the reverse does not hold: something can 
be impossible even if it is not self-contradictory. On Penelhum's account, 
a devil in disguise would count as something possible, because it is not 
self-contradictory; similarly, a disembodied person would be possible, too. 
However, there is more to possibility than mere lack of self-contradiction, 
as will be shown more clearly later. Penelhum's criterion is too rash: from 
the alleged lack of self-contradiction of 'disembodied existence', its 
12 
impossibility does not follow. Penelhum's account, then, does not clarify 
what intelligibility means. 
3. Hocutt (1974) criticizes Penelhum's position. He considers 
unintelligibility to be a sociological notion, instead of a logical one, as 
Penelhum suggests. That something is unintelligible, Hocutt says, means 
that no-one can understand it. The autobiographical statement 'this does 
not make sense to me' and the statement 'this is unintelligible' are not at 
two different levels (personal and logical, respectively, as Penelhum 
maintains), but at the same one: the former involves a single person, 
whereas the latter involves many more. Thus, when it is said that 
'disembodied existence' is an unintelligible notion, what is meant is that 
nobody can understand it. There is no logical test that settles the question 
about the intelligibility or not of 'disembodied existence'; it is simply a 
more practical matter: do people make sense of it or not? If they do not, 
then it is unintelligible. 
Hocutt wants to conclude that 'disembodied existence' is an unintelligible 
notion. However, the obvious reply is that for centuries people have made 
sense of such a notion: in fact, it is part of many religious beliefs, 
especially in our western, Christian society. In this case, either 
'disembodied existence' is intelligible, and therefore possible (preserving 
the truth of Hocutt's sociological notion of intelligibility), or his criterion 
fails. 
Hocutt denies the existence of tests of intelligibility: the only test, he says, 
is people's ability to understand. If something is not understood, it needs 
more explanation. 
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"If we are intelligent, informed, and competent in the language, our 
petition will have force. If we are very intelligent, very informed and 
very competent in the language, our failure to understand will 
constitute presumptive evidence that no one else is likely to succeed. " 
(52) 
The key question is: who is the competent person? Hocutt may answer 
that he and others like him, all very intelligent people, who deny the 
intelligibility of the concept of disembodied people. On the other hand, 
those who claim to understand the notion of disembodied existence, would 
point at themselves (and many more), all very intelligent people, as well. 
Obviously, this line of argument does not settle the question. 
In short, then, the proposal according to which intelligibility is the 
criterion of possibility is not conclusive. If, on the one hand, intelligible is 
understood in logical terms as lack of self-contradiction (along Penelhum's 
and Armstrong's lines), it is not sufficient as a criterion of what is possible. 
If, on the other hand, a sociological approach is adopted, then the alleged 
intelligibility of a certain notion cannot be easily and definitely settled. 
1.3.2. Imagination and science 
Let us return to imagination as the criterion for possibility. This idea is 
frequently found among philosophical discussions of personal identity. As 
seen in the quotations at the beginning of the chapter, in thought- 
experiments, in considerations of one's own fate, or in describing the first- 
person point of view of a disembodied person, the power of imagination is 
used in order to conclude that what is conceivable is possible. A critical 
review of this idea is proposed in the following paragraphs. 
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1. Attention to detail. In these sorts of examples we are asked to imagine 
something: usually, a picture painted with very broad strokes, as if the 
details did not matter. However, it will be argued that they do matter, and 
that it is when the whole situation (including the finer details) is imagined 
(or an attempt is made to imagine it) that the entire project collapses. 
Smithurst (1980-1) proposes the following comparison. On the one hand, 
he says, we can imagine a man immersed in water for a long period of 
time, who comes up breathing. Here, we are asked to imagine a situation 
which hardly contains any details, but just a very general description. On 
the other hand, could we imagine the same man under water by giving a 
description of the movements of his flooded bronchia? Could we imagine 
the progressive flooding of his bronchia, the subsequent troubles for his 
respiratory system, the lack of oxygen affecting the heart, etc, together 
with his coming up breathing after all that? Imagination succeeds in the 
former case, whereas it fails in the latter. The difference between both 
cases is the attention paid to the details: if the relevant details are 
explicitly present when one is imagining the man under water (as in the 
latter description), then imagination will fail. Imagination is successful 
only because a very general picture is taken into account, while many 
pertinent and necessary details of that picture are deliberately left out. 
Thus, an appearance of possibility has been produced whereas, in fact, the 
whole situation is impossible. 
In Strawson's quotation above, he himself points at the place where the 
difficulty lies: how are quasi-tactual and organic sensations to be imagined 
without a body? He claims that the general effort of imagination required 
is not great, but why does he not try to spell out the details involved in 
such a picture? If he tried, he would probably find himself in trouble. 
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This is why it is easier to speak in general terms: because ignoring the 
relevant details (like the processes of perception in a disembodied state) 
avoids many difficulties, making the desired conclusion (ie, that 
disembodied persons are possible) easier to reach. 
Strawson's position needs some qualification. Although he affirms that it 
is conceivable that one should survive his own bodily death, such a 
disembodied existence is only "logically secondary". This is due to the 
fact that what is logically primitive is the concept of a person, which is 
neither a pure consciousness, nor a body, nor a compound of both. That 
the concept of a person is primitive means that he is the subject of both 
states of consciousness and corporeal characteristics. 
He goes on to say that "a person is not an embodied ego (consciousness), 
but an ego might be a disembodied person, retaining the logical benefit of 
individuality from having been a person" (103). That is to say, the 
existence of a disembodied person is secondary with respect to a person; 
the former can only make sense after the notion of a primitive person. 
Such a disembodied person could only be individuated by reference to the 
former person: 'I am the disembodied person that, when embodied, did 
such-and-such', for instance. In this sense, memory of the embodied state 
plays a crucial role, so that if memory fades, and finally disappears, the 
disembodied person would not be able to think of himself as an individual, 
distinguishable from other people, the chair he is sitting on, and so on. In 
Strawson's view, the idea of a pure (disembodied) ego from birth is not 
conceivable, for he would have no memory of his previous embodied state 
(what previous state! ), and therefore, would not count as an individual. 
But this amounts to making memory, in the case of the disembodied 
person (not from birth), a necessary property of his, because if his 
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memories totally disappear, then he would cease to be an individual; that 
is, he would be like the disembodied ego from birth. 
Moving on, similar problems arise in Gillet's example: what are the 
mechanisms involved in the communication between the child and the 
spirit? This detail is not given by Gillet. He simply suggests that it is not 
like a normal process of oral conversation between two embodied persons, 
but rather like "thoughts popping into her head". Obviously, this does not 
help very much in providing an account of how communication happens: 
how are the spirit's thoughts popped into the child's head?; how are they to 
be distinguished from mere hallucinations? 
2. Imagination and science. Scientific hypotheses help us understand the 
world; in this way, science can help us understand what is possible and 
what is not. For example, we can imagine an iron bar floating on water. 
However, according to scientific facts, it is not possible. The impossibility 
is clearly manifested if we consider the chemical properties of iron and 
water. From these properties, other superficial features of iron follow, like 
the impossibility of its floating on water. The former chemical properties 
give an account of the latter superficial features. Our effort of imagination 
concerned only the latter properties, not the former: we were asked to 
imagine that an iron bar could float on water, without changing the 
chemical properties of iron. However, unless those underlying properties 
are modified, the more superficial ones will not vary. That is to say, our 
effort of imagination is useless, unless it includes a change in chemistry. 
But, as far as our knowledge is concerned, the chemical properties of iron 
are inherent features of things. Therefore, something that appeared to be 
conceivable is not possible. 
2 
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It is argued, then, that simple imagination is not the criterion of possibility, 
because our scientific theories have a say; that is, if what seems to be 
possible contradicts our present scientific knowledge, then there is a 
prima facie case for denying its possibility. In the case of disembodied 
existence, science is unable to give an account of how perception in a 
disembodied state occurs, or how a disembodied person acts upon the 
world. Simply saying, as it has been suggested, that something is an 
example of extra-sensory perception (ESP) is nothing more than a label, 
and an explanation is still required. Until that is properly accounted for, 
there is strong prima facie evidence for denying the possibility of 
disembodied existence. 
It could be objected that science proposes hypothetical explanations, 
which may turn out to be wrong; in that case, the constraints that science 
poses on imagination as a criterion for what is and is not possible do not 
seem to be so powerful. If we rely on scientific explanations to deny the 
possibility of a product of imagination, and such explanations might be 
false, then the significance of what science says is diminished. 
The reply is twofold. On the one hand, in relation to the hypothetical 
nature of scientific explanations, the following could be said. If science 
discovers essential properties of things, then some (many? ) of its findings 
will not turn out to be wrong in the future. Kripke (1980) considers the 
case of gold, whose atomic number is 79. Now, if the latter is an essential 
property of gold, then it is not possible that the atomic number of gold is 
not 79; that is, the atomic number of gold is necessarily 79. (However, 
this model might not be applicable to the class 'person', if it turns out that 
person, unlike gold, is not a natural class, something which will be 
minutely discussed in a later chapter. ) 
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On the other hand, science, as it stands at present, gives us an explanation 
of many phenomena. As a matter of fact, it provides us with an account of 
how the processes of perception and action occur, including certain 
physical organs in embodied persons. However, those who defend the 
possibility of disembodied existence fail to give an account of how those 
people in a disembodied state get to perceive the world and act upon it. 
They are quick to say that it is not like ordinary processes, but what are 
the processes involved? They simply cannot give a satisfactory 
explanation. Until a better theory of reality is found (one that may3 
include disembodied as well as embodied personal perception and action), 
the present one is still valid. 
3. Extrapolation from other possible worlds. The next point is not so 
directly related to disembodied existence in particular, but to the so-called 
'puzzle' cases which are used in discussions of personal identity (see Flew, 
1985). Take the case of the prince and the cobbler (or any of its 
variations, like Robinson and Brown, Mr. Boltitude and son, and so on): 
one fine morning, a prince wakes up in the body of a cobbler, surrounded 
by the cobbler's world, although still conscious of his royal origin and life 
(he remembers being acknowledged as prince, for instance); and vice 
versa. It is said that the best available hypothesis for explaining what has 
happened is to say that there has been an exchange of bodies between two 
people. That is, it is assumed that were we to live in the possible world 
where the example of the prince and the cobbler is set, we would realize 
that the memory criterion of personal identity prevails. Therefore, it is 
concluded, personal identity consists in memory identity, not only in that 
possible world, but in our actual one, too. 
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However, our actual world does not host those kind of examples. Why 
would we be allowed to make such a rash extrapolation from other 
possible worlds to the actual one? That extrapolation may be made, but 
not in such a straightforward and simple manner. Certain aspects would 
require consideration: description of the details, explanation of how the 
body-exchange took place, and so on. In short, then, 'puzzle' cases are 
resolved far too quickly. 
4. Appeal to imagination begs the question. Disembodied existence is 
said to be conceivable because it is previously supposed to be possible. 
This is especially clear in the paper by Harrison mentioned above. He 
says he wants to defend the view "that people do not need to have bodies, 
that is, that it is not logically necessary that people have bodies" (44). At 
this point, one would expect some sort of philosophical argument trying to 
prove such a thesis. Instead, what is found is a very entertaining story, 
that begins with a dream and goes on to tell the adventures of an allegedly 
disembodied person, who manages to be re-embodied... After the tale, the 
disembodied person engages in philosophical thought, disputing the 
possibility of disembodied existence: 
"I found what I read interesting enough, though naturally I did not 
agree with those passages which attempted to prove the logical or 
conceptual impossibility of disembodied existence" (48; my emphasis). 
One may wonder whether Harrison thinks that such a story does the job; 
or whether he thinks that the whole question is so obvious that no 
argument is required. In the paper, however, he clearly begs the question. 
Why does it seem so obvious to him that disembodied existence is 
logically possible? Because he is a disembodied person himself; ie, 
because disembodied existence is deemed possible in the first place. 
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Summarizing, then, imagination cannot do the job it has been claimed to 
do in dealing with questions of personal identity. Basically, imagination 
as the criterion of possibility is constrained by scientific facts about the 
world: certain facts about the world are necessarily the way they are (like, 
the atomic number of gold being 79). When it is argued that imagination 
succeeds, that is due either to a rash assumption of what is imagined (no 
attention to detail, extrapolation from other possible worlds), or to a 
question-begging use of the imagination. 
1.3.3. Imagination and Cartesianism 
Imagination could be used to argue in support of a Cartesian view of 
personal identity; that is, the view according to which people are 
disembodied Egos. In 'Imagination and the Self, Williams states the 
following pro-Cartesian argument. One could ask oneself 'could I have 
been someone else? ' An answer could go as follows. I can easily imagine 
that I might have had a different body or different psychological features 
(including memory), and still be me. If this turns out to be true, then 
possession of a certain body, and/or possession of certain psychological 
features, are not necessary for me to be the person I am. Therefore, I am a 
Cartesian Ego. 
The key notion in this argument is the idea that I could have been someone 
else. For instance, what does 'I might have been Napoleon' mean? It 
seems to mean that there might have been a possible world where 
Napoleon existed, I existed, and Napoleon was me. Probably, Napoleon 
would have the same external appearance; so, it would not be possible to 
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tell the difference from an external, third-person point of view. From a 
first-person point of view, however, I could imagine being Napoleon; that 
is, I could imagine the world from Napoleon's point of view: the desolation 
of Austerlitz, memories of past love affairs, the awareness of my short 
stature, and so on. I could even say things like 'I am conquering the 
world'. 
What does 'I' in the above sentence stand for? Usually, 'I' stands for the 
speaker, the person who utters the sentence. The speaker here is not 
Napoleon, but the person imagining being Napoleon (in fact, could he not 
imagine being someone else, too? ). On the other hand, such a person is, 
as it were, only playing the role of Napoleon on that particular occasion. 
'I' is, therefore, ambiguous between the real person and the one he is 
impersonating (ie, Napoleon). However, Williams argues, from the fact 
that the 'I' is ambiguous between the speaker and Napoleon, it does not 
follow that the 'I' stands for something else, a Cartesian Ego. The idea that 
'I' is a Cartesian Ego is an illusion produced by a tricky imagination. 
Imagining myself without any of my present (corporeal or psychological) 
features is different from demonstrating that I do not need any of those 
characteristics to keep my own identity. Therefore, imagination alone 
cannot prove that I might have been someone else, or that I could have 
had a different body and still be me. 
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1.4. CONCLUSION 
The point of this chapter is twofold. First, it has been shown that the 
claim that disembodied existence is possible is not univocally understood 
by those who defend it: some people appeal to a logical sense of 'possible', 
others introduce sociological considerations, and others still place 
imagination at the centre of that claim. Second, the identification of 
imaginability and possibility has been particularly criticized: on the one 
hand, science constrains what is possible, but not what is imaginable; on 
the other hand, the allegedly successful move from imaginability to 
possibility is due either to a faulty reasoning (eg, a rash extrapolation from 
other possible worlds to the actual world), or to an insufficient description 
of what is imagined, or to a question-begging implicit assent to the idea 
that what is imaginable is also possible. 
With these methodological considerations in view, it can now be seen that 
the thought-experiments that abound in philosophical literature will not be 
regarded in the present work as offering crucial arguments to illuminate 
the topic of personal identity. This less colourful, less spectacular method, 
I believe, will deliver better results. 
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Chapter 2 
PENELHUM ON DISEMBODIED PERSONS 
2.1. DISEMBODIED PERSONS DEFENDED 
After the previous general considerations about disembodied existence, 
this chapter will be dedicated to the analysis of the arguments put forward 
by those who defend the possibility of disembodied persons. In particular, 
the discussion will focus on two main topics: perception and agency. The 
initial intuition that both perception of the world, and the subsequent 
action upon it, are made possible by the phenomenon of embodiment will 
be argued for; therefore, both perception and action are impossible in a 
disembodied state. Nonetheless, some philosophers suggest that 
perception and action could take place in a disembodied state, and those 
arguments will be addressed now; especially, the arguments found in 
Penelhum's Survival and Disembodied Existence. 
2.1.1. Vision and hearing' 
An embodied person's perception of the world takes place through certain 
physical organs, like the visual and auditory systems. These organs are 
the perceptual link between the person and the world. Could a 
disembodied person see (or hear) the world? 'See', on the one hand, 
means 'perceive by the eye'; but since the disembodied person lacks eyes, 
the physical organ for vision, he2 could not be said to see in this sense. In 
another sense, 'see' means 'have visual experiences': here, no explicit 
mention of something physical is made, so that the disembodied person 
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could be said to see in this second sense. A disembodied person, then, 
could have visual experiences of objects: the same experiences that an 
embodied person would have in optimum circumstances. 
A second question is whether disembodied people would occupy a 
specific place in space. Obviously, since they lack bodies, they would not 
occupy a place in the same way in which an embodied person is situated 
at a certain point p in space; ie, a point which is determined by the 
situation of the person's body. However, disembodied people could be 
said to occupy the same place that a normal observer would occupy if the 
latter saw the things the disembodied person sees; that is, disembodied 
people could be said to be at the centre of their own visual field. And that 
seems to be a definite place in space, one that could be precisely 
determined in virtue of the account they give of their visual experiences. 
For example, if they said that they saw the fridge in front of them and the 
cupboard to their left, at a certain distance, then it should be concluded 
that they were placed at an exact point p in the kitchen. Two 
consequences follow. 
First, a difference between embodied and disembodied people. In the 
normal state of embodiment, two different people cannot be located at the 
same place in space simultaneously; however, in a disembodied state, such 
a principle does not apply: if two different disembodied persons gave an 
identical description of their visual experiences, it would have to be 
concluded that they were located at the same place at the same time. In 
the embodied case, such a situation is impossible, because of the 
properties of material bodies; in the disembodied case, however, since 
people lack material bodies, such a situation would be possible. An 
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equally possible alternative is that a disembodied person could occupy the 
same place as an embodied person. 
Second, for disembodied people, their being where they are would consist 
in their seeing things the way they do. If they saw things differently, or if 
they saw a different part of the world, then they would be at a different 
point. Analogously, if they did not see (or hear) anything at all, they 
would not be anywhere at all. 
An embodied person usually moves in order to correct his visual 
experiences, that is, in order to obtain a better perception of something, 
when what is seen is not clear (perhaps it is half-hidden, or the angle of 
vision is not favourable). Could a disembodied person do so? Could he 
move deliberately from one place to another? This problem is closely 
linked to the general question of agency, which will be dealt with later. 
However, it can be anticipated that disembodied people could not move in 
the sense of activating their locomotive system (a physical organ), and 
therefore, would not be able to correct their visual experiences in this way 
(ie, the way of the embodied person). Could they get a better perception 
(change of the angle of vision, for instance) without any physical 
movement, just by trying to do so? At this point, Penelhum points at the 
similarity with aspect-switching perception, as in the picture in which a 
duck or a rabbit are alternatively seen. The latter, he argues, provides an 
analogy for the disembodied person's obtaining a better perception just by 
trying. This point will be taken up later, when discussing disembodied 
agency. 
It has been maintained that disembodied persons could occupy a definite 
place in space, from which they would be able to see (ie, have visual 
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experiences of) the world. What would happen if they did not occupy a 
place in the world? Could they still see (or hear) the world? Penelhum 
says that, in that case, they could see clairvoyantly. Clairvoyance is 
perception of the world by extra-sensory means. It is usually put together 
with other phenomena, like telepathy, and telekinesis, under the heading 
'extra-sensory perception (ESP) phenomena'. Many experiments have 
been carried out in parapsychological laboratories, in order to find out 
whether ESP really occurs. It has been said that there is evidence in 
support of ESP (see Thakur, 1976), which in turn would support the claim 
that disembodied persons can see clairvoyantly. A full discussion of the 
problems involved here is not intended. Suffice it to say that the 
mechanisms of ESP have not yet been found, and that it is difficult to 
make room within our physics for the claim that ESP can be scientifically 
explained. Until the powers of explanation and prediction of a theory of 
ESP can be tested, we can only give it the benefit of the doubt. 
2.1.2. Bodily sensations 
Could disembodied people have bodily sensations? Obviously, they could 
not have perceptions of their own bodily states, because they have no 
body. A pain, for example, could not carry information about the place of 
the body where some damage has been caused; nor could a tickle inform 
them about the definite point in the body where the sensation comes from. 
However, sensations could carry information about something in the 
environment. For instance, when a sensation of heat is felt, it would mean 
that the temperature in the surroundings is rising; similarly, a tickle could 
mean that a certain kind of stuff is around, producing a particular type of 
sensation; or a pain may mean that a different kind of substance is around, 
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the one that brings about the sensation. In this sense, it has been 
suggested, disembodied people could have bodily sensations. 
2.1.3. Touch 
It appears as if it would be impossible for a disembodied person to have a 
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sense of touch. How is it possible to touch anything without a body? 
When something is touched, there is a contact between two material things 
(for example, my hand and the keyboard on my computer). It is 
impossible to touch something that lacks materiality (for instance, an 
immaterial keyboard on an immaterial computer). Similarly, an immaterial 
person could not touch any material objects. 
Nonetheless, it has been claimed that a disembodied person could learn by 
touch "in that it might feel rough or warm to him, when it was rough or 
warm" (34). In this sense, a disembodied person could learn about his 
external environment, although not about his body. 
A final general objection to the above account of disembodied perception 
would go along the following lines: in giving disembodied people the 
possibility of seeing, hearing, having bodily sensations and so on, have 
disembodied people not been given their body back? The answer is 
negative. If it was the case that they had a body, they would be able to 
see/hear it; their bodily sensations would carry information about their 
own body (instead of what is beyond their skin); they would be able to 
occupy some space that other objects could not occupy simultaneously. 
That is, the account given so far is an account of disembodied perception 
for disembodied persons. 
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2.1.4. Disembodied agency 
In an embodied agent, a distinction can be made between two types of 
actions: basic and non-basic. The former are actions which do not require 
the previous doing of another action. There are two main groups of 
examples: on the one hand, mental actions, like imagining, saying 
something to oneself; on the other hand, movements of one's own limbs or 
members. In order to imagine something, or move my left arm, I do not 
have to carry out any previous action. Unlike these, a non-basic action 
requires that the agent perform a previous action. For instance, raising a 
table requires the movement of the agent's arms and hands in a conjoined 
effort. 
What would count as an example of a basic action for a disembodied 
person? Obviously, not the movement of the agent's limbs, because he has 
no body. What, then? It has been suggested that a mental act, the mental 
act of trying or willing. Thus, if a disembodied agent wanted to raise a 
table (a non-basic action), there must be a previous act of trying, which is 
analogous with the embodied person's movement of arms and hands. 
This notion of trying or willing needs more examination. Two different 
senses of 'trying' can be distinguished. First, a technical sense (trying to 
do something, deciding to do something, willing something). When 
somebody tries to do something in this sense, he is determined to carry out 
an action, and must provide the means for that action. For example, if 
someone tries to raise a table, he must try somehow: in the case of an 
embodied agent, by using his arms; in the case of a disembodied agent, by 
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his mental act of trying. Clearly, this is not an explanation of what is 
meant by the disembodied person's trying or willing: such a notion is 
presupposed, rather than explained. This sense of trying is, then, rejected: 
simply saying that the disembodied agent tries to raise the table by trying 
is not a satisfactory explanation (if it is an explanation at all). 
Second, a psychokinetic sense, which consists in "privately urging 
something to happen that I want to happen" (39). For instance, dice are 
shaken and thrown, and a person is asked to will a certain score; if the 
willed score happens, it is said that people can affect the course of events 
just by willing. This would be what happens in disembodied agency: the 
agent could raise a table just by willing it, in the sense of urging something 
to happen. Penelhum accepts that no explanation of the connection 
between the willing and the physical change in the world is given (ie, that 
it seems to be a mysterious power had by the agent), but he adds that 
perhaps certain correlations could be found (for example, between the 
intensity of the willing and the height of the risen table), making the whole 
phenomenon less mysterious. That is, if certain correlations (similar to 
those studied by science) were to be found, then the air of mystery would 
vanish. 
Furthermore, Penelhum rejects the possibility that the raising of tables 
could count as basic actions for disembodied agents. The main reason 
seems to be that if the raising of a table was a basic action, then there 
would be no need for the act of willing (because in basic actions no 
previous action is required); then, it would be as if the table was the 
agent's body at the time, and this is a very awkward conclusion to draw. 
The motif behind Penelhum's rejection is that if spirits could occupy 
physical objects, then they could also occupy the bodies of embodied 
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persons (like in mediumistic communication). However, he does not 
welcome the possibility that spirits should be able to occupy a medium's 
body, using it as their own body4. 
A question was posed above and left unanswered: could a disembodied 
person get a better perception just by trying? The answer is affirmative, 
since trying (in the psychokinetic sense) is a basic action: the disembodied 
person acts on the world just by trying. Thus, while in an embodied state, 
people would move from one place to another to get a better perception, in 
a disembodied state, a mere act of trying would do the job. 
2.2. DISEMBODIED PERSONS DISPUTED 
After the exposition of certain arguments defending the possibility of 
disembodied perception and action, attention will be directed to the critical 
analysis of those arguments. Since one of the main contentions of this 
thesis is to defend the necessity of embodiment for personal identity, the 
whole thesis is a criticism of the opposite view (the possibility of 
disembodied persons). More particularly, it will now be shown how 
unsatisfactory Penelhum's arguments are. A definite refutation of those 
arguments may not be achieved, but it will at least be stressed that there 
are many shadows and unclear passages. Thus, the path will have been 
cleared for a positive account of the necessity of embodiment for 
personhood in the following chapters. 
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2.2.1. Vision and hearing 
Penelhum proposes two different senses of 'seeing' (seeing as perceiving 
by the eyes, and seeing as having visual experiences), and maintains that a 
disembodied person could see in the sense of having visual experiences. 
A disembodied person could see* without the help of any physical organs. 
Seeing* the world is the same as seeing it, but without any physical organs 
being involved. That this is the way in which Penelhum constructs seeing 
in the disembodied state is supported by the fact that he understands vision 
in the disembodied case on the model of vision in the embodied case: a 
disembodied person sees* what an embodied one would see in normal 
circumstances; that is, both of them would have the same visual 
experiences. The visual experiences being the same, the only difference 
lies in the mechanism of vision: whereas an embodied person sees the 
world, a disembodied person sees* it. 
This duality of senses does not end the controversy about vision in a 
disembodied state; on the contrary, here is where the problems begin. For 
instance, is Penelhum right in constructing disembodied vision as a special 
case of embodied vision? It has been suggested that, in opposition to what 
he seems to think, the sort of perceptual experiences had in an embodied 
state do not have to continue in a disembodied state. Could it not be the 
case, for example, that a blind person sees perfectly well, after his death 
(that is, in a disembodied state)? Or could he not become deaf at the same 
time as recovering his sight? A blind person is blind due to the 
malfunctioning of his visual system (body); but when he becomes 
disembodied after dying, why should he still have the same deficiencies as 
when embodied? In general, there is no reason to presume that 
disembodied experiences would be similar to embodied ones. In that case, 
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and extrapolating from these examples, the perceptual experiences of a 
disembodied person need not be constructed on the model of the 
experiences of an embodied person. These considerations undermine 
Penelhum's approach to the topic, based on such an analogy. 
If the question is pressed a little further, we could ask why the experiences 
of a disembodied person should be the experiences of a disembodied 
person. Why should they be attributed to him, as if he was still an 
individual (ie, according to the model of attribution of experiences to 
embodied people)? Why should he have stable and continuous 
experiences as opposed to unrelated and chaotic ones (eg, he may have 
myopic experiences one day, perfectly good sight the next day, and so 
on)? Without a body, such possibilities cannot be prevented. (For related 
considerations, see Puccetti, 1967. ) 
1. The Mechanism Problem. An initial problem for Penelhum's account 
of vision in a disembodied state is that no explanation is given of how it 
takes place. In embodied vision, there is a material external object that 
affects a material subject through material organs (eyes, nerve endings and 
so on), producing the appropriate visual experience. The having of visual 
experiences is brought about through, and explained by, the physical 
mechanisms of vision. Thus, Penelhum's two senses of seeing considered 
above are unified in the embodied case: an embodied person has visual 
experiences because he perceives by the eyes. Let us try to apply this 
model to the disembodied case: there is a material object that affects an 
immaterial subject ..., 
but how! How is the connection made possible? 
What is the analogue of the embodied person's physical organs of vision in 
the disembodied case? How is the visual experience produced? No 
account of the mediating processes is given. It is simply assumed that 
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such visual experiences are possible, although it is not said how. 
Nonetheless, just saying that a disembodied person sees* the world 
(although perhaps a useful notation) does not amount to giving an 
explanation of how such visual experiences are produced. Therefore, 
Penelhum's construction of disembodied vision according to the model 
provided by embodied vision fails; ultimately, disembodied vision is 
postulated, but not explained. 
It could be replied that such an objection relies too heavily on the human 
mechanisms of vision and is, therefore, too parochial. We say of different 
animals (belonging to different species) that they can see, even if their 
visual mechanisms differ a great deal from the human mechanism for 
vision. Similarly, the reply goes, disembodied persons could be said to 
see, even though their visual mechanisms are also different from the 
human model. What this amounts to is the acknowledgement that vision is 
a functional term, so that different physical mechanisms can all perform 
the same role (see Snowdon, 1990: 142). In that case, then, Penelhum can 
avoid the Mechanism Problem. 
This reply certainly diminishes the impact of the previous objection to 
Penelhum's account. One last comment will be added, which, even if it 
does not settle the question, will however make explicit the differences 
involved. It is one thing to argue that different material mechanisms can 
carry out the same role of producing visual experiences; it is another thing 
to argue that immaterial mechanisms can carry out that task. The latter 
goes against certain assumptions that are part of our understanding of the 
process of vision, in a way that the former does not. The latter has an air 
of unintelligibility about it (what are immaterial mechanisms? ), not found 
in the former. Therefore, the analogy with animals (and the ascription of 
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vision and visual experiences to them) does not in itself provide an 
example on which disembodied vision might be constructed. 
2. The Objectivity Problem. It is the problem of where the content of 
disembodied visual (and, in general, perceptual) experiences come from. 
Concerning the embodied case, three points must be borne in mind. First, 
the content of an embodied person's perceptual experiences comes from 
the world, due to a series of causal relations that hold between individual 
objects in the world and the perceiver. These relations can be generalized 
for all instances of objects belonging to the same type, and for all (or 
almost all) perceivers, members of the same species. There are, then, 
certain causal laws relating the environment and individual perceivers; for 
instance, neural laws. 
Second, and because of these causal relations, perception exhibits what 
can be called the aboutness of perception: perceptual experiences are 
about objects that are objective, in the sense that their nature, or essential 
character, is independent from the perceiver's dispositions or mental 
phenomena. For example, my visual experience of a tree is about an 
external object (a tree), independent from my seeing (or my being 
prepared to see) it; that visual experience is an instance of a causal law 
linking trees and perceivers in general. Visual experiences are, then, 
experiences of something in the world; that is, the subject perceives the 
external world. 
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Third, the object of perception, the external object in the world, is a 
constitutive part of the experience, so that if the object did not exist, no 
experience about that object could be had. For instance, a visual 
experience of a tree includes the real objective tree in the world as part of 
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the visual experience itself The latter can be expressed by saying that 
visual (in general, perceptual) experiences are de re. Consequently, there 
cannot be visual experiences of non-real, non-objective trees. The 
importance of the latter will become apparent shortly, when presenting the 
distinction between perceptual and hallucinatory experiences. (See Burge, 
1986, for a more detailed formulation of the objectivity and causality 
conditions of perception. ) 
In the disembodied case, however, causal links between the environment 
and the perceiver are difficult to find. This is partly due to the Mechanism 
Problem, that is, to the fact that nothing analogous to the causal neural 
laws linking external objects and perceivers in the embodied case can be 
found in the disembodied case. In fact, this is an instance of a more 
general problem, that of accounting for the interaction between the 
material and the immaterial. Now, once this causal link between an 
external object and the perceiver is lost, the aboutness of perception is 
also called into question: is perception about external, independent 
objects; or are the objects of perception dependent on the subject's 
perceiving them? The latter amounts to a denial of the objectivity of 
perception: that is, the difference between perceiving something, and the 
object of perception existing with independence of such an act of 
perceiving. Now, if the objectivity of perception is denied, then the 
disembodied perceiver's experiences are purely inner, and have no world- 
involving component. To that extent, they have no content, for the latter 
comes from the external world. 
That the latter is Penelhum's position can be seen by considering his 
analysis of the spatial location of the disembodied perceiver. Penelhum 
claims that, for a disembodied person, his being where he is consists in his 
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seeing (or hearing) things the way he does. That is, the disembodied 
person's spatial position is understood as a sensory property; that is, as a 
phenomenological "disposition to affect sensitive beings with certain 
experiences" (Evans, 1980: 95). For a disembodied person, being at a 
place p is a sensory property because it consists in having such and such 
visual (or auditory) experiences. For embodied people, however, being at 
a place p is not just (the same as) having certain experiences, since 
somebody could still occupy a point p in space in the absence of any 
visual (or auditory) experiences; consider, for instance, cases of sleep or 
coma. 
A closer analysis will show that there are two perspectives involved here. 
From a third-person point of view, even if an embodied person did not 
perceive anything in the world (like in cases of sleep), he could still be 
located in space by others: other people could say, referring to him, that he 
is sleeping in his bedroom. From a first-person point of view, though, he 
would not be able to locate himself if he did not have any perception of 
the world6. 
In the disembodied state, a person would not be able to self-locate himself 
if he did not have any perception: 'I am where I am because I see so and 
so'. The difference with the embodied person lies in the third-person 
perspective: if he did not have any perceptions, others would not be able 
to locate him in the spatio-temporal world. When he has perceptions, and 
he communicates with other people, the latter have the necessary 
information, and can place him at a definite spatio-temporal position. If he 
lacked perception of the world, other people would not be able to locate 
him. Why is it so? Because he would not be able to self-locate himself in 
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the first place. That is to say, self-location affects the third-person 
location of the disembodied person. 
Unlike this, in the embodied state, there is independence between both 
perspectives: a person can be located by others even if he cannot self- 
locate himself. In the disembodied state, there is not such an independent 
criterion. The only criterion for the location of a disembodied person by 
others is his own self-location, communicated to others. This amounts to 
saying that there is only one way of knowing whether there are 
disembodied people, and where they are: communication with them; or 
better, communication from them to us. 7 The dissimilarity with embodied 
people must be stressed; for the latter, materiality allows for independent 
ways of spatial location, not available in the disembodied case. 
This dissimilarity is due to the fact that embodied people do not 
understand spatial location as a sensory property, but as a primary 
property, in the sense that there is something, independent from the 
dispositional property itself, that grounds the disposition to have certain 
experiences. Thus, although being at a place p is the ground for the 
disposition to have such and such visual (or auditory) experiences, it is not 
the disposition itself (unlike the disembodied case, in which ground and 
disposition are confused). This is similar to the way in which a certain 
arrangement of molecules is the ground for the fragility of a certain object, 
but is not the fragility itself. Evans argues that this distinction is a "deep 
conceptual prejudice of ours", and that its omission produces a "sense of 
disquiet" (102) hardly avoidable. This deep conceptual prejudice is what 
has been referred to as the objectivity of perception, that is, the idea that 
the objects of perception are existentially independent from the subject's 
act of perceiving. This, in turn, requires a distinction between the subject 
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of perception and the external, objective world. When this distinction is 
not made explicit, the result is a confusion of both spheres, so that the 
subject's perceiving, and what he has experiences of, are not properly 
distinguished. Ultimately, it results in perceptual experiences devoid of 
content. 
A criticism that could be made is that the immediate (or direct) object of 
perception is not an external object, but an internal 'something' (call it 
sense-datum, representation, or what you like). Even if this assertion does 
not appear to be intuitive, its plausibility emerges when we consider cases 
of hallucinatory perception. In the latter, unlike in cases of genuine 
perception, the subject sees something that does not exist in the world; 
therefore, it is argued, the immediate object of his experience must be 
something internal. Now, if that is the case with hallucinations, then that 
must also be the case with genuine perceptions, for the processes involved 
in perception are the same. The latter move is supported by the idea that 
whether the experience is genuine or hallucinatory, there is something 
common to both, the fact that it looks to the perceiver as if so-and-so were 
the case. Therefore, it is concluded, perceptual experiences are inner 
experiences. 
Penelhum does seem to conceive of visual experiences as inner, at least in 
the disembodied case, for he argues that the disembodied person would be 
able to see in the sense of having visual experiences, even if these do not 
contain an outer element (which conveys the contentual component of the 
experience). If the previous argument from hallucination is correct, then 
Penelhum might be able to avoid the Objectivity Problem. 
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Nonetheless, the previous argument from hallucination has recently come 
under attack. Snowdon (1990) has argued that there is not an inner core 
of perception in the sense described above. Although 'looks'-sentences ('it 
looks to the perceiver as if... ') are true both in cases of hallucination and in 
cases of genuine perception, they are not necessarily made true by the 
same state of affairs. It might be the case that they have "disjunctive 
fulfilment conditions", which means that the same 'looks'-sentence could 
be made true (1) if there is a certain external object perceived by the 
subject (in the case of a true perception), or (2) if it is as if there is a 
certain object being perceived (in the case of a hallucination). If this reply 
works, then the analysis of hallucinatory experiences cannot be 
extrapolated to other types of perceptual experiences, like genuine 
perceptions. Therefore, it might still be argued that genuine perceptual 
experiences are world-involving, in the sense that their content comes 
from the external world. Thus, the criticism still holds that, insofar as 
Penethum conceives of experiences in the disembodied case as inner, then 
they lack content (or, at any rate, genuine content). 
Furthermore, it could be argued that, insofar as the object of perception is 
constitutive of the perceptual experience itself, since disembodied 
experiences do not involve a relation to an external object, then such 
perceptual experiences cannot obtain. It is not simply that perceptual 
experiences are the result of a causal relation between objective elements 
in the world and the perceiver, but also that the external object in the 
world is itself part of the perceptual experience (ie, it is a de re 
experience). 
Thus, the difference between genuine perceptions and hallucinations 
becomes clearer. In cases of genuine perception, there is an object in the 
40 
world that constitutes the perception, whereas hallucinations lack such an 
object and are, therefore, an empty gesture. Perceptual experiences are de 
re, whereas hallucinations lack a real object; hallucinations, therefore, do 
not count as genuine perceptions. 
A consequence from this is that insofar as Penelhum's account of 
disembodied perception tries to cut across both genuine perceptions and 
hallucinations, by characterizing perceptual experience in terms of their 
inner subjective appearance ('it looks to the perceiver as if... '), then he fails 
to appreciate the real issue, the fact that perceptual experiences are de re 
attitudes, directed to particular objects in the world. This is fatal for 
Penelhum's project, for if disembodied experiences are not constituted by 
an external object, then they are not genuine perceptual experiences. 
Furthermore, non de re, disembodied, perceptual experiences are not even 
possible, since they are not constituted by an external object. 
3. The Challenge. Those who, like Penelhum, defend the possibility of 
disembodied perception want to argue that the content of disembodied 
perceptual experiences is similar to the content of embodied perceptual 
experiences. Thus, they conceive of disembodied perception as embodied 
perception minus the embodied perceptual mechanism. This is coupled 
with the idea that perceptual experiences are purely inner, and do not 
contain a world-involving aspect; in other words, that the perceptual state 
one is in is not constituted by any element external to the perceiver himself 
(what Burge, 1986, has referred to as 'individualism'). Thus, it would be 
argued that a disembodied person's perceptual experiences are the same as 
the perceptual experiences of an embodied person. 
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This line of argument has been counter-attacked by arguing that perceptual 
experiences are world-involving: one, the content of our perceptual 
experiences is causally dependent on the objects of the external world; 
two, real objects in the world are constitutive of the perceptual experience 
itself. If this is so, it cannot be conceded to those who defend the 
possibility of disembodied perception that the experiences of disembodied 
perceivers have the same content as the experiences of embodied 
perceivers; or, indeed, that the experiences of disembodied perceivers, 
characterized in purely subjective phenomenological terms, are the same 
as the perceptual experiences of embodied people. 
Therefore, the challenge to accounts like Penelhum's is similar to the 
challenge posed by McDowell to Cartesian accounts of perceptual 
experience. According to McDowell, the Cartesian gap between inner and 
outer is such that "subjectivity is confined to a tract of reality whose layout 
would be exactly as it is however things stood outside it" (1986: 151). A 
person's psychological states are, therefore, characterized with total 
independence of the way the external world is. In such a picture, contact 
with, and experience of, the world is not so much problematic and fallible 
as truly mysterious. Take the case of perception. If a person's perceptual 
experiences are characterized exclusively in phenomenological terms (its 
seeming to the perceiver as if .. 
), then those experiences are "bland or 
blind", closed to the light coming from outside, thereby failing to reveal 
the external world. In this context, the intentionality of experience 
becomes a magical affair. How can the perceiver jump from the infallibly 
accessible, self-standing, inner realm to the external world without falling 
in the abyss that separates these realms? 
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Following McDowell's lead, Penelhum's account can also be labelled 
'Cartesian'. Therefore, it is just as magical that a disembodied person can 
have disembodied perceptual experiences, bearing in mind that perceptual 
experiences should convey information about particular objects in the 
external world. The disembodied perception theorist must supply an 
alternative explanation to the one suggested above in terms of causal and 
constitutive (de re) links between the perceiver and the world. The latter 
is sometimes provided by appealing to the imagination: it is possible to 
imagine the same perceptual experience in a completely different world, 
and even when there is no world at all. (One such case is the brain in the 
vat hypothesis, which will be discussed later. ) However, as argued in the 
last chapter, imagination alone cannot do all the work, for it simply begs 
the question at hand. 
2.2.2. Bodily sensations and touch 
The question of whether disembodied people can have bodily sensations 
will now be addressed. First of all, let us consider the following account 
of bodily sensations for embodied people. Bodily sensations have a 
twofold function: on the one hand, they carry information about something 
outside the body (a certain substance that tickles, or hurts); on the other 
hand, they carry information about the body itself (where the tickle or pain 
come from). 
In the account of bodily sensations for disembodied people given by 
Penelhum, the second element is missing: bodily sensations carry 
information only about the surrounding environment. However, what 
would be the usefulness of such information? The usefulness of bodily 
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sensations for embodied people derives from the fact that the information 
coming from the environment is related to the information coming from the 
body itself. Because I feel where something is tickling me, and because I 
detect the object that is tickling me, I can do something about it. Because 
I feel the pain in my leg, and see that a pin is stuck in it, I can relieve the 
pain by pulling out the pin. It appears that bodily sensations, insofar as 
they do not relate the information coming from the environment to the 
information coming from the body, would not be very useful to a 
disembodied person. 
Nonetheless, this does not show the impossibility of bodily sensations for 
disembodied persons. It simply shows that an argument could be made 
from an evolutionary point of view: the evolutionary history of the species 
would have got rid of something completely useless; since bodily 
sensations are not helpful for disembodied persons, then the latter will not 
have any bodily sensations. It could be replied that perhaps disembodied 
people have evolved in a way (different from embodied people) that 
confers some utility to the possession of bodily sensations that convey 
information about the external environment alone; and that those who are 
in an embodied state may not know what the function of bodily sensations 
in a disembodied state is. For an argument against the possibility of bodily 
sensations in a disembodied state, let us turn to related considerations 
about the sense of touch. 
For embodied persons, the sense of touch provides information about the 
environment: something is warm, or rough. Who learns those things about 
the environment? The person who touches. How does such a person get 
such information? By touching; ie, by feeling something with his body (in 
particular, with his limbs). In touching something, two material things are 
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in contact; in feeling that something is rough, an embodied material person 
must touch a material rough object. 
Penelhum claims that a disembodied person could feel the warmth or 
roughness of something (ie, learn something true about such an object) by 
touch. However, if a disembodied person lacks materiality, how could he 
get such information about the environment by touch? If touching 
something requires a material subject, then a disembodied person cannot 
touch anything; and, therefore, he cannot learn anything about the 
environment by touch. 
Analogous considerations can be applied to bodily sensations. Let us 
analyze bodily sensations as carriers of information about the 
environment; ie, there is something that tickles or hurts. To whom is the 
information carried? To the person who feels the tickle or the pain. How 
is the information carried? In the embodied case, the answer is obvious: 
there is a stimulation of certain nerve endings which is interpreted by the 
organism as a ticklish or painful feeling in a part of the organism's body. 
The body acts as the medium through which information about the 
environment is passed on to the person. The person learns that there is a 
particular ticklish or painful substance in his environment because it 
affects his body. Therefore, the information conveyed about the external 
environment cannot be separated from the information about the body 
itself 
In the disembodied case, however, there is no explanation of how 
information about the environment is made available to the person. The 
problem lies in the fact that bodily sensations convey two messages, and 
one of them (information about the body) is missing. 
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2.2.3. Agency 
Penelhum suggests that disembodied people could act upon their 
environment, because they could bring about changes in the world by a 
mental act of willing or trying. An initial difficulty with this view is that, 
as Hampshire (1959) has said, if agency is an internal event, how can 
willing something be distinguished from thinking of something as 
desirable? For instance, what would be the difference between willing 
that a certain score occur after throwing the dice, and thinking of the 
occurrence of a certain score as desirable? But, if there is no difference 
between them, is it the case that whatever the disembodied agent thinks of 
as desirable will happen? If there is nothing external to account for the 
difference, why is it the case that willing something, instead of thinking of 
something as desirable, brings about changes in the world? 
If this is what agency in the disembodied state consists in, then it is very 
different from agency in the embodied state, for in the latter a clear 
distinction is made between thinking of something as desirable and doing 
it. Somebody may think that global peace is desirable and, nonetheless, 
do nothing to achieve it (perhaps due to laziness, or perhaps due to the 
genuine belief that the problem is beyond his sphere of influence). On the 
other hand, someone may do something about global peace, even though 
he does not consider it to be desirable (he may have been forced to act). 
A second difficulty for Penelhum's account is his claim that a disembodied 
person would be able to act on a material world. Now, how would it 
happen? Penelhum acknowledges that, analogously to the technical sense 
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of trying that he rejects, the psychokinetic sense does not offer an 
explanation of the connection involved between willing and bringing about 
changes in the world. The problem of interactionism, that is, the question 
about the possible connections between the material and the immaterial, is 
one that has worried philosophers for a long time. Nonetheless, not only 
does Penelhum fail to suggest a solution, but also chooses to ignore it by 
claiming that interactionism is possible, although no explanation can be 
given. In fact, as has been mentioned, interactionism is a problem not only 
for his account of disembodied agency, but also for his account of 
disembodied perception of the world. 
Finally, the alleged intelligibility of the idea of acting by an act of willing 
will be questioned. Penelhum's acting by willing is similar to those cases 
where magicians bring about a change in the world without touching the 
object. Thus, it might be argued, if people find the latter example 
intelligible (which does not amount to its possibility; see chapter 1), then 
they would also find Penelhum's example intelligible. 
The example of the magician is found intelligible because it resembles 
more common cases of agency: for instance, the case where somebody 
moves a table by pushing. The magician, using his skill, does not have to 
sweat in pushing the table; he may simply use his magic wand, or magic 
dust, or utter some magic words. Note that there is a gradation here, from 
the common case of pushing the table, to the use of the magic wand 
(which the magician touches the table with), to the act of sprinkling magic 
dust, and to the utterance of a magic formula (where there is no physical 
touching involved). The latter examples are understood because of their 
similarity with the usual case. Therefore, the usual case in which a table is 
moved by pushing is epistemologically primary with respect to the rest. 
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Penelhum's psychokinetic sense of acting by trying could be similarly 
regarded as epistemologically dependent on the common case of acting. 
The disembodied agent in Penelhum's example would be like the magician 
who makes things happen by uttering a magic formula; only he does not 
even have to pronounce the magic words, but simply mentally will the 
movement of the table. But, if that is the case, then in the same way in 
which the example of the magician is epistemologically dependent on the 
usual case of acting by physical contact, the disembodied agent's example 
of acting by willing is also dependent on the common case of embodied 
agency (ie, acting by physical contact). Now, if the former cannot be 
made intelligible without the latter, then disembodied agency can only be 
defended as a sophisticated variation of embodied agency, and the latter 
needs investigation, something that will be carried out later on. 
Another way in which the intelligibility of disembodied agency could be 
called into question is by arguing that, in the same way in which 
perception is de re, so is agency. Therefore, the charge is not only that 
Penelhum ignores the causal links between the agent and the world, but 
also that he fails to account for the constitutive (de re) links between them. 
The latter can be brought out as follows. The object of one's actions is a 
constitutive part of the intentional action itself. For example, my intention 
to move a table is directed to a particular table in the world. Thus, my 
intention is not identifiable independent of the particular table onto which 
it is directed. (Similarly, it has been argued that my perceptual 
experiences cannot be individuated irrespective of their object in the 
world. ) 
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The importance of de re intentional action can be stressed by reflecting on 
the difference between two sorts of cases. According to the first case, one 
intends to move a table; according to the second, one intends to move a 
table, but suddenly, when one is about to carry out one's intention, another 
table appears within one's reach, with the result that one moves it. In the 
first case, the table one moves is the table one intends to move. In the 
second case, the table one moves is not the table one intended to move, 
but a table that turns up out of nowhere. Without an account of intentional 
action in de re terms, such a distinction could not have been made. 
Furthermore, the second case would not count as a de re intentional 
action, for it is only as a result of luck that the agent moves that table. The 
latter case is dependent on the former. 
The basic role of de re intentional action can also be seen by considering 
the relations between the intention to move a table, and the intention to 
move any table: the latter is dependent on the former. The general 
principle is that abstract intentions are secondary with respect to concrete 
ones. 
Moreover, to argue against a de re conception of intentional action is to 
invite the accusations of mystery and magic considered in the perceptual 
case: how does a purely subjective intention in the inner realm succeed in 
bringing about a change in the world? The way to avoid the problem 
caused by the inner/outer gap is to make the objects of intentional action 
part of the intention itself. 
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2.3. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, the notion of a disembodied person, or more particularly, 
the notions of a disembodied perceiver and a disembodied agent, have 
been under intense scrutiny. The core of the argument is that no account 
can be given of where the content of the disembodied person's experiences 
comes from; in particular, does such a content come from the external, 
objective world? This, in turn, affects the disembodied person's action 
upon the world: can he act upon those objects perceived as existing in an 
external, independent world? Furthermore, to the extent that the 
disembodied person lacks links to the world, both at the levels of 
perception and agency, is he a person at all? That is, are these links to the 
world not necessary for a person to be a person? The answer to this 
question cannot be given just now, but the next chapters will address it, 
culminating in chapter 7, where a definition of embodiment is provided. 
Before doing so, the other main strand in this thesis, the dichotomy 
between the subjective and objective points of view, will be introduced. 
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Chapter 3 
THE SUBJECTIVE/OBJECTIVE DICHOTOMY 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Madell complains that "contemporary discussions of the problem of 
personal identity generally display little or no recognition of the divide 
which ... 
is at the heart of the problem" (1991: 127). That divide is the 
dichotomy between the subjective and objective approaches. The core of 
the objective approach is the 'person-as-a-natural-kind thesis: a person is a 
member belonging to a natural kind (namely, human beings), whose 
essence is the same as that of other members belonging to such a kind. 
Therefore, the solution to the problem of personal identity comes from the 
discovery of the essence of the natural kind person. 
According to the subjective approach, analysis of persons as merely 
objects, members of a certain kind, fails to capture a central element of 
personhood - the fact that persons are essentially perspectival, that they 
have a point of view. This essentially perspectival character of persons is 
not simply the idea that my experience is partial (that I cannot, for 
instance, see the world as a whole, or from all points of view, but I can 
only see that face of things available to me from the position I occupy), 
but the idea that I am a certain object, that there is a property which 
consists in being uniquely me (or being mine), manifested in the question 
"what is it for some element of th[e] objective order to be me? " (130). 
Those who defend a subjective approach, like Madell, argue that, since 
the objective approach fails to account for this irreducibly perspectival 
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fact, then "we must bid farewell to the idea that our understanding of 
persons is governed by a conception of human beings as merely a certain 
sort of object in the world, a natural kind" (131; my emphasis). Therefore, 
a proper theory of personal identity must account, on the one hand, for the 
fact that people are objects in the world (although not "merely" so), and on 
the other hand, for the irreducible subjective fact that I am one of those 
objects in the world, or rather that one of those objects is me. That is, a 
theory of personal identity must provide an account of the unification of 
the subjective and objective approaches, of the person as both subject and 
object. 
Although one may expect Madell to give such a unitary account, he goes 
on to say that "it does not appear even intelligible to suggest that the two 
sides of the subjective/objective dichotomy may be aspects of one and the 
same entity" (141; my emphasis). Despite Madell's claim, certain attempts 
to reconcile the subjective/objective dichotomy can be, and have been, 
made, notoriously that of Thomas Nagel, one of the champions of the 
subjective standpoint. (A review of different attempts to overcome the 
objective/subjective dichotomy can be found in Janaway, 1983-4. ) 
3.2. NAGEL' S PROJECT OF UNIFICATION 
3.2.1. Introduction 
In his book The View From Nowhere (see also 'Subjective and Objective'; 
Nagel, 1979b), Nagel takes up the discussion of the identity statement 'I 
am TN (Thomas Nagel)', a statement which bears a most important 
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philosophical truth for the topic of personal identity. It is his contention 
that 'I am TN is not only true, but also non-trivially informative and 
remarkable. It is non-trivial in that, unlike 'I am I' or TN is TN', it 
conveys some information which cannot be grasped at first sight, and 
whose understanding requires a certain amount of philosophical insight. It 
is remarkable in that it is the (somewhat inadequate) verbal formulation of 
a deep intuition, the fact that "I, who am thinking about the entire, 
centerless universe, [am something so specific as this: this measly 
gratuitous creature existing in a morsel of space-time, ... 
[some]thing so 
small, and concrete and specific" (61). 
The analysis of 'I am TN' is also an attempt to shed light on the 
controversy between first- and third-person, or subjective and objective, 
approaches to personal identity, and to unify both standpoints, without 
reducing the former to the latter. 
3.2.2. Things vs modes of presentation 
The statement 'I am TN' could be taken to mean either (a) that there are 
two different things which are in fact identical, or (b) that there is one 
single thing, comprehensible under two different modes of presentation. 
In the former case, 'I' and TN' refer to two different things; in the latter, 'I' 
and TN' refer to the same thing under two different aspects. How does 
Nagel understand 'I am TN': are 'I' and TN' things, or are they modes of 
presentation? 
View (a) has been defended by Malcolm (1988), who maintains that 
Nagel's text contains an underlying Cartesian assumption, the idea that 
53 
there is an I (Self, Subject) which happens to be identical with an ordinary 
person, TN. Thus, I and TN are two different entities which are in fact 
identical. The arguments Malcolm offers in support of this view are, on 
the one hand, the peculiar treatment of I and TN, and on the other hand, 
the accidental connection between I and TN. 
The following two quotations are, according to Malcolm, representative of 
Nagel's treatment of I and TN: 
"this thinking subject regards the world through the person TN" (60); 
"I have had to rely heavily on TN's experience, language, and 
education, and I do not constantly subject each of his pretheoretical 
beliefs to detached assessment" (62); 
"I am a subject that can have a conception of the centerless universe in 
which TN is an insignificant speck, who might easily never have existed 
at all" (61). 
The first sentence quoted suggests the idea that there is a Self hidden 
behind the person TN, looking at the world through the eyes of TN. This 
idea can be understood either in the literal sense that there is an inner Self 
who uses TN (a different entity) as his window to the world, or in the non- 
literal sense in which somebody may sometimes say that he looks at the 
world through his own eyes, meaning that he sees the world by using his 
eyes. Only if the former sense is the one intended by Nagel could he be 
accused of postulating an inner Cartesian Self. 
Furthermore, Cockburn has criticized the idea that Nagel falls into a 
Cartesian conception of the self, for Nagel affirms that 'I am TN (a 
person/human being)', which is inconsistent with the Cartesian approach: 
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that is, if I am TN, then I cannot be "something distinct from, which is 
located within, TN" (1994: 381). 
Nonetheless, the thesis that I and TN are two different entities appears to 
be vindicated in the other two sentences quoted above. According to the 
second one, there are two different entities, one of which relies heavily on 
the other for its conception of the world. The idea that there are two 
different entities is confirmed in the final sentence, where the gap between 
both entities is broadened by suggesting that one of them could have 
existed even if the other one had not. 
The latter seems to lead to the idea that the connection between I and TN 
is accidental. This could mean either that TN's existence is not necessary 
for I's (my) existence, or that I could have been somebody else other than 
TN, or both things. The argument might go along the following lines. 
Situations can be thought of in which TN "might never have existed at all" : 
for instance, if TN's mum and dad never met; or if they conceived a girl 
instead of a boy; or if they conceived a boy whose genetic make-up was 
radically different from TN's (whatever this may mean). From here, some 
people may be inclined to conclude that, instead of TN, there would be 
NT, and that I is (am) NT. Therefore, I and TN are accidentally 
connected. 
Before going any further, it must be stressed that Nagel's position in this 
topic is not crystal clear, and that as well as claiming that TN "might 
easily never have existed at all", he maintains that "the connection 
between me and TN is [not] accidental ... 
however, 
... something essential 
about me has nothing to do with my perspective and position in the world" 
(61-2). Let us leave the question of the connection between I and TN for 
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the time being. It will suffice to say that, even if Nagel does not defend 
such an accidental connection, the latter is compatible with his position. 
Arguments against the idea that Nagel supports view (a) are, first of all, 
the following assertions: 
"the objective self [I] is not a distinct entity. Each of us, in addition to 
being an ordinary person, is a particular objective self, the subject of a 
perspectiveless conception of reality" (63); 
"it [the objective self, I] shouldn't be given a metaphysical 
interpretation" (66). 
Moreover, and apart from what Nagel himself says, it could be argued that 
if two things are identical, then there are not two things, but only one. 
Take the classical case of Hesperus and Phosphorus, which were 
supposed to refer to two different heavenly bodies: one of them was 
visible in the evening ('Hesperus'), and the other one was visible in the 
morning ('Phosphorus'). Later, people realized that they were not two 
different objects, but the same one (as a matter of fact, the planet Venus). 
Therefore, when it is said that 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' what is meant is 
that what were thought to be two different objects are in fact one single 
object, under two different aspects. The same could be said of such 
identity statements as 'the person who lives at 10 Downing Street is the 
Prime Minister', 'the Prime Minister is John Major', and 'I am John Major': 
there is one person which is presented to us under two different aspects. 
This leads to the view (b), that in 'I am TN' there is one single object 
comprehensible under two different modes of presentation. 
interpretation of Nagel's text given by McGinn: 
This is the 
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" 'I' refers to me under the mode of presentation 'bearer of an objective 
conception', while TN' refers to me under the mode of presentation 
'creature with this specific point of view'" (1987: 267-8). 
Besides, it agrees not only with Nagel's negative statements quoted above, 
but also with other positive ones: 
" 'I' as referring to me qua subject of the impersonal conception of the 
world which contains TN" (64, my emphasis); 
"the objective self is the only significant aspect under which I can refer 
to myself subjectively that is supplied by the objective conception of 
the world alone" (65, my emphasis). 
3.2.3. Analysis of 'I am TN' 
After the conclusion reached in the previous section that 'I' and TN' do not 
refer to two different things, but to the same thing under two different 
modes of presentation, it remains to be seen what those modes of 
presentation are. However, the matter is not straightforward, for both 'I' 
and TN' can be understood in either of two ways. On the one hand, 'I' 
may be: 
(i) the subject of an impersonal and centreless conception of the 
world, what Nagel calls 'the objective self; or, 
(ii) the subject of a particular, centred experience (eg, 'I have a 
toothache'). 
On the other hand, TN' may be: 
(111 the ordinary person TN, as conceived by me and other fellow 
persons; or, 
(iv) the person TN as objectively conceived, that is, under the 
impersonal perspectiveless conception of the world. 
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According to this, 'I am TN' could be analyzed as one of the following four 
theses: 
(A) the subjective self (ii) is the ordinary person TN (iii); 
(B) the objective self (i) is the ordinary person TN (iii); 
(C) the subjective self (ii) is TN-under-impersonal-conception (iv); 
(D) the objective self (i) is TN-under-impersonal-conception (iv). 
First of all, the notions of the objective self and the impersonal conception 
of the world must be explained. Nagel claims that, as well as having a 
conception of the world from a subjective point of view, one can also 
achieve an objective conception of the world. A central aspect in 
achieving the latter is the realization that there are other points of view in 
the world, apart from one's own. Thus, one detaches oneself from one's 
personal point of view, accepting the possibility of an impersonal 
perspective. Along this line of progressive detachment from one's own 
perspective, one also accepts that there might be perspectives that escape 
our human understanding; that is, that there might be non-human points of 
view in the world (Madell may call this 'the overcoming of the person-as- 
a-natural-kind thesis'). The result of this process of reaching an objective 
conception of the world is a conception of the world from no particular 
point of view, but including all possible points of view: the impersonal 
perspectiveless conception of the world. One of the elements contained in 
this impersonal conception is oneself, the person one is; or, as Nagel puts 
it: 
"This centerless world contains everybody, and it contains not only 
their bodies but their minds. So it includes TN, an individual born at a 
certain time to certain parents, with a specific physical and mental 
history" (56). 
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This is what has been labelled 'TN-under-the-impersonal-conception'. It is 
different from 'the ordinary person TN' ((iii) above) in that the latter is an 
object in a personal, centred conception of the world, the centre being 
oneself. 
The objective self, on the other hand, is the subject of such an impersonal 
conception, able to look at the world from any perspective: 
"it is the perspectiveless subject that constructs a centerless conception 
of the world by casting all perspectives into the content of that world" 
(62). 
It is different from the subjective self in that "[the objective self] can step 
away from the unconsidered perspective of the particular person I thought 
I was" (63), whereas the subjective self s perspective onto the world 
cannot be separated from the particular person it is. The fact that the 
objective self can separate itself from the particular person through which 
one's perception of, and action upon, the world takes place is what gives 
rise to the alleged accidental connection between I and (say) TN 
(something to which the discussion will shortly return). The objective self, 
however, is not a common universal subject: "each of us, in addition to 
being an ordinary person, is a particular objective self' (63-4). 
Bearing this in mind, which one of the previous four theses catches the 
sense of Nagel's assertion 'I am TN'? Why does the latter offer a solution 
to the subjective/objective dichotomy? It must be remembered that 'I am 
TN' expresses here the sense of amazement at the fact that one of the 
objects in the world is me; that is, that in an impersonal conception of the 
world, there is an object that is me. It would seem, then, that neither (A) 
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nor (C) are the appropriate interpretation of 'I am TN' for, as has been 
previously quoted, 'I' refers to me "qua subject of the impersonal 
conception of the world which contains TN" (64), whereas in (A) and (C) 
'I' is the subjective self 
According to McGinn (see quotation above), (B) is the correct 
interpretation, 'I' being the 'bearer of an objective conception', and 'TN' the 
'creature with this specific point of view'. However, it is problematic 
whether 'TN' is the ordinary person TN for, as Nagel has insisted, 'I am 
TN' does not simply mean that the speaker's name is TN; that is, the 
philosophically laden use of the sentence 'I am TN' is different from the 
use of such a sentence in ordinary contexts. Nagel suggests that one may 
say, introducing oneself to somebody else, 'I am TN', but this is not the 
philosophically interesting identity statement under discussion. 
Therefore, (D) is Nagel's interpretation of 'I am TN': first, it expresses the 
idea that there is an objective, perspectiveless, conception of the world, of 
which 'I' is the subject; second, the idea that one of the objects of such an 
impersonal conception is me (that is, TN). Furthermore, 'I am TN' unifies 
the subjective and objective standpoints, because I/objective self is the 
subject of an objective conception of the world which contains the object 
TN. In other words, I am a subject (the subject of an objective 
conception), and can refer to myself in the first person; and I am also an 
object, publicly identifiable in the third person (an object in the impersonal 
conception of the world). 
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3.2.4. Criticisms 
1. The accidental relation between I and TN. It has already been 
mentioned that Nagel does not make it absolutely clear whether the 
relation between I and TN is accidental or not. However, other defenders 
of the subjective approach, like Madell, are more assertive: "there is no 
way of entertaining the possibility that 'I' and its objective setting are 
anything but contingently connected" (1991: 141). This possibility goes 
hand in hand with the idea that I could have been someone else: if I and 
TN are only contingently related, then it is possible that I might have been 
NT, instead. 
Cockburn has argued that this possibility is not simply the result of a vivid 
imagination (something that has already been rejected as the criterion of 
possibility; see 1.3.2. ): we can make sense of the idea that I could have 
been someone else, if a context can be thought of in which the words 'I 
could have been NT' can get a hold. For instance, if my/TN's mum and 
dad had conceived a baby whose genetic make-up was radically different 
from mine/TN's, then I might feel envy if I consider my/TN's present 
make-up to be highly defective. In such a context, the possibility that I 
could have been NT is not just "an idle sequence of mental imagery" 
(1994: 383), but a situation where such attitudes as envy are applicable. 
(Similarly, I might express my envy after losing a Mercedes at a raffle, by 
saying 'I could have owned that Mercedes'. ) Here is a situation where the 
sentence 'I could have been NT' has a use. Therefore, the idea that I could 
have been somebody else makes sense. 
There is, however, a reason why such a possibility is not immediately 
obvious, the fact that I could not have had a different origin (including 
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genetic make-up) from the one I actually have (for instance, NT's origin); 
for if per imposibile I had had a different origin, then I would not be TN, 
but NT, and therefore, it would not be the case that I could have been 
someone else. 
It is these two different, apparently contradictory, sets of claims (one, the 
idea that I could have been someone else makes sense; two, the idea that if 
I was someone else, then I would not be me) that has led some 
philosophers (see Mackie, 1980) to distinguish two senses of T. On the 
one hand, the transcendental 'I', which stands for 'the subject, whatever it 
may be, of this series of co-conscious experiences and thoughts' (or 'the 
subject, whatever it may be, of these experiences'). On the other hand, the 
empirical 'I', which stands for the human being/person in question (eg, 
TN). 
Although there is, in principle, the possibility that 'I' may refer to two 
different things in the transcendental and empirical uses, as a matter of fact 
both uses refer to the same thing, the person/human being TN. Whereas in 
the empirical use the reference is direct, in the transcendental use the 
reference is indirect: 'the subject, whatever it may be, of these experiences' 
is factually the person/human being TN. There are, therefore, two 
different rules that give the meaning of 'I' (depending on the transcendental 
or empirical uses), rules that converge in ordinary circumstances: 'I' is, in 
fact, the person/human being TN. 
According to this, when I say 'I could have been someone else (other than 
TN)', 'I' should be understood in the transcendental use: 'the subject, 
whatever it may be, of these experiences' is not the person/human being 
TN, but someone else; that is, unlike in ordinary circumstances, the 
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transcendental 'I' is not the empirical 'I'. On the other hand, when I say 'I 
could not have been someone else' ('I could not have had a different 
origin'), the 'I' is the empirical 'I', that is, the person/human being TN. 
Therefore, the alleged contradiction between those two claims vanishes on 
closer inspection, for a distinction has to be made between the two 
different uses of 'P. 
This, however, is too sketchy an account of the transcendental use of T. 
First of all, it must be made clear that 'I' is an indexical pronoun, which 
refers to the particular person/human being uttering it on each occasion. 
This is the primary referential use of T. So far, Mackie need not contend 
this, for he in fact affirms that there is an empirical use of T. The 
difficulties arise when this so-called empirical use is not treated as 
primary; in particular, when the transcendental use of 'I' is characterized 
with total independence from the empirical use. 
Thus, what happens when I entertain the possibility that I could have been 
somebody else? First, I must rely heavily on a vivid imagination, pace 
Cockburn: 
"I do not construct an apparently objective course of events and then 
have to identify myself with some item already in it: rather I tell a story 
about myself as centre [... ] in constructing a subjective, egocentric, 
story I can think of 'I' simply as the subject, whatever it may be, of 
these present experiences and do not include any features of any 
individual essense which may prevent me from coherently imagining 
... 
" (Mackie, 1980: 55-6). 
Second, and with the aid of the imagination, I am able to make certain 
assumptions that will help me entertain the possibility that I could have 
been somebody else. What particular assumptions I make will depend on 
whom that 'somebody else' is. For instance, if as Williams (1973a) 
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suggests, I could have been Napoleon, then I must assume that Napoleon 
is not dead, as well as that I was not born in the twentieth century. In 
general, assumptions about my actual origin and the 'somebody else's' 
origin are important. But I must also ignore certain details of my own life, 
like the fact that I never wear hats, or that I cannot ride horses. Were I not 
to ignore these facts, how could I entertain the possibility of being in the 
battlefield, commanding my army, on the verge of defeat at Austerlitz, for 
example? 
Together with the use of the imagination, I must also lose some sense of 
reality, so that I can use 'I' without making it refer to the person/human 
being I in fact am. Thus, when I say 'I could have been somebody else', 'I' 
refers to 'the subject, whatever it may be, of these experiences', but in such 
a way that 'I' is not linked to any empirical person. Therefore, the 
transcendental use of 'I' is in fact a figurative use, rather similar to what 
children mean when they say, while playing, 'I am a pirate'. What children 
mean is that they can abstract certain features they have, so that they can 
consider themselves to be pirates: for instance, instead of a normal hand, 
they a have a hook, and so on. The transcendental use of 'I' shares this 
strategy of abstraction, although taken to the extreme, so that 'I' does not 
possess any of the features that may hinder this exercise of the 
imagination. The result is that the transcendental 'I' is a postulated, 
figurative 'I', without referring to any empirical person/human being. If 
this is the case, then the alleged accidental connection between I and TN 
does not follow, or perhaps follows in a figurative sense. 
2. The special character of 'I am TN'. As has been previously pointed 
out, Nagel dismisses those contexts in which, for example, one introduces 
oneself to someone else by saying 'I am TN' as philosophically irrelevant. 
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He maintains that he wants to "explain why 'I am TN' seems to say more 
about the world than that the person speaking is called TN" (60). Well, 
one such context may be the situation in which there is an impostor 
claiming to be me, and I complain 'I am TN', meaning not just that my 
name is TN, but that there is a case of deceitful impersonation. Could 
Nagel be thinking of this sort of example? The answer is no: when 
analyzing the metaphysically interesting identity statement 'I am TN', he is 
trying to capture the amazing (to him) fact that one of the objects in the 
impersonal conception of the world is me. Could it be that Nagel's sense 
of amazement is derived from the fact that I and TN are accidentally 
connected: since it is not necessary that I be TN, how extraordinary it is 
that I am TN! However, if such a connection is not accidental (as it has 
been shown above), then the sense of amazement disappears. If so, then, 
the identity statement 'I am TN' is not special in the sense in which Nagel 
claims it to be, that is, as conveying the belief that I (the objective self) am 
one of the objects in the impersonal conception of the world. 
3. The notion of the objective self. If the Nagelian project of unification of 
the subjective and objective standpoints is to succeed, he must give an 
account of the objective self as (identical with) an object in the world (or 
rather, expressed in Nagel's own terms, as an object in the impersonal 
conception of the world). As has been seen, the objective self is the result 
of a process of progressive abstraction, starting from one's own 
perspective on the world, but accepting the possibility that it (the objective 
self) can adopt other perspectives. 
A problem for Nagel, though, is the apparent lack of reality of the 
objective self; in other words, does the objective self belong to the world? 
Nagel's remarks concerning this topic are ambiguous. On the one hand, he 
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maintains that "each of us, in addition to being an ordinary person, is a 
particular objective self, the subject of a perspectiveless conception of 
reality" (63-4). He also explicitly affirms that "I stop short of excluding 
[the objective self] from the world entirely. ... 
The objective self is the 
last stage of the detaching subject before it shrinks to an extensionless 
point" (62; my emphasis). Like Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, Nagel 
claims that the self is the limit of the world; unlike him, he does not 
exclude it from the world "entirely". On the other hand, consider the 
following quotation: 
"Th[e objective] conception [of the world] does not itself imply 
anything about who its subject is, or even that he exists at all inside the 
world being described. So far as the content of the objective view 
goes, it might be of a world in which I, its subject, never have existed 
and never will. But since the objective conception has a subject, the 
possibility of its presence in the world is there" (64). 
On the one hand, it appears that the objective self is nothing more than a 
postulate, that which through a process of abstraction forms an impersonal 
and perspectiveless conception of the world. Furthermore, it cannot be an 
element of the world under the impersonal conception because, if it were, 
it would not be the subject of such a conception. (The impersonal 
conception of the world includes TN and TN's perspective on the world, 
as well as other persons and their perspectives. Thus, if the objective self 
were an element of the world under the impersonal conception, it would 
be TN, but not the subject of such a conception. ) On the other hand, if it 
is not an element in the world (an object), then the project of unification of 
the objective and subjective standpoints collapses. Hence, the peculiar 
status of the objective self: neither in the world nor "entirely" outside it. 
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Is there a way out? It may appear that there is not for Nagel's own 
project. However, it will be argued next that a different account of the 
unification of the subjective and objective standpoints is possible, which 
does not face the difficulties encountered by the one just reviewed. 
3.3. PROPOSAL FOR A NEW PROJECT OF UNIFICATION 
Nagel has forcefully stated the case against reductive conceptions of 
reality (particularly, against the reduction of mental events/states to 
physical ones). The central idea is that the subjective character of 
experience will be left out of a purely objective conception of reality, 
something he has vividly expressed as the idea that "we will not know 
exactly how scrambled eggs taste to a cockroach even if we developed a 
detailed objective phenomenology of the cockroach sense of taste" (25), 
or in his famous remark that we do not know what it is like for a bat to be 
a bat (see 1979a). The point being made is that there are specific 
(regarding the species) differences which cannot be captured in purely 
objective terms, and that a subjective use of the imagination is required. 
This idea has also been explained by claiming that our experience of the 
world is perspectival, that is, that the world is experienced from a 
particular point of view. Thus, the point of view of a bat is different from 
our point of view, and we cannot comprehend the former in objective 
terms. The notion of perspectivity, though, is richer than that, for it also 
refers to the idea that there is an irreducible subjective fact which consists 
in being uniquely me (or mine): my personal experience of the world (not 
just the specific one) cannot be understood from an objective standpoint, 
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either. Therefore, a successful unification of the subjective/objective 
dichotomy must start by acknowledging the perspectival character of our 
relation to the world. 
At the level of experience, perspectivity is not just the partiality of 
experience (the fact that I cannot perceive the world from all points of 
view at once), but also what could be called 'the subjectivity of 
experience': the fact that my experience of the world (including myself) is 
not accessible from an objective viewpoint. 
At the level of thought, perspectivity can be manifested by calling 
attention to the gap between descriptive/objective thought and indexical 
thought, between 'the so-and-so is F and 'I am F. As Perry (1979) has 
explained, the entertaining of the former ('the so-and-so is F) will give rise 
to a different course of action than the latter ('I am F'): for instance, if I 
read in the paper that the one millionth user of the Brynmor Jones Library 
has won a prize, but am not aware of the fact that I am the one millionth 
user of the Brynmor Jones Library, then I will not claim the prize. This 
suggests the irreducibility of indexical thought to descriptive thought, as 
well as the necessity of the former. 
It is a further claim whether 'the so-and-so' and 'I' are two distinct modes 
of presentation of the same entity, the former being the objective, and the 
latter the subjective, one. Madell has argued that this way of looking at 
the question fails to understand what is at stake in the subjective/objective 
dichotomy: "no response which simply amounts to positing [a first-person 
mode of presentation] something which is common to everyone can meet 
it" (134). Madell's concern seems to be that if the first-person mode of 
presentation is common to everyone, then that which is being uniquely me 
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is lost. However, 'common' could be understood in two different ways. 
On the one hand, it could mean that everyone who engages in indexical 
thought use 'I', the first-person mode of presentation, in the same way; that 
there is one mode of presentation, the same for every use of T. On the 
other hand, it could mean that each person who engages in indexical 
thought uses 'I' in a different way, as Husserl has maintained: "each man 
has his own 'I'-presentation (and with it his individual notion of I) and this 
is why the word's meaning differs from person to person" (quoted in 
McGinn, 1983: 61). 
Madell's worry would be acceptable in case 'common' was understood in 
the former sense, but not if it is understood in the latter sense. In fact, it is 
the latter that is the proper way of understanding it. If the 'I'-presentation 
was the same for everyone, then there would not be an epistemological 
barrier between the way in which I know myself, and the way in which I 
know someone else, but such a barrier is there. Therefore, Madell's worry 
can be dismissed: the difference between objective and indexical thought 
can be grasped in terms of modes of presentation, without reducing the 
subjective to the objective. 
Turning now to Nagel's own project of unification, it will be remembered 
that his understanding of the 'I' and 'TN' modes of presentation gives rise 
to several problems: the former occupies a peculiar position (neither in the 
world nor outside it); and the latter is an object in the world, but in the 
world under the impersonal conception. It will now be suggested that 
such a unifying project is misguided, because a high price has to be paid: 
how can it succeed in unifying the subjective and objective sides of the 
person if the latter is hardly recognizable, either under 'the objective self 
or under 'TN-under-the-impersonal-conception' presentations? In other 
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words, is the person, the subject-matter of the topic of personal identity, 
subjectively identified as 'the objective self, or objectively and publicly 
identified as 'TN-under-the-impersonal-conception'? Instead, the 
unification of the person is the unification of the subjective self (see (ii) in 
3.2.3. ), the subject who ascribes both mental experiences and bodily 
characteristics to himself, and the ordinary person as conceived by me and 
other fellow persons (see (iii) in 3.2.3. ). The latter involves the 
recognition that a person is an object in the world (and a member of a 
kind), but not in the same way in which a stone, for instance, is an object. 
Therefore, this element will have to be taken into account in a successful 
unifying project. 
Finally, the identity statement 'I am TN' captures the idea that there is 
something, a person, comprehensible under two modes of presentation: the 
subjective, first-person 'I', and the objective 'TN'. This is true and 
informative, but not remarkable in the way claimed by Nagel (because, 
among other things, the relation between I and TN is not accidental). In 
fact, 'I am TN' has to be analyzed as the first of the four theses mentioned 
above: the subjective self (ii) is the ordinary person TN (iii). 
This new proposal of unification can be exemplified, on the one hand, in 
perception, and on the other hand, in action. In perception, the person not 
only perceives the world, but also himself in the world (his own location, 
some of his bodily features), as a subject of experience. In action, the 
person is able to act upon the world and himself as part of the world, from 
his condition of subject of action, of agent. That is, there is a 
reconciliation of the objective and subjective sides of the person. 
In short, the ingredients of this new proposal of unification are: 
70 
1. the person as essentially material, 
2. the treatment of the person as member of a kind, 
3. the perspectivity and subjectivity of experience, 
4. the irreducibility and non-eliminability of the subjective side of 
the person, 
5. a view of the person as perceiver and agent, and 
6. the interdependence between perception and agency. 
In the remainder of this thesis, attention will be paid to the foregoing list. 
In particular, the objective and subjective sides of the person will be dealt 
with, in order to subsequently propose the promised reconciliation. Thus, 
in chapter 4, the objective approach (including the 'person-as-a-natural- 
kind' thesis) will be analyzed in detail. It will also help to link the two 
main strands in this work, the subjective/objective dichotomy and the 
necessity of embodiment. Next, chapters 5 and 6 will focus on the 
subjective side of the dichotomy, suggesting the proper way of 
understanding the status of the person as subject. 
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Chapter 4 
EMBODIMENT AND THE BRAIN 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Is possession of a body necessary to be a person? Or rather, could there 
be a person who lacked bodily characteristics? Cartesian dualists would 
answer that the existence of a body attached to the mind is not necessary; 
that a person is constituted by his mind; and that the body is only a 
contingent feature, something the person could do without. At the other 
extreme, materialists would argue that a person is essentially a material 
entity; that postulating disembodied persons is simply the result of a 
fanciful imagination. 
In the recent materialist tradition, possession of a body has sometimes 
been identified with possession of a brain. The brain is an important part 
of a person's body, the neurophysiological centre, from which control over 
the correct functioning of many cognitive and practical abilities is exerted. 
It is considerations like these that have prompted the view that the brain is 
the crucial part of the body as far as personal identity and survival are 
concerned. Further support can be found in the widely acknowledged fact 
that brain death is the criterion for human death. In this view, a person is 
his brain, while the rest of his body is only an accompaniment. 
This chapter will carefully examine and criticize such a position. The 
criticism of the view that possession of a brain is necessary and sufficient 
to be a person will offer the opportunity to introduce some ideas about 
what possession of a body in the context of personal identity should 
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amount to. Moreover, this chapter will offer the continuation of the 
argument about whether there can be disembodied persons (see chapter 2). 
4.2. NAGEL ON PERSONAL IDENTITY 
Thomas Nagel (1986) analyzes the concept of self in an analogous way to 
such natural-kind concepts as gold. It is commonly held in philosophy of 
language that our intuitive concept of gold does not determine the 
extension of what is called 'gold'. There are things that are like gold in 
their external appearance, although they do not share the internal essence 
of gold. What gold is is a matter of scientific discovery. Scientists 
discover whether something is gold or not by looking at the internal 
structure of the thing in question. In general, the extension of natural-kind 
terms is determined by science, and not by the intuitive concepts people 
possess. Analogously, it is argued, the intuitive concept of self does not 
determine whether something is a self or not. What people are is, in part, 
a matter of scientific discovery, and, in part, a question of philosophical 
reflexion. In what ways do these two parts relate to one another? 
Philosophically speaking, the idea of myself is the idea of something 
which can be subjectively identified, and which can also be 
observationally objectively identified as a persisting object in the world. 
Or, as Nagel puts it: "I am whatever persisting individual in the objective 
order underlies the subjective continuities of that mental life that I call 
mine" (40). 
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At this point, the philosophical analysis ceases, leaving a blank that has to 
be filled by science. The task for science is to discover what meets those 
conditions, as specified by philosophy. Nagel's empirical hypothesis is 
that the self is the brain. That is, the brain is what underlies the 
continuous mental life I call mine. The functioning brain is the core of the 
self. The rest of the body is integrally attached to it, and it is also part of 
the self. However, since I could survive the destruction of my body, 
whereas I cannot survive the destruction of my brain, only the latter is 
essential to the self. 
4.3. PERSONS AND NATURAL KINDS 
A problem that is usually posed in connection with questions of personal 
identity is whether what a person consists in is a matter of scientific 
discovery or not. Nagel and others (like Mackie, 1976) think it is. Nagel 
supports his claim with Kripke-like considerations about natural-kind 
terms. Kripke (1980) maintains that what counts as gold is determined by 
scientific hypothesis. If people want to know whether something is gold 
or not, they rely on a chemist's judgement; they do not ask a child, since 
children usually call gold whatever stuff is shining yellow, without any 
other qualifications. The chemist, on the other hand, looks at the internal 
constitution of the substance, at its chemical structure, in order to 
determine whether it is gold. The last stage of the argument is simply to 
partially apply such an analysis to the concept of a person, concluding that 
what counts as a person is a matter of empirical, scientific hypothesis. 
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4.3.1. Does science give essential features? 
One question that has to be asked is whether or not science gives essential 
properties of things. If it does not, then Nagel's argument collapses, since 
the latter is based on the idea that there are certain internal properties of 
things that determine what such a thing is. So, the question about whether 
there are essential features of things has to be considered. 
Locke (1959) distinguishes between two senses of essence: real and 
nominal. The real essence of a substance is its internal constitution, the 
particular way in which its internal atoms are organized; the nominal 
essence is the complex abstract idea which we associate with the name in 
question. Taking gold as an example, its real essence is the internal 
chemical structure of particular instances of gold; on the other hand, its 
nominal essence is the complex idea, the set of defining characteristics, 
associated with the name 'gold' (that is, yellow, shiny, malleable, fusible, 
soluble in aqua regia, and so on). 
In classifying something as gold, Locke goes on, it is the nominal essence 
that is taken into account; that is, it is checking whether or not the 
particular object is yellow, shines, is malleable and so on. The nominal 
essence of gold is, then, the set of necessary and sufficient characteristics 
that define what gold is. The real essence, on the other hand, is unknown: 
"We in vain pretend to range things into sorts, and dispose them into 
certain classes under names, by their real essences, that are so far from our 
discovery or comprehension" (III, VI, 9). How do we classify things, 
then? By their nominal essence: "the ranking of things into species is done 
by us according to the ideas that we have of them" (III, VI, 13). 
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What does the name 'gold' (in general, natural-kind terms) stand for? 
Locke seems to think that the name 'gold' stands for the complex idea in 
the speaker's mind; things are classified and named according to their 
nominal essence. However, this would make communication difficult (if 
not impossible), since different people associate different descriptions with 
the name 'gold': for some, gold is the yellow, shining substance from 
which expensive jewellery is made; for others, it is the shining yellow, 
malleable, soluble substance used in chemical laboratories; and still, other 
people could attach to it a different set of characteristics. How could this 
problem be avoided? Locke says that: 
"They [men] have supposed a real essence belonging to every species, 
from which these properties all flow, and would have their name of the 
species stand for that. " (III, VI, 49) 
"In the general names of substances, whereof the nominal essences are 
only known to us, when we put them into propositions, and affirm or 
deny anything about them, we do most commonly tacitly suppose or 
intend, they should stand for the real essence of a certain sort of 
substances. [... ] and therefore the mind, to remove that imperfection 
as much as it can, makes them, by a secret supposition, to stand for a 
thing having that real essence" (III, VI, 17-8). 
Locke realizes that people intend to refer to real essences when using 
names like 'gold'. 'Gold' refers to the stuff whose internal constitution is 
such-and-such, not to the nominal essence that may vary from speaker to 
speaker. Nonetheless, Locke considers this procedure to be an abuse of 
words, a "preposterous and absurd" way of communication, since "our 
names stand for ideas we have not, or (which is all one) essences that we 
know not, it being in effect to make our words the signs of nothing" (III, 
X, 21). That is, Locke acknowledges the existence of such a practice, but 
does not welcome it. 
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In summary, Locke's conclusion is that the real essence of a substance like 
gold is unknown to us I. The only essential features available to us are the 
ones included in the nominal essence; the essence of gold is, then, the set 
of properties that define and classify a particular instance as gold. 
Putnam (197 5) has challenged this Lockean conclusion, by criticizing two 
assumptions present in many theories of meaning: 
i. that to know the meaning of a term consists in being in a 
certain psychological state; and, 
ii. that the meaning of a term (intension) determines its 
extension. 
Putnam criticizes the assumption that the meaning of a term like 'gold' is 
an idea present in people's minds, which in turn determines the extension 
of the name 'gold'. He gives the Twin-Earth example, exactly like our 
Earth, except that the chemical structure of water is not H2O, but XYZ. 
People who live on Earth, and those who live on Twin-Earth, are both in 
the same psychological state when they want a glass of water, for 
instance, but while the person on Earth refers to the stuff whose internal 
constitution is H2O, the Twin-Earthian refers to the stuff whose internal 
structure is XYZ. It is possible, then, to be in the same psychological 
state (thirst for water), but differ in the extension of the term (H2O, XYZ). 
Therefore, the meaning of a term, understood as being in a psychological 
state, does not determine the extension of that term. 
Another thesis defended by Putnam is what he calls 'the division of 
linguistic labour', according to which different people play different roles 
in a linguistic community. Some people know how to distinguish a 
genuine piece of gold from a fake one; the rest simply borrow the term 
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from those experts, and use it like they would (ie, intending to mean by 
'gold' what the experts would) in their daily life. Discussion over a 
particular instance is settled by the experts, who appeal to the internal 
micro-structure of the object to determine whether or not it is gold. 
That is, there are ways of finding out the real essence of gold and water (in 
general, natural kinds). Real essences can be known. Furthermore, it is a 
necessary truth that the real essence of a substance is what it is, and not 
something else: it is a necessary truth, for instance, that water is H2O, and 
could not be XYZ. The name 'water', then, stands for the real essence of 
water, not for its nominal essence. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that there are discoverable properties of 
gold and of other natural kinds, which can be taken to be crucial in 
determining whether or not an ambiguous instance is to be classified as, 
say, gold. In this sense, it can be said that there are essential properties of 
things. It must be noted, though, that 'essential properties' is not used here 
in a strict sense, and that sometimes differences in nature may be more a 
matter of family resemblance than one of common, necessary and 
sufficient properties. Differences between families in the animal kingdom 
may, for instance, be a matter of overlapping characteristics, rather like a 
gradation of grey colours, instead of black or white. 
4.3.2. Is 'person' a natural-kind term? 
Nagel's argument would also fail if 'person' was not a natural-kind term, 
since, in that case, the alleged analogy between gold and person would not 
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work. Before this possibility is examined, let us first consider whether 
there are natural kinds. 
Locke asks himself this question, but his answer is ambiguous: 
"it is evident they [the nominal essence of things] are made by the 
mind, and not by nature"; 
"if several men were to be asked concerning some oddly-shaped foetus, 
as soon as born, whether it were a man or not, it is past doubt one 
should meet with different answers. Which could not happen if the 
nominal essences, whereby we limit and distinguish the species of 
substances, were not made by man with some liberty; but were exactly 
copied from precise boundaries set by nature"; 
"though the mind of man, in making its complex ideas of substances, 
never puts any together that do not really, or are not supposed to, co- 
exist; and so it truly borrows that union from nature"; 
"nature makes many particular things, which do agree one with 
another in many sensible qualities, and probably too in their internal 
frame and constitution: but it is not this real essence that distinguishes 
them into species; it is men who ... range them 
into sorts" (III, VI, 36). 
Although, on the one hand, he affirms that men classify things into sorts, 
according to their interests, on the other hand, he maintains that there is a 
certain order in nature, which men copy. Nature makes things similar in 
their internal constitution, in their real essence; there is a natural order. 
However, classification into species does not come from nature, but is 
made by men, according to the nominal essence of things. 
But if only the nominal essence is taken into account, and different people 
have different nominal essences, two problems arise. First, how is 
arbitrariness in the classification to be avoided? Is the classification 
grounded on sound and stable characteristics, which do not vary from 
speaker to speaker? Second, how is communication possible? Is it 
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guaranteed that people refer to the same objects (especially when those 
objects are absent)? 
Locke is divided: he wants to affirm that names stand for the nominal 
essence of things (and that real essences are unknown), but he sees the 
difficulties posed by such a thesis: arbitrariness and lack of 
communication. This may be the reason why his assertions are 
ambiguous. 
However, if as has been pointed out above, the unknowability of real 
essences is denied, then names can stand for real essences without being 
made meaningless; real essences, that is, that belong to the natural order. 
Thus, real essences and natural kinds can be affirmed without absurdity. 
Moreover, the kind of considerations discussed by Putnam provide further 
support in favour of the thesis that there are natural kinds (like gold or 
water), whose internal constitution can be discovered by science. The 
existence of natural kinds is more clearly manifested by contrast with non- 
natural kinds, like chair or table (in general, artefact-names). The latter 
are not found in nature, but made by man, with human purposes and 
designs; their essence is not obtained by scientific investigation, but 
determined by the human designer in the function assigned to them. 
Therefore, to the question posed a few paragraphs ago, the answer is that 
there are natural kinds. 
Bearing this in mind, the next step is to consider whether 'person' is a 
natural-kind term. In order to do so, it will be useful to analyze the 
similarities and differences between a couple of terms: 'person' and 'human 
being'. At the same time, the notion of person defended in this paper will 
acquire more definite contours. 
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The notion of a human being collects the features included in the species 
homo sapiens. It is a concept coming from biology, and, like many other 
biological notions (such as lion and tiger), it stands for the members of a 
certain natural species, which can be characterized and distinguished from 
members of other species in the animal kingdom. In this sense, it is a 
natural-kind term, and science can discover what is essential to the species 
homo sapiens as opposed to other species. This notion of a human being 
resembles Locke's notion of a man, different from that of a person. 
According to Locke, man is an animal, and the identity of man is the 
identity of an animal: 
"This also shows wherein the identity of the same man consists; viz. in 
nothing but a participation of the same continued life, by constantly 
fleeting particles of matter, in succession vitally united to the same 
organized body. " (II, XXVII, 7) 
The identity of man consists in the continuation of the same life in the 
same living body. Even though some particles are replaced, the 
replacement is slow and progressive, so that talk of the same life is still 
possible, as shown in the sameness of the body. On the other hand, 
"person stands for ... a very 
intelligent being, that has reason and 
reflection... " (II, XXVII, 11), whose identity consists in sameness of 
consciousness. In this sense, if the consciousness of a prince's past life 
(including memories and other psychological traits) abandoned him and 
entered the body of a cobbler, he would still be the same person as the 
prince, although in the cobbler's body; however, he would not be the same 
man as the prince, because there is no continuity of the same body. 
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It must be made clear that the distinction between human being and person 
proposed here does not copy Locke's distinction. For Locke, possession 
of a body is necessary for being a man, although it is not necessary for 
personal identity (sameness of consciousness being the necessary and 
sufficient condition). Here, though, it is argued that possession of a body 
is necessary both for being a man and for being a person. Therefore, 
Locke's account of persons is at odds with the one defended in this thesis. 
But let us focus on the distinction between human being and person. After 
arguing that human being is a natural kind, let us consider why it differs 
from the non-natural kind person. Locke claims that a person "is a 
forensic term, appropriating actions and their merit; and so belongs only to 
intelligent agents, capable of a law, and happiness, and misery" (II, 
XXVII, 26). The relationship between the notions of person and agent is 
exemplified by Locke in the following way: if a sleep-walking man kills 
somebody, he cannot be held responsible for the murder committed whilst 
asleep, since he is not conscious of what he was doing in his sleep, and, in 
consequence, is not the same person, and cannot claim the murder to be 
his. 
Ignoring Locke's own views on the notion of a person manifested in this 
example (such as the fact that personal identity is the same as sameness of 
consciousness), there are some insights worth taking into account. There 
is, on the one hand, the idea that a person is an agent; and, on the other 
hand, the view of an agent as somebody who is held responsible for his 
actions. (The notion of agency will reappear later on in this work, and its 
importance and relevance to the subject of personal identity will be made 
clear then. ) 
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Locke's insight can be applied to two special uses of the notion of a 
person: in legal cases, the class of persons does not only include individual 
human beings, but also institutions and corporations; in alleged cases of 
multiple personality, it is said that several persons inhabit the same human 
being. The concept of a person that emerges from these special cases 
cannot be straightforwardly identified with that of a human being: a person 
is a subject of action and responsibility, liable to punishment or reward, 
subject to other people's admiration or praise (ie, moral attitudes). A 
person is an agent, subject to moral evaluation. According to this, 
institutions are persons because they are liable and responsible for what 
they do. Similarly, in cases of multiple personality, the actions of different 
personalities are evaluated, praised or punished, separately; moreover, 
different personalities will claim to have nothing to do with the other 
personalities, being independent agents with respect to them. 
2 In 
summary, a person is an agent, responsible for his actions. In this sense, it 
is different from a human being, towards whom moral attitudes cannot be 
adopted (unless the notions of human being and person are mistakenly 
identified). 
Bringing the argument to an end, 'person' is not a natural-kind term, unlike 
'human being' or 'gold'. Thus, the similarity between the concepts of gold 
and person drawn by Nagel does not hold. Therefore, the essence of a 
person, what personal identity consists in, is not a matter of scientific 
discovery, unlike the case of gold or other natural kinds. 
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4.3.3. Objection: person as a natural kind 
An objection to the view that person is not a natural kind could be 
constructed along the following lines. Certainly, classification into homo 
sapiens, dolphins and so on is made in accordance with similarities found 
in nature. However, this is not the only possible natural classification. It 
could be the case that different natural species have certain features in 
common, which can be put together making up a new class. In fact, this is 
so in the case of a person: it is a natural kind, but one that cuts across the 
classification into homo sapiens, dolphins, and so on. Person and homo 
sapiens are natural kinds, although in different senses. 
Such a view (or, at least, a similar one) has been put forward by Wiggins 
(1976,1980) and others (Kitcher, 1979). In fact, Wiggins suggests that 
the concept of a person is "akin to a natural kind concept" (1980: 172), and 
offers an analogy. The concept of a vegetable refers to different sorts of 
plants which are both savoury and edible by human beings. It is not a 
natural kind concept, although it includes members of many different 
natural kinds (Cruciferae family, Leguminosae family, etc). Analogously, 
person is not a natural kind, but includes members of many different 
natural kinds. Regarding the concept of person, Wiggins adds, there is a 
natural component (that is, people must be animals); but there is also a 
functional, or systemic, component, so that persons "perceive, feel, 
remember, imagine, desire, make projects ..., conceive of themselves as 
perceiving, feeling, remembering ..., 
have, and conceive of themselves as 
having, a past accessible in experience-memory and a future accessible in 
intention ... 
" (171). 
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This account is naturalistic, in the sense that persons have an animal 
component and are found in nature. However, 'person' is not a natural- 
kind term, because the classification into persons cuts across natural 
kinds, and in doing so, a non-natural component is introduced. The 
analogy with vegetables will show this point. Classification into 
vegetables is made by human beings, according to their nutritional and 
culinary interests: they are the plants that human beings eat. Nature 
simply classifies plants into families (Cruciferae, Leguminosae, and so 
on), not into 'plants edible by humans beings' and 'plants not edible by 
humans'. Analogously, nature classifies animals into different species 
(homo sapiens, dolphins, and so on); afterwards, considering human 
interests, people make cutting-across classifications into 'persons' and 
'non-persons'. 
It follows, then, that the question of personal identity is not an empirical 
one: although there is a natural component, the non-natural component 
suggests that what is essential to a person cannot be discovered by 
empirical means. There are not two different senses of natural kind, one 
for person and a different one for human being. The alleged former sense 
(the one for person) is not, in fact, a natural kind, since the classification 
into persons and non-persons is made according to non-natural 
characteristics. Thus, the rejection of Nagel's analogy between person and 
gold is still valid. 
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4.3.4. Conclusions 
1. Person is not a natural kind, unlike gold This can be shown by 
considering the case of a very perfect mechanical replica of a human 
being, and asking whether it could be taken to be a person. There is a 
crucial dissimilarity between natural kinds (like gold) and mechanical 
robots. In the case of gold, complete knowledge of its internal 
constitution is sufficient to establish whether a particular instance is gold. 
However, the case of the robot is different, since the most complete 
knowledge of the robot does not itself determine whether it is a person. 
The question about the personhood of the robot is still possible. Whether 
a particular robot is a person depends on where we draw the line between 
persons and non-persons: nature itself does not draw that line. Personal 
identity, then, is not just a matter of discovery: an element of decision is 
also needed. 3 Therefore, person is not a natural kind, because 
classification under the categories 'person' or 'non-person' includes an 
element of interpretation, not present in the classification of other things 
under the categories 'gold' or 'water'. Person is better understood as an 
interpretive schema, rather than as a natural kind. 
2. The question whether human being is a natural kind is altogether 
different, and its discussion is not a main point of this chapter. In 
analyzing a particular instance, if the features that characterize a human 
being are met, then it is a member of the species homo sapiens; if it has 
certain elements in common, but differs in others, it may be considered to 
be a member of another species. If there was life on another planet, for 
instance, and scientists wondered whether or not its inhabitants were 
human, similarities with the human species would be crucial: if the 
differences were too big and important, they would not be classified as 
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human. The method employed here differs from the one used to establish 
whether robots are persons: the former is, but the latter is not, empirical. 
3. As far as Nagel's argument is concerned, there is a fundamental flaw: 
person is not a natural kind, so that whether or not a particular instance is 
a person is not a matter for empirical investigation. 
4.4. THE SUFFICIENCY AND NECESSITY OF THE BRAIN 
Nagel's views on personal identity stress the necessity and sufficiency of 
the brain. This work is committed to the view that embodiment is 
necessary to be a person. Do Nagel's views amount to the thesis that the 
brain is all that is needed for embodiment, in the context of personal 
identity? Let us analyze this possibility in the hope of getting a clearer 
account of what possession of a body means. Since Nagel does not 
explain his notion of a brain (perhaps because he considers it to be a 
question for neurophysiologists, not for philosophers), two accounts of the 
brain will be proposed. 
According to the first account, the brain is an organ of the species homo 
sapiens, which happens to be essential to the identity of the species. 
Briefly, the human brain controls the movement of the limbs, receives and 
organizes sensory inputs coming from the different senses, recognizes 
emotions, deals with articulated speech, is the seat of memory and 
attention, and so on. Dazzled by the important functions carried out by 
the brain, some philosophers have argued that: 
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I 
"The real essence of personal identity will be whatever underlies and 
makes possible the unity of consciousness. [... ] It is an empirical 
question what makes co-consciousness possible ... we 
know at least 
the outline of the answer: what makes co-consciousness possible is the 
structure of the central nervous system and the persistence of that 
structure through time. " (Mackie, 1976: 200) 
On this account, the brain and the central nervous system are the key 
organs that constitute the identity of the members of the human species. 
As long as the brain remains the same through time, the identity of the 
human being is preserved. 
The second account of the brain accuses the first one of parochialism, of 
not being abstract enough to include other non-human individuals under 
the category of persons. Different biological species, the argument goes, 
do not have to possess the same biological organs, although they must 
have one organ or another that plays the role played by the conjunction of 
the brain and the nervous system in the human species. On this second, 
functionalist account, personal identity in general does not consist in the 
possession of a human brain; for other species, whatever organ that plays 
the same functional role played by the conjunction of brain and nervous 
system in the human case constitutes the identity of the species. (See 
Shoemaker, 1984a: 126ff. ) 
Before passing on to other matters, it will simply be pointed out that both 
the parochial and the functionalist accounts consider personal identity to 
be a matter of scientific enquiry. This is due to the fact that they fail to 
distinguish between a person and a human being. When such a distinction 
is made, it becomes clear that possession of a brain (or whatever organ 
plays the role of the human brain) may be essential to the identity of a 
member of the human species (or a member of other species), but does not 
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constitute personal identity. 
arise. 
Let us now see whether other objections 
Of these two accounts, which is the one Nagel has in mind when he 
suggests the necessity and sufficiency of the brain for the identity of a 
person? If it is the first one, Nagel can be accused of giving an account 
which is species specific, only applicable to the human case. If he 
modifies it so as to include other species (that is, if he adopts the 
functionalist account), he must specify the role played by such organs. On 
the functionalist account, it is not a particular organ that is important, but 
the role played by that organ. Is such a role necessary and sufficient to be 
a person; ie, does personal identity consist in having an organ with a 
certain role? 
Against the adoption of the parochial account of the brain, it has been 
objected (Glover, 1988) that it is not clear whether all parts of the human 
brain are necessary for the identity of a person. And if they are not all 
necessary, which are? Nagel argues that a person is his brain because he 
can survive the destruction of other parts of his body, but not the 
destruction of his brain. It is similarly argued now that a person may 
survive the destruction of certain parts of his brain, in which case those 
parts are not, on Nagel's own grounds, essential to the person. But if that 
is the case, then the claim that a person is his brain is not narrow enough 
so as to exclude those parts of the brain which are not an essential part of 
the person. The objection does not disappear if a functionalist account is 
adopted, for it is unclear what role played by the human brain, or by other 
organs in other species, is in fact necessary for the identity of an individual 
person. Are the control of limb movement, or articulated speech, 
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necessary? Or the recognition of emotions? Or the remembering of past 
experiences? 
Before going on any further, I would like to introduce certain 
considerations that will receive further treatment later on. In 
characterizing the human brain, both the functions of organizing sensory 
inputs and controlling movement and speech have been mentioned, 
although not enough emphasis has been put on them. These functions of 
the brain serve to connect the body as a whole to the external world: 
through them, the body is able not only to learn about what goes on 
around it, but also to intervene and affect the course of wordly 
happenings. The brain, then, plays the crucial role of opening the door for 
an exchange between the body itself and the external world. 
The question that must be asked now, if Nagel's thesis is to stand, is 
whether or not the brain is sufficient for that exchange to take place. This 
question can be divided into two parts. Firstly, is the brain the physical 
ground for exchange at the sensory level? Obviously, it plays a necessary 
role, but other physical organs are also involved: in vision, for instance, 
the eyes (with their own complexity), the nerves transmitting the visual 
stimuli4; in hearing, the ears (external and internal organs); and so on for 
other senses. Secondly, is the brain the physical ground for exchange at 
the intentional level, that is, for intervening in the external world? The 
brain sends responses (depending on the sensory inputs) to the nerves, 
which are connected to the muscles, producing the desired movement, for 
instance, of limbs and mouth: several organs, other than the brain, are then 
required for intentional action on the world. In short, although the human 
brain has an important function to carry out, it is not the only organ 
required for perceiving, and acting upon, the world. 
5 Possession of a 
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brain in the functionalist sense is not sufficient for this exchange at the 
sensory and intentional levels, either, since the role played by the brain (or 
other organs in other species) is not enough to guarantee sensory and 
intentional contact with the world (at least, if the role of the brain in other 
species is the same as in the human species): the role played by such 
organs as ears or limbs, distinct from the role of the brain itself, is also 
necessary. 
In conclusion, Nagel's view that possession of a brain is necessary and 
sufficient to be a person fails, both in the parochial sense and in the 
functionalist sense, for possession of a brain does not amount to full 
embodiment, in the definition of embodiment hinted at here, that is, as 
actively participating in wordly happenings. Furthermore, it may be 
anticipated that to the extent in which traditional materialist theories fail to 
conceive of the body as playing an active role in the world, they also fail 
to capture a central idea of what possession of a body, in the context of 
personal identity, means. (More on this point later. ) 
4.5. BRAINS IN A VAT 
4.5.1. The hypothesis of the brain in a vat 
According to the hypothesis of the brain in a vat (Putnam, 1981; see also 
Evans, 1982: 2498), it could be the case that one's brain was kept alive in a 
vat, connected to a super-computer, so that it received sensory inputs to 
the nerve endings as if it were seeing the world or hearing sounds, 
although, in fact, the inputs were coming from the computer. Thus, the 
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computer might, for instance, produce the image of a tree in front of us, 
which would lead us to think that there is a tree in front of us, although 
there is no real tree in front of us, but only an image of a tree produced by 
the computer. 
The importance of the hypothesis of the brain in a vat is that it is a 
counter-argument against the view defended in this work: that embodiment 
(especially in the sense hinted at in the last section) is necessary to be a 
person. Several arguments will be put forward to show that brains in a vat 
cannot be persons, preserving the truth about the necessity of embodiment. 
4.5.2. Can brains in a vat be persons? 
The hypothesis of the brain in a vat can be regarded as a sceptical problem 
about our knowledge of the external world. How do we know that we are 
not in such a predicament? How do we know that when we perceive a 
tree it is a real tree that we are perceiving, and not an image induced in us 
by a computer? Nonetheless, the sceptical problem will not be addressed 
here. Instead, we will consider whether or not the brain in a vat is a 
person. 
An initial argument against the view that the brain in a vat is a person has 
already been suggested, when it was argued that possession of a brain is 
insufficient for full embodiment. Following this suggestion, the discussion 
that follows will try to cash in on an important difference between the 
brain in a vat and a normal person. The latter is sensonly and intentionally 
linked to the world. The brain in a vat, however, receives inputs from the 
super-computer to which it is attached (equally, it can send outputs back 
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to the computer), but is not sensorily and intentionally linked to the world. 
Let us look at this in detail. 
As suggested when criticizing Penelhum's account of disembodied 
perception (see 2.2.1. ), perception is a causal concept. For something to 
be a perceptual experience of something else, there must be a causal 
relation (according to a law) between an external object and a perceiver. 
That is, the former causally explains the perception experienced by the 
latter. Furthermore, such a causal relation is a relation between two 
existentially independent items: a perceiver, and an object in the external 
world, whose essential character is independent from the perceiver's 
dispositions or mental phenomena. In the present case, the experience of 
a tree had by the brain in a vat is not accounted for, or causally explained 
by, the existence of a tree in the real, external world; it is just a case of 
stimulation of the nerve endings of the brain in a vat by the super- 
computer. Therefore, the input received by the brain would not count as a 
case of genuine perception. 
Analogously, the brain in a vat could form an intention to sit under such a 
tree, as an output sent back to the super-computer, which would result in it 
seeming to the brain in a vat that it is sitting under a tree (again, thanks to 
the hallucinations produced by the computer). However, this is not a case 
of action, because there is no causal link from the brain in the vat to the 
world: there is no change in the environment, but only a semblance of it. 
But, if the brain in a vat is linked to the super-computer (from which 
sensory inputs are received), then, is it not linked to something in the 
world, namely the super-computer? Isn't the super-computer something 
real, external and different from the brain, as well as existentially 
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independent from it? Even after granting that there are no trees or other 
objects that the brain in a vat has images of, there is still a world, whose 
only object might be the super-computer. In that case, when the brain in a 
vat has the image of a tree, it does not perceive a real tree, but surely the 
brain in a vat is genuinely perceiving a state of the super-computer. 
'Genuinely' means that the brain in a vat is causally connected to the super- 
computer, so that a state of the computer causally explains the perceptual 
experience had by the brain in a vat. Thus, the image is produced by a 
genuine perception of the real world: not a perception of a real tree, but of 
a state of the super-computer. Then, the brain in a vat would be linked to 
the world, and, therefore, might count as embodied, in the same way in 
which a person is. 
It could be replied that for something to constitute a genuine perception of 
something else, two requisites must be fulfilled. First, there must be a 
causal connection to the environment. Second, that connection must be of 
the right type: if a tree (causally! ) produces in me the image of a house, 
that is not a genuine perception; however, if a real house produces in me 
the image of a house, that is a case of genuine perception. Similarly, if a 
state of the super-computer produces in the brain in a vat an image of a 
tree, that does not count as a case of genuine perception; genuine 
perception of a tree should be produced by a real tree in the world. 
However, since there are no real trees ex hypothesi, then there cannot be 
genuine perception of trees. Therefore, the brain in a vat cannot count as 
embodied. 
This reply to the previous objection, it could be argued, is based on a false 
analogy between the brain in a vat and us. We know what a tree and a 
house look like, so we know when the right type of connections are 
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present, for instance when a tree produces the image of a tree; on the other 
hand, if a tree produced the image of a house, there would be something 
wrong. However, it could be said that the brain in a vat does not know 
what a tree and/or a house look like, since it only receives sensory inputs 
from the super-computer, inducing the image of a tree or a house, 
respectively. There is nothing external (a tree or a house) with which it 
can compare the image it has in order to determine whether the right type 
of connections are present. In other words, the question about the 
correctness of its perceptions and its causal links to the world simply does 
not arise for the brain in a vat. Such a question arises, and makes sense, 
for us, because we are considering the whole example of the brain in a vat 
from an outside perspective. That is, we know what a house looks like, 
and know that if a tree produces the image of a house, there is something 
wrong in the causal link. From the inside, however, the brain in a vat 
cannot make sense of the distinction between the wrong and right types of 
connection. 
Even if this line of reasoning in terms of the right type of causal links 
between the world and the perceiver is not found conclusive, there is still 
another aspect of perception that will prove helpful. It is the previously 
mentioned idea that the object of perception is a constitutive part of the 
experience. Thus, in my perception of a tree, the objective tree itself is 
part of the content of my perceptual experience; my experience 
is, then, a 
world-involving experience, not an inner experience. However, 
in the 
case of the brain in a vat, what would be the content of 
its experiences? 
If, by hypothesis, there is nothing in the world at all, its experiences would 
be devoid of content. Furthermore, insofar as the object of perception is 
constitutive of the experience itself, since there is no object 
(ie, an 
objective, perceiver-independent, item in the world) of perception, then 
95 
such perceptual experiences cannot obtain at all. That is, the alleged 
perceptual experience of a tree had by the brain in a vat is not such, but 
only a hallucination induced by the super-computer. 
Regarding the intentional link with the world, could it be said of the brain 
in a vat that it can intervene in the world, affecting the course of worldly 
happenings? It might be argued that since there are no objects in the 
world (or even, no world at all, as we know it), then it is impossible, by 
hypothesis, that it should be able to act upon them. Nonetheless, it might 
be replied, the brain in a vat could form an intention, say, the intention to 
sit under a tree, even if its actual occurrence could not take place. 
However, not even this would be possible for the brain in a vat. Our 
active involvement in the world is intrinsically linked to the content of our 
perceptions. Thus, when I see a tree, I can form the intention to sit under 
that tree; was I to lack direct perception of the tree, I could not intend to 
sit under it. What would be the content of such an intention, and where 
would it come from? Now, since the brain in a vat has experiences which 
are devoid of content (or, even more strongly, has no perceptual 
experiences at all), then it cannot intend to affect the world. In short, the 
content of our perceptions and the content of our intentions are 
intrinsically linked, and if the former is missing, then the latter is also 
affected. 
The summary of this extensive discussion is that brains in a vat do not 
count as embodied in the sense hinted at in an earlier section, that is, in the 
sense of being actively involved in the world, both at the sensory and 
intentional levels. Now, inasmuch as this active embodiment is a 
necessary requirement for being a person, brains in a vat do not qualify as 
persons. 
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Chapter 5 
REDUCTIONIST ACCOUNTS OF THE PERSON 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
There have been two different reactions against the Cartesian model of the 
person as an immaterial person. First, it has been suggested that the 
person is reducible to a series of mental and/or physical states. Second, a 
number of philosophers (called here the 'No-Ownership' theorists) have 
also proposed the elimination of the Cartesian-like substantialist subject of 
experience; instead, they maintain, there are only experiences. 
In this chapter, both the eliminativist and reductionist theses will be 
explained and, then, critically reviewed. It will be shown that both 
theories fail to provide a satisfactory account of what a person is: an 
account which could free us from Descartes's dualism. More particularly, 
they do not give and adequate account of the person as subject. Thus, the 
way will be clear for a positive account of the person in non-reductionist 
terms in the following chapter. 
5.2. HUME'S REDUCTIONIST THESIS 
Hume criticizes both the conception of the self as a substance and our talk 
of personal identity. He argues that the self is nothing more than a fiction, 
and that talk of personal identity is the result of an illusion of the 
imagination. Let us consider both theses in detail. 
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Adopting a general empiricist background, he argues that the ideas we 
possess are derived from corresponding impressions. From where is the 
idea of self derived? Bearing in mind that the idea of self is the idea of 
something "invariable and uninterrupted", it must come from an 
impression which also exists invariably and without interruption. 
Nonetheless, impressions, such as "pain and pleasure, grief and joy, 
passions and sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same 
time" (1975: 162); that is, impressions do not exist invariably and 
uninterruptedly. Therefore, the idea of self cannot be derived from any 
impression. Now, if such an idea is not derived from any impression, then 
it is not possible that we have such an idea: it must be a fiction. Two 
questions arise. First, how is such a fictitious idea acquired? What is it 
based upon? Second, if the idea of a self (as something invariable and 
uninterrupted) is a fiction, what account can be given of what people are? 
Turning to the second question, Hume mocks the usefulness of 
introspection to find the inner self 
"For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I 
always stumble on some particular perception or other... I never can 
catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe 
any thing but the perception. " (162) 
He goes on to say that people 
"are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which 
succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a 
perpetual flux and movement. " (162) 
There is not a 'something' to which experiences are ascribed, but just a 
succession of experiences themselves (perceptions, in Hume's 
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terminology). The connection between the different experiences takes 
place according to relations of resemblance, contiguity and causality. My 
present experiences resemble, or are contiguous with, former experiences, 
which are brought to the present by the faculty of memory. In addition, 
my experiences also interact with each other as cause and effect: 
impressions bring about ideas which, in turn, give rise to other 
impressions. In this sense, memory is not what constitutes personal 
identity; rather, memory is what discovers the relations existing between 
experiences. 
Let us return to the question about the sense in which talk of personal 
identity is fictitious. What is such talk based upon? According to Hume, 
it is based on a confusion, in our normal way of thinking, between the 
notions of identity and diversity. The former is the "idea of an object that 
remains invariable and uninterrupted through a variation of time"; the latter 
is the "idea of several different objects existing in succession, and 
connected together by a close relation" (163). However distinct both 
ideas are, we are tricked by the imagination into ascribing identity where 
there is only diversity. 
Some of the causes for this confusion are suggested by Hume: when a 
comparatively small part of an object varies, for example, the change is 
ignored in favour of the unchanged part, leading us to affirm the identity of 
the whole; or, when there is a gradual change, the latter is not usually 
perceived; or, when some parts are substituted for, but both the old and 
new parts serve the same purpose, the substitution is ignored in favour of 
the common end or purpose, giving an impression of identity. Thus, Hume 
can conclude that 
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"all objects, to which we ascribe identity, without observing their 
invariableness and uninterruptedness, are such as consist of a 
succession of related objects. " (165) 
If talk of identity in general is a mistake, so is talk of personal identity. 
The assertion that I am the same person as yesterday is a mistake: 
properly speaking, there is a diversity of related objects (resemblance, 
contiguity and causality). In order to justify this absurdity, we either 
"feign the continued existence of the perceptions of our senses", or 
"imagine something unknown and mysterious, connecting the parts, beside 
their relation" (164). Thus, the belief in an underlying substance to which 
experiences are ascribed is erroneous; and so is talk of personal identity. 
5.3. CRITICISMS OF HUME 
Two main criticisms of Hume's position will be proposed: the first one 
concerns his reductionist analysis of persons as bundles of experiences; 
the second one attacks the idea that there is not a substance-like perceiver 
or thinker of the experiences, that is, the idea that there is nothing over and 
above the bundle of experiences. 
5.3.1. The bundle of experiences vs the person 
Against Hume's contention that a person is a "bundle or collection of 
different perceptions", it can be argued that the identity conditions of the 
bundle are different from the identity conditions of the person: whereas a 
particular experience is a necessary part of a bundle, it is not a necessary 
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part of a person. On the one hand, the identity conditions of a bundle 
include every single element contained in it. If one single element was 
missing (or added, or substituted for), there would be a different bundle. 
For instance, if a bundle consists of the elements {E, E', E*}, and another 
bundle consists of the elements {E, E*}, then it cannot be said that the 
former is the same as the latter, since there is an element present in the 
former which is missing in the latter. Thus, every element of a bundle is a 
necessary part of it. 
On the other hand, the identity conditions of a person do not necessarily 
include all the experiences had by a person. The painful experience I am 
undergoing at the moment does not necessarily belong to me; if I had not 
touched the burning pan, for example, I would not have had such an 
experience. Thus, the identity conditions of a person are not the same as 
those of a bundle of experiences. Therefore, a person cannot be reduced 
to a bundle of experiences. 
5.3.2. Kant: the subject of experiences is here to stay 
Hume is sometimes accused of failing to appreciate a crucial internal 
incoherence in his criticism of the idea of personal identity. Thus, the 
accusation goes, when he says that "I never can catch myself at any time 
without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception", 
his denial of the self is invalid, for it is precisely the 'I' that can never 
observe any thing but the perception, that he is looking for. In other 
words, in order to refute the notion of the self, he requires to presuppose 
that very same notion. 
101 
From an approach sympathetic to Hume's position, it might be replied that 
the 'I' which is presupposed is not the same as the notion of the self being 
criticized, but that the former is just a way of talking (the normal way of 
talking), highly influenced by the Cartesian-type account of personal 
identity. If so, then, Hume's problem is not so much one of internal 
inconsistency, but one of lack of precision: perhaps he should have made 
it clear that "I" and "myself' were not to be regarded as philosophically 
laden notions, but rather in the way in which non-philosophically minded 
people may use them. 
However, Hume is not safe yet. Consider the following argument. 
According to Hume's reductionist thesis, people are a bundle of 
perceptions, connected through relations of resemblance, contiguity and/or 
causation. Thus, experiences E and E' belong to the same bundle if they 
are connected through some of those relations. Now, how could Hume 
distinguish between experiences that are connected through one or more 
or those relations, but do not belong to the same bundle, and those 
experiences that are not only so related, but also belong to the same 
bundle? For instance, think of two different experiences that resemble 
each other, are spatio-temporally contiguous, and causally related (ie, 
when the first experience occurs, we expect the occurrence of the second 
one), but whereas one of them, El, belongs to bundle,, the other, E2, 
belongs to bundle,. Is the latter possible? If it is, how could Hume place 
them in the appropriate bundle, if attention to the relations between them 
is not sufficient? If it is not, how can Hume disallow it? It appears as if 
his only way out is to make reference to a subject of experience (self), a 
common 'something' to which the experiences are ascribed. But if this is 
the case, then his reductionist account of personal identity fails. 
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It could be maintained (in fact, it has been maintained; see Kitcher, 
1990: 101) that Hume was aware of this difficulty: that his account of 
persons as a bundle of experiences related by resemblance, contiguity and 
causation, does in fact presuppose the notion of the self (or mind, or 
subject of experiences) which is supposed to reduce and replace. In the 
appendix to the third book of the Treatise of Human Nature, he shows his 
uneasiness regarding this matter: 
"upon a more strict review of the section concerning personal identity, 
I find myself involved in such a labyrinth, that, I must confess, I neither 
know how to correct my former opinions, nor how to render them 
consistent" (1975: 173); 
"there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent; nor is it in 
my power to renounce either of them, viz. that all our distinct 
perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives 
any real connexion among distinct existences. " (175-6; my 
underscoring) 
Hume's concern is the following dilemma: on the one hand, if the sort of 
objection considered in the previous paragraph (ie, the lack of a way of 
distinguishing between those experiences that are appropriately related, 
but do not belong to the same bundle, and those that do belong to the same 
bundle) is to be avoided, then he must allow for real connections between 
experiences; but on the other hand, real connections cannot be allowed 
because they are not perceived. If he was to concede that the mind could 
perceive real connections, then he would be letting in the notion of a self 
or an individual mind through the back door. 
In this context, what Kant is able to provide is that real connection 
between experiences lacking in Hume, a connection which is not the 
product of external perception, but the result of an act of the faculty of 
understanding. But let us take a step at a time. 
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Kant, like Hume, acknowledged that the introspective approach to 
personal identity was faulty. In Kant's own terminology, the self is not 
given in intuition. This, however, does not warrant a total and sceptical 
denial of the self, along Hume's lines. On the contrary, there must be 
something beyond the experiences themselves, to which the latter belong 
(or, are ascribed); there must be something that really unifies the 
experiences, so that a distinction can be made between the group of 
experiences that, being connected through relations of resemblance, 
contiguity and causation, belong to the same bundle, and the group of 
experiences that, although connected through the appropriate relations, do 
not belong to the same bundle. 
In the Trascendental Deduction' , Kant starts by talking of the "synthesis 
of the manifold", which refers to the idea that the unity and conjunction of 
the manifold (that which is perceptually received by our sense-organs in 
intuition) cannot be given to us by the senses (the faculty of sensibility); 
instead, it is the result of an act of the faculty of understanding, since unity 
has its origin in the subject himself, not in the objects. More simply, the 
result of our perception of the world lacks unity and order, since the latter 
cannot be found in the objects themselves, but is provided by the subject 
of the perception. Now, within the subject, it is not the faculty of 
sensibility (which is pure receptivity), but the faculty of understanding, of 
categories, that produces such a unity. This act by which our experiences 
(or rather, representations) are orderly arranged is called synthesis. Thus, 
the order perceived in the world is the result of the acts of synthesis 
applied to the objects of intuition. 
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The central element in the Transcendental Deduction is what Kant calls 
the "synthetical unity of apperception", or "transcendental unity of 
apperception" : 
"The I think must accompany all my representations, for otherwise 
something would be represented in me which could not be thought; in 
other words, the representation would either be impossible, or at least 
be, in relation to me, nothing. " (130) 
This is a complex thesis, but a proper understanding of it will show how 
Kant refutes Hume's denial of personal identity. The first point present in 
the above quotation is the previously mentioned idea that cognition 
requires both an external and an internal component. Thus, unless what is 
received from the outside in intuition is supplemented by an internal 
element of order (by an internal rule), we would have no experience at all: 
"the manifold representations which are given in an intuition would not 
all of them be my representations, if they did not all belong to one self- 
consciousness" (131; my emphasis); 
"the synthetical unity of consciousness is, therefore, an objective 
condition of all cognition, which I do not merely require in order to 
cognize an object, but to which every intuition must necessarily be 
subject, in order to become an object for me" (134; my emphasis). 
This act of giving unity and order to the objects of intuition is an act of 
synthesis, as explained above. Furthermore, this act of synthesis is a 
necessary act, if the objects of intuition are to become objects of cognition 
for me. That is, without such a synthetical unity, what is given to me in 
intuition would not become an object of my experience, something to be 
cognized by me. Kant expressed this by saying that the "transcendental 
unity of apperception" is an a priori condition of experience. For me to 
have experiences is not sufficient that there be an object of intuition, but 
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such an object must be conceptualised, that is, brought under the 
categories. There is no experience without the faculty of understanding. 
The unity of apperception also includes an element of self-consciousness: 
"I am, therefore, conscious of my identical self, in relation to all the 
variety of representations given to me in an intuition, because I call all 
of them my representations", 
"... otherwise I must have as many-colored and various a self as are the 
representations of which I am conscious. " (132) 
Self-consciousness should not be understood in the Cartesian sense of 
awareness of a separate entity, a self: as mentioned above, such an entity 
is not given in intuition. Self-consciousness is, rather, my awareness of 
the fact that, since all my representations are precisely my representations, 
then they must be unified under (or, ascribed to) the same numerically 
identical self: 
"all my representations in any given intuition must be subject to that 
condition under which alone I can ascribe them to the identical self as 
my representations" (quoted in Strawson, 1966: 95). 
The alternative to this position is a view of the self as various and 
multiple, in which every representation would be ascribed to a different 
subject. The requirement of self-consciousness prevents this possibility. 
(In a more modem context, a similar position, which will be considered in 
detail in the next section, has been defended in terms of the notion of a 
momentary thinker or subject of experiences. ) 
To sum up, these are the ingredients of Kant's refutation of Hume. First, 
Hume's difficulty was the lack of real connections between perceptions. 
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Kant's reply consists in arguing that not only are there real connections 
between mental experiences, but also that those connections are necessary 
for cognition: without the synthetical unity of apperception, the 
representational character of my experiences (representations) could not 
be accounted for. That is, I could not account for the fact that they are 
experiences for me, that they convey information for me. The latter is not 
only the thesis that there could be no experiences for me, but the thesis 
that there could be no experiences, since the having of experiences 
requires the faculty of concepts. In other words, without the a priori unity 
of apperception, without a subject that produces the judgements where the 
synthesis of the manifold under categories takes place, there would be no 
experience at all. This argument is most devastating for Hume's project, 
for it implies that, on the one hand, if Hume's denial of the self is a denial 
of such a subject, then it follows that no experiences at all can be had; on 
the other hand, if Hume admits the existence of experiences, as he must 
do, then he is in fact presupposing the notion of the self he tried to do 
away with. In such a case, his uneasiness in the appendix to the third 
book of the Treatise of Human Nature is justified, for his own account 
needs the notion of the subject of experience he set out to abolish. 
Second, the necessary connections between representations through acts 
of synthesis allow for the refutation of the view that people are a bundle of 
perceptions, and that nothing underlies such a bundle. The fact that 
certain representations are unifiable by synthesis means that they are my 
representations: they are synthesized by an act of my understanding. 
Thus, the difficulty faced by Hume, according to which he could not 
distinguish between experiences that are connected through the 
appropriate relations (of resemblance, contiguity and causation) but do not 
belong to the same bundle, and those experiences that are appropriately 
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connected and belong to the same bundle, is not a problem for Kant. He 
can use his notion of a synthetical unity of apperception, and argue that 
those representations (experiences) which are conjoined together by 
synthesis, belong to the same subject of experiences; in other words, they 
are my representations. Thus, it can be shown that Hume's reductionist 
thesis is mistaken, for it cannot account for the real connections between 
experiences, which makes up the unity of consciousness. 
Third, the idea that the self can be reduced to a series of empirical laws of 
association (resemblance, contiguity, causation) among experiences is 
rejected by two more considerations. One, empirical laws of association 
cannot meet the requirement of universability and necessity that is needed 
to explain the connectability among experiences. Kant explicitly opposes 
the objective validity of the categories to the subjective validity of the 
laws of association: 
"a judgement is nothing but the mode of bringing given cognitions 
under the objective unity of apperception ... a relation which 
has 
objective validity, and is perfectly distinct from that relation of the very 
same representations which has only subjective validity -a relation, to 
wit, which is produced according to laws of association" (136-7). 
Two, it has been suggested (Hatfield, 1992) that the laws of association 
would be conceptually inadequate for the task concerning the 
Transcendental Deduction, since the former are couched in the language of 
factual causal relations, whereas the Deduction demands an argument cast 
in the language of right. That is, even if the laws of association were 
universal and necessary, they would only establish universal and necessary 
causal factual relations among experiences, whereas what is needed is an 
argument that shows the right or entitlement to make such relations among 
experiences. The latter must be a priori, and derives from the unity of 
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apperception, as explained above: without the latter, I would not be 
entitled to call my representations mine. Support for this view can be 
found in Kant's definition of 'Deduction': 
"Teachers of jurisprudence ... 
distinguish in a cause the question of 
right (quid juris) from the question of fact (quid facti), and ... give to the proof of the former, which goes to establish right or claim in law, 
the name of Deduction" (119); 
together with his claim that, 
"all attempts at an empirical deduction, in regard to give a priori 
conceptions, are vain, and can only be made by one who does not 
understand the altogether peculiar nature of these cognitions. " (121) 
Kant's rejection of Hume is not, however, a defence of Cartesian theses, 
since the doctrine of the unity of apperception does not amount to a 
substantialist account of the person. The unity of apperception is a formal 
requirement, but does not make any claims about the nature of the person, 
the subject of experiences underlying the different representations. 
Consider the following quotations: 
"in the synthetical unity of apperception, I am conscious of myself, not 
as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I am" (146); 
"by this I, or He, or It, who or which thinks, nothing more is 
represented than a transcendental subject of thought = x, which is 
cognized only by means of the thoughts that are its predicates, and of 
which, apart from these, we cannot form the least conception. " (308) 
The result of the unity of apperception is that there is a subject to whom 
representations belong (or, are ascribed), and that it is the same subject for 
all representations. However, nothing else can be known about it, either 
as it is in itself (noumenon), or as it appears (phenomenon). The attempt 
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to infer from the unity of apperception the idea that such a subject of 
experiences is a simple, immaterial, identical through time, substance is a 
mistake, unveiled in the Paralogisms. 
Kant makes clear the error of reasoning made by rational psychologists 
(among which Descartes may be included): they expect an intuition of the 
subject of thought as object, to which the category of substance (and the 
properties of simplicity, immateriality and identity through time) could be 
applied; but when such an intuition is not given, they mistake the unity of 
consciousness itself for the awareness of a unitary substantial being. For 
us to have knowledge of a substantial being, there must be something that 
is given in intuition. But the subject of thought cannot be given in 
intuition, for it is precisely that which unifies the different contents given 
in intuition, the unity of apperception. The rational psychologists' error 
consists in supposing that from the abstract formal properties regarding the 
subject of thought follow other properties regarding the nature of such a 
subject. 
In summary, what Kant adds to the question of personal identity is an 
account of what being a subject consists in, the formal conditions of 
subjecthood. In this sense, he distances himself from Descartes's Cogito 
and from Hume's scepticism. Against the former, he maintains that the 
subject of thought is not given in intuition as an object. Against the latter, 
he argues that there are necessary real connections among experiences, 
and that a reductionist account of personal identity could not explain how 
it is that my experiences are mine. 
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5.3.3. Persons vs person-stages 
Kant's defence of subjects of thought, beyond experiences and the 
relations among them, is all-important, for it allows for a distinction 
between two different kinds of categories in our conceptual scheme: basic 
particulars and those things (especially, states and processes) which 
depend on basic particulars for their identification. The latter distinction is 
in fact Strawson's (1990): 
"For if we think, once more, of the requirements of identifying 
reference in speech to particulars states of consciousness, or private 
experiences, we see that such particulars cannot be thus identifyingly 
referred to except as the states or experiences of some identified 
person. States, or experiences, one might say, owe their identity as 
particulars to the identity of the person whose states or experiences 
they are. " (97) 
An instance of an experience of pain, for example, must be identified as 
someone's pain. Even when the expression 'that pain' is used ostensively 
to identify a particular experience, it must be short for 'the pain you have 
just felt' or 'the pain you are causing me', or something similar, where a 
reference to the person who suffers the pain must be present. 
Strawson's notion of a person is not the same as Kant's transcendental 
subject of thought, for the former incorporates empirical properties, like 
the possession of a body (see Strawson, 1966: 97-112,163-9). However, 
a person includes the property of being a subject, to whom experiences 
(states and processes) are ascribed. As Strawson has powerfully argued, 
the identification and re-identification of the latter would not be possible 
without the previous identification of the former. (More on this in the 
following chapter. ) 
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The notion of a person as a temporally extended subject has recently come 
under attack. Understanding experiences as events, Aquila (1979) has 
introduced the notion of momentary thinkers or perceivers, which "would 
exist precisely as long as each particular thought or perception itself 
exists" (113). He concedes to the reductionist that there is no persisting 
Cartesian-like subject of experience; but, since experiences are particular 
events involving particular thinkers (ie, a relation among a spatio-temporal 
position, an individual thinker/perceiver and the experience itself), he 
allows for the existence of a subject of experience. 
The key element here is the notion of a momentary thinker. What is the 
difference between the notion of a subject of experience in Strawson's 
terms and that of a momentary thinker? In other words, what is the 
difference between a person and a person-stage? Persons have persistence 
conditions over time: they occupy room in spatial, as well as in temporal, 
dimensions. Person-stages, on the other hand, are time-slices of people; 
that is, people at a certain time. On Aquila's account, the momentary 
thinker to whom a certain experience is ascribed at t is different from the 
momentary thinker to whom a different experience is ascribed at a later 
time t', even if both count as the same person in Strawson's terms. 
An interesting consideration here is that the notion of a person-stage is 
dependent on the notion of a person. (See Noonan, 1989: 122ff. ) In many 
respects, a person-stage can undergo the same experiences as a person, 
particularly if they are of an instantaneous nature. For instance, both 
persons and person-stages can be said to have a toothache, in the sense 
that at a precise time t they suffer from toothache. There are, however, 
certain actions, such as running a marathon and reading a book, which 
could be ascribed to a person, but not to a person-stage, since they involve 
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a process which requires longer periods of time. Therefore, 'longish' 
actions cannot be ascribed to a person-stage. This means that, as far as 
the ascription of experiences in concerned, person-stages are secondary 
with respect to persons: person-stages are those persons to whom 'longish' 
actions (in general, 'longish' experiences) cannot be ascribed. 
A major difficulty for person-stages is the ascription of memory 
experiences. Memory experiences are ascribed to people because the 
same person who claims to remember something (from the inside, from a 
first-person perspective) was present at the time when the remembered 
experience occurred. However, if person-stages do not have conditions of 
persistence over time, then they cannot claim to remember anything. 
It could be argued that the above criticism relies too heavily on the actual 
notion of memory, and that a new notion, that of q-memory, could be 
introduced. Parfit (1975) has defined it in the following terms: 
I am q-remembering an experience if (1) I have a belief about a past 
experience which seems in itself like a memory belief, (2) someone did 
have such an experience, and (3) my belief is dependent upon this 
experience in the same way (whatever that is) in which a memory of an 
experience is dependent upon it. " (209) 
That is, where Strawson would say that a person remembers something 
that happened to him, the reductionist may say that person-stage2 q- 
remembers something that happened to person-stage,. In the latter case, 
the fact that it is the same person is not presupposed: a certain q-memory 
experience could be attributed to a subject different from the subject to 
whom the experience occurred. Therefore, the notion of a momentary 
subject of experience could be rescued. 
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A feature of first-person thought is that certain inferential (as opposed to 
causal) relations hold between different thoughts. For instance, from the 
thought that I am F and the thought that I am G, can be inferred the 
thought that I am F and G. No further premises concerning the identity of 
'I' are needed. First-person memory claims follow the same pattern: from 
the thought that I see so-and-so, the memory claim that I saw so-and-so 
can be inferred, without the need for any premises stating the identity of 
the person in question. It is a feature of I-thoughts that they span over a 
period of time: the 'I' who had the experience is the same as the 'I' in the 
memory-experience. Therefore, if the subject of experience is understood 
as a momentary subject of experience, then he would not have first-person 
memories. 
The strategy of this argument is not a direct attack on the notion of q- 
memory. Instead, there is an appeal to the characteristics of first-person 
thought. Therefore, it can be concluded that a momentary subject of 
experience would not be able to entertain first-person memory thoughts, 
not because of the logic of 'remembering', but because of the logic of I- 
thoughts. 
In fact, this point can be analogously extended to the whole reductionist 
project of personal identity. According to Hume, the relations among 
mental states are causal. However, it could be suggested, causal relations 
alone will not suffice to explain the complexity of people's mental life. 
Consider, for instance, the relation between an intention to do something 
and the action that follows. It is not simply that intention I causes action 
A; it is, rather, that intention I involves a commitment to do action A. This 
means that intention I must typically be followed by action A, and that if 
the former was followed by action A' instead, it will be said that A' is not 
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the right sort of action. For example, if I signal for a left turn while driving 
(that is, I make my intention to turn left public), and then fail to do so, I 
can be reprimanded for not doing the right thing. In short, then, the idea 
of a commitment2 built into the notion of an intention cannot be explained 
in causal terms; the notion of commitment is a normative one. Therefore, 
there are normative relations among mental states. To the extent to which 
a reductionist account fails to include them as part of people's mental life, 
the reductionist project is a failure. 
5.4. A SECOND REDUCTIONIST THESIS: PARFIT 
As has been mentioned, according to Hume, there are three types of 
relations between experiences: resemblance, contiguity and causality. It 
has also been said that the existence of these three types of relations 
among certain experiences does not guarantee their belonging to the same 
bundle. A particular example of this objection will now be described, and 
then the proposal suggested by Derek Parfit to meet that objection will 
receive critical attention. 
Imagine that I am daydreaming, when a very loud thump suddenly wakes 
me up, and that the same happens to my friend daydreaming next to me. 
My daydreaming and my waking up, two different experiences, belong to 
the same bundle, Hume would argue, because they are contiguous. 
(Incidentally, 'my' in 'my daydreaming' and 'my waking up' should not be 
regarded as implying ascription of experiences to persons. In what 
follows, the notation is changed so as to avoid the charge of begging the 
question. ) Since my friend also undergoes the same experiences as me 
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(first, daydreaming, and then, waking up), couldn't my friend's waking up 
(let us call it 'waking-up2') be associated with my daydreaming (let us call 
it 'daydreaming, ')? In other words, since daydreaming, is contiguous with 
both waking-up, and waking-up2, why is it the case that daydreaming, and 
waking-up, (and daydreaming2 and waking-up2) are collected together in 
the same bundle? As far as the three types of relations mentioned by 
Hume are concerned, daydreaming, and waking-up2 (and daydreaming2 
and waking-upl) could belong to the same bundle. Parfit's solution is to 
make the experiences dependent on a body: daydreaming, and waking-up, 
belong to the same bundle because they depend on the same body. Let us 
examine this view. 
It is Parfit's contention that the unity of consciousness can be explained in 
an impersonal way, that is, without reference to persons. He maintains 
that "these two unities [the unity of consciousness at any time, and the 
unity of a whole life] must be explained by describing the relations 
between these many experiences, and their relations to the person's brain" 
(1984: 217). That is, the core of this reductionist project lies in the fact 
that he questions the existence of a subject of experience to whom 
experiences are ascribed. More precisely, he holds that, in one sense, we 
are subjects of experience, but he denies that "the subject of experiences is 
a separately existing entity, distinct from a brain and a body, and a series 
of physical and mental events" (1984: 223). 
A case of a conception of persons as separate entities is the Cartesian 
view of the Pure Ego. Parfit endorses Lichtenberg's criticism that 
Descartes was wrong when he stated his 'I think, therefore, I am'; instead, 
he should have favoured an impersonal description, like 'It is thought: 
thinking is going on'. It could nonetheless be objected that, if several 
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thoughts are expressed in this impersonal manner, there would be no way 
of distinguishing whether they belong to the same person or not; and that, 
therefore, reference to persons is necessary. 
Parfit's answer is the relativization of experiences to a particular life: some 
experiences belong to a certain life, while other experiences do not. But is 
this not an effective relativization to persons, only using another name? In 
other words, are lives not identified by previously recognizing persons, 
that is, as the life of a person? No, they are not, since the individuation of 
a particular life is relative to a particular body, not to a person. Thus, 
where Lichtenberg said 'It is thought:... ', Parfit proposes instead 'In the 
particular life that is now directly causally dependent on body A, it is 
thought:... '. Thus, Parfit concludes, the unity of consciousness can be 
accounted for in an impersonal way, in terms of the interrelations between 
the mental and physical events constituting a person's life (which is 
dependent on a certain body). 
5.5. CRITICISM OF PARFIT: EXPERIENCES ARE ASCRIBED TO 
PERSONS 
This section will oppose the reductionist's claims that there is a basic level 
at which talk of persons is unnecessary, and that the causal relations 
among experiences, causally dependent on a body, can provide an account 
of personal identity. It will be argued that experiences, qua particular 
experiences, are necessarily owned by a person. This point, though, 
should not be confused with the causal dependence of experiences on a 
body. People's visual experiences depend on their body, because they see 
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through their body's open eyelids, because the orientation of their body's 
eyeballs and the location of their body itself condition their field of vision. 
However, this is different from the ascription of visual experiences to a 
body. Visual experiences are causally dependent on a body, but they are 
ascribed to a person. That the two questions are different is something 
that Strawson affirms: 
"They [the sort of facts considered above] explain why I feel peculiarly 
attached to what in fact I call my own body; they even might be said to 
explain why, granted that I am going to speak of one body as mine, I 
should speak of this body as mine. But they do not explain why I 
should have the concept of myself at all, why I should ascribe my 
thoughts and experiences to anything. " (93) 
The reductionist would oppose Strawson's account and insist on the fact 
that he is talking of an impersonal level, where persons are unnecessary. 
At that level, it is argued, experiences are ascribed to (or owned by) a 
body. An argument supporting the reductionist's position could be that 
non-human animals can also be ascribed such experiences as pain. If this 
is so, why should the ascription of experiences to persons not be 
understood as the ascription of experiences to a human body (in the same 
way in which ascription of experiences to animals are regarded as 
ascription of experiences to non-human bodies)? 
It could be replied that the analogy with the ascription of experiences to 
animals is not a valid model. Certainly, such experiences as pain are 
easily ascribed to animals: in particular, to animals which are closer to us, 
like dogs or cats, although its ascription to other animals, like green flies, 
is not so straightforward. Moreover, there are other types of experience, 
particularly those connected with first-person thought, such as shame or 
pride (see Campbell, 1992: 390), or the previously mentioned 
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autobiographical memory, which are not so easily ascribed to animals. It 
is a feature of the ascription of shame (or pride), and memory experiences, 
that self-consciousness is required on the part of the subject to whom the 
experience is ascribed. For me to feel ashamed (or proud), I must be 
aware of myself as the person who has done something wrong (or 
praiseworthy). In this sense, it could be maintained that it is difficult to 
say of an animal that it feels ashamed (or proud) of itself. 
Nonetheless, some people may want to argue that certain animals 
(particularly, those closer to us) appear to behave as if they felt ashamed 
after telling them off (perhaps, they go to a corner and lay on the floor 
hiding their tail and looking sad). They may be inspired by certain 
experiences with apes, who have not only been taught to associate their 
names with the word 'pain', but are also able to play a little trick on the 
experimenter, so that, under certain circumstances, they learn to indicate 
someone else's name if it means that they themselves will be rewarded 
first. This sort of evidence is said to support the claim that animals are 
self-conscious. Could we say that those animals are self-conscious in the 
same sense in which people are self-conscious? 
This question could be debated for quite some time. What is clear is that 
those who may want to ascribe experiences of shame and pride to animals, 
could do so by defending that the latter possess a certain degree of self- 
consciousness and are, therefore, subjects of experiences, in the same way 
that people are. That is, they would argue that animals, in that respect, are 
like people. What they could not conclude, though, is the reductionist 
claim that experiences can be ascribed to bodies, instead of persons. 
Animals would not be ascribed experiences qua bodies, but qua subjects 
of experience, that is, insofar as they are like people. Therefore, the 
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reductionist fails in his claim that ascription of experiences to animals 
offers a model on which an impersonal account of the ascription of 
experiences could be constructed 
A source of the problems faced by the reductionist may be that he is 
misled by the fact that the boundaries of the person coincide with the 
boundaries of the material body, and mistakenly takes the latter to be the 
real subject of experience. The distinction between the material and the 
sensory/intentional bodies discussed in the following chapter may shed 
some light on this issue. 
Before this question is abandoned altogether, though, it might be useful to 
pay some attention to a counter-example against the idea that experiences 
are identifiable-dependent on a subject of experience. Zemach (1975) 
considers the possibility that there may be a person with psychic powers, 
who may be able to 'feel' (ie, know about) somebody's distress without 
knowing who the person is (perhaps the other person is in a different 
room, and the psychic has never met him). After some time, the example 
goes, the psychic may feel the same distress again, realizing that it is the 
same feeling as before, and may identify who is suffering the experience - 
the person sitting next to him, say. Therefore, Zemach concludes that "it 
is not necessary that we identify feelings by reference to some previously 
identified person", and that "it is false that a feeling of some person must 
be imagined as belonging to the same person in all the possible worlds in 
which it exists" (123). 
What Zemach's example shows, if anything, is that a person endowed with 
psychic powers could know about someone's distress without knowing 
who the person is. What it does not show (contrary to what Zemach 
120 
seems to believe) is that such a distressful experience could exist without a 
bearer. It is clear that such an experience is someone's, even if the person 
in question is not (yet) known. Therefore, the example has not succeeded 
in showing that experiences are independent of a subject of experience. 
On the contrary, it helps to show that, even if those with psychic powers 
could 'feel' experiences in such a way, such experiences would belong to 
someone. The thesis that identification of experiences is dependent on the 
person who has them is not a temporal thesis (it is not about what occurs 
first: the experience or the person), but a conceptual one: it stresses that 
experiences must have a bearer. Zemach's example is similar to the 
following: speaking on the phone to an unknown person (perhaps one is 
working for 'The Samaritans'), one can identify someone else's distress 
without knowing who the distressed person is . 
However, that does not 
mean that the distressful experience exists without the person who suffers 
it. 
To be more precise, it could be suggested that the thesis about the 
necessity of a subject of experience concerns experience-tokens, not 
experience-types. Experience-types (like an experience of distress or a 
thought that 2+2=4 as used in a lecture by a psychiatrist or a 
mathematician, respectively) are not ascribed to a person. But as soon as 
reference is made to a particular experience of distress, the question 
'whose experience is it? ' is one that must be answered. In short, it is 
conceptually true that experience-tokens are ascribed to a person. 
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5.6. AN ELIMINATIYIST THESIS: THE NO-THEORY 
The 'No-Ownership' theory (or, NO-theory) is said to have been defended 
by Wittgenstein (1969: 67), when he suggests two different uses of first- 
person pronouns, like 'I' or 'my': the use as subject (in 'I have a toothache' 
and 'I see so and so'), and the use as object (in 'I have a bad tooth'). The 
fundamental difference between both uses is that while the 'I' in the latter 
sentence can be replaced by (and, therefore, refers to) 'this body', the 'I'-as- 
subject does not refer to anything in the world; there is nothing of which it 
can be said that has a toothache or sees so and so. 3 
The NO-theorist distinguishes two senses of 'ownership': first, there is 
ownership by a body (causal dependence of experiences on a particular 
body); second, ownership by a Cartesian-like Ego. The former type of 
ownership is contingent: what is owned by a particular body B could have 
been possessed by a different body B'. The latter type is necessary, since 
the experiences of an Ego E could not have belonged to P. However, the 
NO-theorist denies the existence of an Ego behind the body. Therefore, 
only the first type of ownership exists: experiences are contingently owned 
by a certain body. 
The main tenet of the NO-theory, then, is the non-referentiality of 'I'; that 
is, the idea that the 'I' in the 'I'-as-subject use does not denote an object in 
the world. Anscombe (1981), has expressed it in the following way: the 'I' 
in thoughts like 'I am standing', 'I see a variety of colours', or 'I jumped' is 
not a name or any other type of referring expression. 
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Malcolm (1979) undertakes the task of identifying four different ways in 
which the 'I' could have been a referring expression, none of which works. 
The first proposal is that 'I' denotes this body. It is rejected, though, 
because it is possible to think of a certain case in which I am in a state of 
sensory deprivation, so that I cannot obtain any information about my 
body. Such a situation does not mean that I lack consciousness of myself, 
because I could say to myself 'I won't let this happen again'. But, then, if 
such a thought makes sense, 'I' cannot refer to my body, since I am in a 
state of sensory deprivation. What is the referent of 'I', then? 
Malcolm's second proposal, following Hume's insight, is that 'I' refers to a 
bundle of experiences (sensations, thoughts, feelings, and so on). Two 
alternatives are open: first, 'I' refers to each different thought, or sensation, 
which forms the bundle; second, 'I' refers to something underlying those 
thoughts and sensations. In the former case, if 'I' refers to every single 
thought, then the referent must be changing all the time, but that may seem 
to differ from our use of the pronoun 'I': does it really denote an ever- 
changing referent? In the latter case, if there is something else that 
underlies the different experiences, there must be a way of unifying such 
experiences; but, what is the unifying principle? 
This leads to the third alleged referent of 'I': a person. When I say, 
Malcolm argues, that 'I am standing up', I mean the same as when I say 
NM (Norman Malcolm) is standing up'. A problem arises here. If 'I' 
referred to a particular person (NM, for instance), I might mistake the 
referent. For example, I might falsely think that I am EA, and not NM, 
with EA's origin and history. In that case, then, if I said 'I am standing up', 
I would mean 'EA is standing up'. But my thinking that I am EA would 
not have any influence on the truth (or falsity) of such a proposition. That 
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is, it would be a true proposition if I am standing up, independently of 
whether 'I' refers to EA or to NM (however different their histories may 
be). In short, 'I' in 'I am standing up' cannot mistake a person for another; 
however, if 'I' stood for a person, such a mistake would be possible. 
Therefore, 'I' does not refer to a person. 
The fourth proposal is a Cartesian Ego, Soul or Self. An initial objection 
can be posed in the following terms. When Descartes affirms that 'I am a 
thinking thing', does 'I' refer to just one thinker, or to ten thinkers thinking 
in unison? A second objection questions whether there is a conception 
under which 'I' is included, in the same way in which London is a town or 
the Nile is a river. So far, the idea that such conception is a human body 
or a person has been rejected; could it be a self? 
Anscombe's own suggestion (and Malcolm's too) is that 'I' is not a 
referring expression. In that case, the proposition/sentence 'I am NM' is 
not an identity proposition/sentence, because 'I' is not an object that can be 
identified (or misidentified) with the object NM. There is no conception 
under which 'I' falls; there is only use. That is, the difference between 'I' 
and NM' is that while NM' falls under a conception (a person), and has a 
referent in the world, 'I' does not fall under any conception and does not 
refer. The latter distinction between conception and use can be made 
clear with an example. If somebody asks a room full of people, 'who is 
NM? ', I can either say 'I am' or raise my arm; both responses have the 
same purpose, the same use. 
124 
5.7. CRITICISM OF THE NO-THEORY 
5.7.1. Immunity to error through misidentification 
As seen previously, there is a passage where Wittgenstein proposes the 
distinction between two different uses of the word 'I': the use as subject (in 
'I have a toothache', 'I see so and so'), and the use as object (in 'I have a 
bad tooth', 'I have a bump on my forehead'). The difference between both 
uses is that 'I' in the use as object refers to a material object, a particular 
body (in fact, 'I' can be replaced by 'this body': 'this body has a bad tooth', 
'this body has a bump on its forehead'), while 'I' in the use as subject does 
not refer to anything. Thus, since 'I' identifies an object in the former use, 
the possibility of misidentification is open, whereas such a possibility does 
not arise in the latter use: 
"One can point to the difference between these two categories by 
saying: The cases of the first category involve the recognition of a 
particular person, and there is in these cases the possibility of an error, 
or as I should rather put it: The possibility of an error has been 
provided for. [... ] It is possible that, say in an accident, I should feel a 
pain in my arm, see a broken arm at my side, and think it is mine, when 
it is really my neighbour's. And I could, looking into a mirror, mistake 
a bump on his forehead for one on mine. On the other hand, there is 
no question of recognizing a person when I say I have a toothache. To 
ask 'are you sure that it's you who have pains? ' would be nonsensical. " 
(1969: 67) 
In the Wittgensteinian tradition, immunity to error through 
misidentification appears to be linked to the non-referentiality of the word 
'I': since 'I' does not refer to any object in the world, 'I' cannot be 
misidentified. Immunity to error through misidentification is a 
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consequence of the fact that there is nothing to be misidentified, because 'I' 
does not refer. 
There is another tradition, exemplified by the work of Evans (1982) and 
Shoemaker (1984), where both theses are distinguished. In the following 
discussion, an attempt will be made to show that the thesis that 'I' is 
immune to error from misidentification does not necessary lead to the idea 
that 'I' lacks a referent in the world. Therefore, the immunity to error 
through misidentification of 'I' does not commit one to the NO-theory. 
Furthermore, it will be argued that, unlike Wittgenstein's characterization, 
immunity to error through misidentification is not only a feature of mental 
self-ascriptions ('I' in the use as subject), but also of bodily self- 
ascriptions. Therefore, the referent of 'I' cannot be a Cartesian Ego, a 
thinking thing, but a person, understood as a subject of both mental and 
bodily self-ascriptions (see 6.2. below). The following explanation stems 
from Evans's account of demonstrative thought, and is intended more as a 
tentative gesture than as a fully worked-out theory. 
Evans's account goes as follows. First of all, he proposes a distinction 
between identification-dependent and identification-free knowledge. Let 
us explain what identification-dependent knowledge is by means of an 
example. When the knowledge that my neighbour is German is the result 
of two propositions: one, that Petra is German, and two, that my neighbour 
is called Petra, it is said that my knowledge is dependent on a previous 
identification of the form a=b (where a and b are two different Ideas; in 
this example, Petra and my neighbour). On the other hand, when 
knowledge is not identification-dependent, then it is identification-free. 
4 
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Identification-free judgements, unlike identification-dependent 
judgements, are immune to one kind of error: since they do not involve an 
identification component, they are immune to the possibility of error 
through misidentification. For instance, the judgement 'I see so and so', 
obtained in the process of normal perception, is not an inference from two 
such other judgements as 'someone sees so and so' and 'I am that person'; 
it is an identification-free judgement, and, therefore, immune to error 
through misidentification. This means that I could be mistaken about what 
I see, but not about that fact that I see it. 
The argument required to show that 'I' in 'I see so and so' is immune to 
error through misidentification is the following. In cases of demonstrative 
identification, there is an information-link between the object in question 
and the thought entertained by the subject about that object. Such an 
information-link, however, may not be sufficient to identify the right 
object. For example, when a man is seen on television, the information- 
link does not provide us with the ability to pick up the right person 
(namely, the person giving the report on television, perhaps hundreds of 
miles away, and not the person inside the television set, as some people, 
unfamiliar with the mechanisms of television, may think). What is needed 
to have discriminatory knowledge about the object in question is the 
ability to locate it in space and time. Once its spatio-temporal location is 
available, we will know which object is taking part in demonstrative 
thoughts (like the thought that this man is bald, when referring to the man 
giving a report on television). Demonstrative thoughts (like, this man is 
bald) are identification-free: on the one hand, there is discriminatory 
knowledge about the object present in the thought (this man); on the other 
hand, there is a direct link subject-object not mediated by an identification 
component. 
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I-thoughts, being sorts of demonstrative thoughts, are information-based. 
This means that the thought that I see so and so is based on information I 
can obtain about myself. Due to the information I can obtain about 
myself, I can self-locate myself in the spatio-temporal order. 5 Therefore, 
I-thoughts are identification-free: there is discriminatory (self-locating) 
knowledge about the object involved, and such knowledge is direct, not 
mediated by any previous identification. 
The feature of immunity to error through misidentification follows suit: if 
there is direct discriminatory knowledge about the object involved in I- 
thoughts, then there is no possibility of picking up the wrong person. 
Immunity to error through misidentification, then, is a consequence of our 
way of gaining knowledge about the world and ourselves, knowledge 
which is identification-free; it is not a consequence of the fact that 'I' does 
not refer. 
5.7.2. The case of bodily self-ascriptions 
On Wittgenstein's account, immunity to error through misidentification is 
only found in the 'I'-as-subject sentences. Since 'I' in the 'I'-as-subject use 
does not refer to any object, there is no possibility of misidentification. 
On the other hand, 'I' in the 'I'-as-object use refers to a particular body, so 
that the possibility of misidentification arises; therefore, 'I' in the 'I'- 
as-object use is not immune to error through misidentification. 
Shoemaker (1984b) distinguishes between two types of immunity to error 
through misidentification. On the one hand, there is absolute immunity in 
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sentences like 'I see a canary': it cannot be the case that I misidentify the 
person who sees a canary (it cannot be the case that it is someone else, 
although I think it is me). On the other hand, there is circumstantial 
immunity in sentences like 'I am facing a table': I could be deceived by a 
set of mirrors, so that it may seem to me as if I am facing a table, but the 
truth is that it is someone else who faces the table. Here, there is 
circumstantial immunity because, depending on the circumstances, the 
possibility of error through misidentification may appear. Nonetheless, 
sentences which have circumstantial immunity may be transformed into 
others with absolute immunity: thus, the sentence 'I see a table in the 
centre of my field of vision' has absolute immunity; it is immune whatever 
the circumstances. 
Evans (1982) argues that immunity to error through misidentification is 
also a feature of bodily self-ascriptions. It has already been explained 
how immunity to error through misidentification follows from our 
discriminatory knowledge about the world; in particular, from our 
knowledge of ourselves. Now, our knowledge about ourselves includes 
both our bodily and mental properties. Therefore, it may appear that both 
bodily and mental self-ascriptions are immune to error through 
misidentification. Let us consider this in more detail. 
There are two ways in which we can obtain information about our bodily 
properties. First, knowledge based upon the proprioceptive sense, the 
sense of heat and cold, the sense of balance, and so on; knowledge which 
can be expressed in sentences like 'I am hot', 'I am falling down' and 'my 
legs are crossed'. When this knowledge is obtained in the normal way and 
under normal circumstances (ie, banning such possibilities as being told by 
someone else, or being under the effects of drugs, etc), and the subject has 
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discriminatory (spatio-temporal) knowledge about the object in question, it 
does not make any sense to ask 'someone is hot, but is it me who is hot? ', 
or 'someone's legs are crossed, but are they my legs? '. It must be stressed 
that Evans is only interested in the knowledge of bodily properties that is 
obtained in normal conditions; unusual circumstances are banned from the 
very beginning. The result is, then, what Shoemaker calls absolute 
immunity to error through misidentification. 
There is, on the other hand, knowledge about our position, orientation and 
relation to other objects, based upon our observation of other objects. For 
instance, 'I am in front of a tree', because I see it; or 'I am over the coast of 
France', when seen from an airplane. In these examples, it does not make 
any sense to say 'someone is in front of a tree (or over the coast of 
France), but is it me? ', when such knowledge is obtained in the appropriate 
way and under normal circumstances. 
It could be replied that the following situation is possible. Imagine a 
rugby match in which the players are trying hard to get possession of the 
ball, so that they end up on top of each other. One of the players suddenly 
feels a pain and sees what he thinks is his left hand bleeding, and says to 
himself 'my arm is bleeding; I won't be able to go on playing'. When he 
finally manages to stand up, he realizes that his hand is OK, and sees that 
one of his team-mate's hands is bleeding. Is this not an error of 
identification concerning bodily self-ascriptions? 
Evans's reply would be that it is not an error of misidentification, but a 
malfunctioning of the perceptual system. Under normal circumstances, 
when the person's perceptual apparatus works properly, such an error 
would not be committed: people do not usually mistake their arm for that 
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of their neighbour. The above example, however, is not normal, because 
the player's perceptual mechanism fails. What happens is that, first, the 
player feels the pain in his left hand, probably because it is being squashed 
by other players; he, then, sees the bleeding hand, associates the blood 
and the pain, and rashly concludes that it is his hand. The malfunctioning 
may be attributed to the improper match between the painful sensations 
coming from his hand and his visual perception of a bleeding hand. 
Similarly, if someone wore a pair of glasses which were connected by 
radio waves to someone else's brain, so that he did not see what was in 
front of him, but what was in front of the other person, he would be 
mistaken in saying 'I am facing a table', for instance, if he in fact was not. 
However, this is not a counter-example against Evans's thesis, because 
Evans is explicitly affirming that bodily self-ascriptions are immune to 
error through misidentification when the information is obtained in the 
normal way. The latter example of the wired up glasses, as well as 
Shoemaker's set of mirrors (1984b) and the case of the rugby player, do 
not meet this requirement of normality. 
It should be noted that the reticence to accept that bodily self-ascriptions 
are immune to error through misidentification seems to lie in a resilient 
Cartesianism: the idea that I could have had a different body, whereas I 
could not have had a different self. That is, I can be mistaken about my 
bodily self-ascriptions ('I have a bad tooth') because the 'I' in them is not 
properly me; it is only my body. Strictly speaking, I am only the 'I' in such 
mental self-ascriptions as 'I see so and so' and 'I think such and such'. 
Therefore, I can commit an error of misidentification in my bodily self- 
ascriptions; in fact, how can I be sure that I am not wearing a pair of wired 
up glasses, as in the example above? Such an error, though, cannot be 
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committed in mental self-ascriptions: it is me who sees and thinks. 
Therefore, in order to resist Cartesianism, immunity to error through 
misidentification must be applied both at mental and bodily levels. 
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Chapter 6 
A NON-REDUCTIONIST ACCOUNT OF THE PERSON 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
After the foregoing criticism of the NO-theory and the Humean and 
Parfitian reductionist theses, a non-reductionist account of the person will 
be suggested. The main advantage of a non-reductionist approach is that 
the person is regarded as a whole, and both mental and physical 
characteristics are equally valued. There is a balance between the 
Cartesian preference for the mental features of the person, and the 
physicalist view of the person as a series of physical states. There is also 
a balance between the immutable Cartesian Ego and the critique of 
substantialist accounts in reductionist or eliminativist terms. 
In this chapter, the main tenets of the non-reductionist position will be 
exposed. Thereafter, and bearing in mind that one of the central purposes 
of this work is to defend the necessity of embodiment to be a person, the 
relation between a person and his material body will be studied in detail. 
6.2. THE NON-REDUCTIONIST THESIS 
6.2.1. Person as a logically primitive concept 
'Being pri_m-itive' is a relative notion: something is primitive with respect to 
something else. In this sense, a person is primitive with respect to a mind 
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and/or a body. "The concept of a person", says Strawson, "is logically 
prior to that of an individual consciousness. The concept of a person is 
not to be analyzed as that of an animated body or of an embodied anima" 
(1990: 103). The aim of this proposal is to go beyond the deadlock 
resulting from the widely accepted division of the person into mind and 
body (or mental and physical characteristics). Instead of starting with the 
mind and the body as the initial notions and, then, arriving at the idea of a 
person as a conjunction of the two, the process is reversed: the person is 
the starting-point, the logically primitive concept, and the mental and 
physical characteristics make sense only in relation to the person. A 
person is a different category altogether: not a mind, not a body, and not a 
sum of both. (See Ishiguro, 1980. ) 
6.2.2. M- and P-predicates 
Although it is claimed that the person is not reducible to a series of mental 
or physical states, it is surely true that people have both bodily and mental 
characteristics. So, how is a person to be defined? Precisely as that type 
of being to whom both bodily and mental properties can be ascribed. Two 
different authors have suggested: 
"the individual concerned, including oneself, should be of a certain 
unique type: of a type, namely, such that to each individual of that type 
there must be ascribed, or ascribable, both states of consciousness and 
corporeal characteristics. " (Strawson, 1990: 104) 
"Our customary use of 'I' simply spans the gap between the mental and 
the physical, and is no more intimately connected with one aspect of 
our self-conception than the other"; 
"a person is no more a thinking thing than a bodily thing" (Evans, 
1982: 256,261). 
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According to Strawson, there are two types of predicates ascribable to 
people: M- and P-predicates. M-predicates, like 'weighs ten stone' or 'is in 
the drawing-room', are those predicates which can also be ascribed to 
material bodies that lack consciousness; for instance, it can be said that 
the table weighs ten stone, or that the table is in the drawing-room. 
P-predicates, on the other hand, are those predicates not ascribable to 
material bodies. They can be subdivided into two groups. The first group 
includes those P-predicates which do not ascribe states of consciousness, 
although consciousness is presupposed in the being to whom they are 
ascribed. An example is 'is going for a walk', which can be ascribed to 
such conscious beings as people, cats or dogs. The second group is 
formed by those P-predicates which ascribe states of consciousness, like 
'is in pain', 'is thinking hard' or 'believes in God'. 
It could be said that Strawson's characterization of M- and P-predicates 
does not provide an exhaustive definition of a person. In particular, some 
of the P-predicates he mentions are not uniquely ascribed to people: such 
predicates as 'is in pain' or 'is going for a walk' are also ascribable to dogs 
or cats. Moreover, for some P-predicates (like 'is smiling', or 'is going for 
a walk') it is not even necessary to be a person, since someone can be a 
person even though he may be unable to smile or walk about. (See 
Moulder, 1973; and Williams, 1973c. ) 
It is true that Strawson's position is by no means perfect. For one, he fails 
to provide an appropriate account of the status of animals, somewhere in 
between persons and material bodies. On the other hand, though, it is not 
a shortcoming that he does not give strict necessary and sufficient 
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conditions for something to be included in the category 'person', since it 
could be argued that he never attempted to do so. His account is a 
reaction against two traditions: the Cartesian tradition, which maintains 
that persons are pure Egos, with no essential material features; and the 
reductionist tradition, for being an inadequate way of dealing with 
Cartesianism. Against these, Strawson maintains that a person has both 
corporeal and mental (or psychological) characteristics. Thus, in affirming 
that M-predicates are ascribable to a person, he is simply saying that a 
person has something in common with other material objects. In arguing 
that people are those beings to whom both M- and P-predicates can be 
ascribed, he distinguishes them from material bodies (and, it could be 
added, from animals, once the necessary qualifications are incorporated'). 
Therefore, this account succeeds in opening the door to a whole new 
approach to the concept of a person, where the latter is not secondary with 
respect to the notions of body and mind. 
The spirit of Strawson's account can also be found in Evans's analysis of 
the concept of a person. Like Strawson, although adopting a first-person 
point of view, Evans says that there are two types of predicates a person 
can ascribe to himself bodily and mental predicates. Among the former 
are those predicates of which knowledge can be obtained through the 
person's proprioceptive sense (like, 'my legs are crossed'), his sense of 
heat and cold, or his sense of balance (like, 'I am falling down'). Among 
the latter are included predicates regarding beliefs or visual experiences. 
This dual component is very important, for it supports the special status of 
persons as beings in the world: on the one hand, persons, like other 
material objects, have corporeal characteristics which are essential to 
them; on the other hand, they have certain features not possessed by other 
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material things. The details of P-predicates ascription will now be 
considered. 
6.2.3. The logical features of P-predicates 
The central aspect of P-predicates is that their ascription to oneself is 
logically linked to the ascription of the very same predicates to other 
people. That is, one would not know how to ascribe a certain P-predicate 
(like 'is in pain' or 'is depressed') to oneself, unless one knew the 
circumstances under which that very same predicate could be ascribed to 
others. Or, as Strawson himself puts it, 
"It is a necessary condition of one's ascribing states of consciousness, 
experiences, to oneself, in the way one does, that one should also 
ascribe them, or be prepared to ascribe them, to others who are not 
oneself' (1990: 99). 
On this account, then, and unlike the solipsist or behaviourist positions 
(which regard first- or third-person ascription, respectively, as the 
logically primary type of ascription), self- and other-ascription lean on 
each other, so that neither of them is logically primary. 
The conditions for the ascription of P-predicates, although logically 
related, is different in the first and third persons. One ascribes P- 
predicates to others in the presence of adequate behavioural criteria, while 
one does not ascribe them to oneself on the basis of such behavioural 
criteria. Or perhaps it should be pointed out that not all P-predicates 
follow this dual way of ascription, but "it is true of some important classes 
of P-predicates, that when one ascribes them to oneself, one does not do 
137 
so on the strength of observation of those behaviour criteria on the 
strength of which one ascribes them to others" (Strawson, 1990: 107). 2 
The following example will make things clearer. Consider the P-predicate 
'is depressed'. As far as its self-ascription is concerned, one ascribes it to 
oneself without having to rely on the observation of one's own external 
behaviour. As far as its other-ascription goes (eg, 'Peter is depressed'), 
one relies on Peter's behaviour (apathy, lack of energy, melancholic look) 
in order to ascribe such a predicate to him. Therefore, 'is depressed' is one 
of those P-predicates whose ascription is different in the first- and third- 
person, although logically linked. 
The point made by Strawson in terms of predicate-ascription can also be 
established at the level of thought, in terms of what Evans calls the 
Generality Constraint (1982: 100). Evans understands the entertaining of 
a thought as an addition of two abilities: one concerning the Idea of an 
object; the other concerning the concept of a property (in the thought that 
a is F (Fa), a is the object and F is the property). The Generality 
Constraint can be expressed by saying that the entertaining of a thought, 
like a is F, lies at the intersection of two series of thoughts: one, a is G, a 
is H, and so on; the other, b is F, c is F, and so on. Entertaining a thought, 
then, is an ability (or a sum of two abilities), in the sense that one should 
know what it means to ascribe other properties to the same object, and 
what it means to ascribe the same property to other objects. For example, 
the thought that Peter is British cannot be entertained unless one knows 
what is meant by (and is ready to entertain) such thoughts as John is 
British, Mary is British, on the one hand; and Peter is English or Peter is a 
student, on the other hand. 
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The Generality Constraint, as a condition for the possession of thoughts, 
establishes that, for someone to be able to ascribe a certain predicate to 
himself, he must also be able to ascribe it to other people. The application 
of the predicate 'is depressed' to oneself is conceptually linked to the 
ascription of that very same predicate to others. Furthermore, the 
Generality Constraint is valid not only for mental ascriptions, but also for 
bodily ones. The thought that I am in front of the cupboard, for instance, 
implies the ability to ascribe such a property ('being in front of the 
cupboard') not only to people, but also to dogs, fridges, and so on. 
6.2.4. One objection 
Many objections have been made against non-reductionist accounts of the 
person. The one that follows has been singled out because it goes against 
the core of the non-reductionist approach. Kjaergaard (1969) has 
criticized the view that persons are logically primary (with respect either 
to a disembodied person or to a body). His argument goes as follows: 
(1) according to Strawson, there are two basic particulars: 
material bodies and persons; 
(2) he also claims that a person has or possesses corporeal 
characteristics (a body); 
(3) he argues that a disembodied person lives only a secondary 
existence, dependent on his previous embodied existence; 
(4) therefore, persons are not basic particulars, since they 
depend on material bodies for their identification; 
(5) therefore, material bodies are the only basic particulars. 
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The point of this objection is that the non-reductionist position, as it is 
defended by Strawson, is incoherent, because, although he maintains that 
persons are basic particulars, his following discussion of the nature of 
persons shows that they are not (at least, if the consequences of his 
arguments are followed to the end). 
But, what is a basic particular? The notion (briefly mentioned in the 
previous chapter) is introduced in the context of an opposition to 
reductionist analyses of the person. There, a distinction is made between 
things and states or processes (of things), the difference being that the 
former can be identified (or re-identified) by themselves, whereas the 
identification of the latter depends on the prior (in the sense of 
conceptually prior) identification of the things whose states or processes 
they are. As discussed in the preceding chapter, identification of a pain 
requires the prior identification of the person whose pain it is. "Hence, 
given a certain general feature of the conceptual scheme we possess, and 
given the character of the available major categories, things which are, or 
possess, material bodies must be the basic particulars. " (Strawson, 
1990: 39) 
Kjaergaard's objection seems to rely on the following analogy. In the 
same way in which identification of a pain depends on the identification of 
the person who bears the pain, identification of a person depends on the 
conceptually prior identification of a material body. Therefore, neither 
pains nor persons are basic particulars; only material bodies are. From 
here, it is only a small step to the view that persons are material bodies; a 
step taken, for instance, by Williams (1973b). 
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What has to be shown, in order to resist this conclusion, is that persons are 
different from material bodies. One way of doing this is to argue that if 
persons were material bodies, then personal names and pronouns would be 
interchangeable salva vent ate with expressions referring to a person's 
body; and, then, look for contexts in which substitution does not only not 
preserve the same truth-value, but also contexts in which substitution is 
illicit, because it breaks semantic conventions (eg, 'NN is proud of his 
body' and NN's body is proud of his body'). This leads to the conclusion 
that persons are categorically different from material bodies. This line has 
been taken, in a recently published paper, by Glock and Hyman (1994). 
The argument to be developed here, though, consists in an analysis of the 
relationship between a person and his material body. A simpler model of 
such a relationship will be proposed, one which will help us to understand 
the differences between a person and his material body. In the course of 
doing so, the discussion will prove crucial in making the notion of a 
person's body more precise. 
6.3. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN A PERSON AND HIS MATERIAL 
BODY 
6.3.1. Definitional connection 
According to certain materialist theories, the connection between a person 
and his material body is definitional: that is, a person is defined in terms of 
his material body; a person is identified with a particular material body. 
What does this amount to? Wittgenstein (see Pears, 1988) offers the 
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following considerations regarding the connection between a person and 
his body. Although it is true that a person cannot exist without a body, the 
definitional connection does not capture that in which the relationship 
between a person and his material body consists. First, it makes sense to 
say of a person that he can change his body. Second, there are two lines 
which connect a person with the world: one going from his perceptual 
organs to his centre of consciousness; the other, from his centre of 
consciousness to the organs that implement his behavioural reactions in 
the world. As a matter of fact, both lines run through the same body, but 
they could be disrupted and attached to two different bodies. Therefore, 
Wittgenstein/Pears conclude, a person is not identical with his material 
body. 
In the next few pages, both the idea that a person can change his material 
body, and the latter possibility of a disruption in a person's connection to 
the world will be considered. It will emerge that there are two ways in 
which a person's embodiment can be analyzed. 
6.3.2. Presuppositional connection 
Let us suppose that (A) somebody's personal line is broken in a consistent 
way, so that such a person always speaks through someone else's mouth. 
Since it might be protested that this description of case (A) begs the 
question (for two different persons are said to be involved), it will be re- 
described in the following way: there is somebody who, for example, feels 
a pain in a certain body's leg (let us call it 'body, '), although he manifests 
the pain through the mouth of a body ('body2'), distinct from the body in 
which the pain is felt. One way of coping with this example would be to 
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suggest that such a person has two bodies: one for his perceptual, and one 
for his behavioural, interaction with the world, respectively. A problem 
for this proposal would be the paradoxical fact that the person would 
appear to be located in two different points in space, but the paradox may 
be solved by specifying whether one is referring to the location of the 
person's perceptual organs (perceptual body), or to his behavioural organs 
(behavioural body). 
Let us further suppose that (B) someone's personal line is broken in a 
completely chaotic manner, so that he feels pain in different, unpredictable 
legs, and manifests the pain through unpredictable mouths, different from 
the bodies in which he feels the pain. Could it be said that such a person 
has a body, although scattered in different places? What would be the 
limits of that person's body? And how could we identify and re-identify 
his body, and the person, in such anomalous circumstances? 
In order to grasp what is going on in both (A) and (B), let us compare 
them with the situation of a normal person. In the normal case, there is, it 
has been suggested, an unbroken personal line which runs through a single 
material body. This is what Pears refers to as the presuppositional 
connection between a person and his body: 
"It is a familiar fact that, when a person's right hand is hurt, there is a 
line running into the seat of his consciousness and out again to his 
mouth. He says 'I am in pain', and though the word 'I', as used by him, 
does not mean 'this body', it does presuppose the integrity of this 
personal line. There has to be a connection running back from the 
mouth that speaks through the seat of the consciousness of the pain to 
the injured part of the body. " (252) 
So far, then, the difference between the normal case and (A) seems to be 
that in the former the personal line flows along one single body, while in 
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the latter there is a personal line running from one body ('body, ') to the 
seat of consciousness and out to the other body ('body, '). In (A), it could 
be said, there is one single person (one personal line) with two material 
bodies. (When the notion of sensory and intentional embodiment is 
introduced in a later chapter, it will be possible to argue that in the normal 
case, unlike in (A), the person's sensory and intentional levels of 
embodiment take place in the same material body. ) 
In (A), then, the relative similarity with the normal case allows for the 
presupposition of a personal line, although one that involves two material 
bodies. In (B), however, the relative similarity existing between (A) and 
the normal case totally disappears. There is no way of telling where the 
personal line begins and ends. Since chaos is total, there is no way of 
determining how the person's sensory and/or intentional links with the 
world are instantiated. The presuppositional connection is, therefore, lost. 
The question about how many material bodies there are cannot be 
answered; that is, our concept of person, body and the relation between 
them cannot be applied to such cases as (B). 
6.3.3. The unique role of my body 
Pears argues that the fact that people may be able to change their bodies 
shows that the definitional connection between person and material body 
is not valid. But, what does it mean to say that people can change their 
material bodies? And, does this model support the view that people's 
connection to their material bodies is not definitional? 
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An initial problem for this model seems to be that, rather than helping 
Wittgenstein/Pears to find an alternative to the Cartesian and 
definitionalist accounts, it results in an embarrassing dilemma. If having a 
particular material body is not necessary for people to be who they are, 
that is, if people can change their material body and still be themselves, 
then the Cartesian position appears to be vindicated. If people can leave 
their actual material body, acquire a new one, and still be themselves, then 
somehow they are so detached from their body that what they are is 
independent from what their body is. 3 However, the Cartesian danger 
aside, arguing that a particular material body is necessary for someone to 
be the person he is, and that he cannot change his body without being a 
different person altogether, apart from sounding too extreme (people can 
in fact change part of their material bodies in transplants and surgery, and 
still be themselves, with perhaps minor changes of personality), somehow 
suggests that people are material bodies. But the latter is precisely the 
definitional view being resisted here. 
In order to find a way out of this dilemma, it is important to make a 
distinction between ownership of material body, and ownership of such 
things as clothes, a car, and so on. People do not own their body in the 
same way in which they own a house or some clothes. Therefore, they 
cannot change their body in the same (easy) way in which they change 
their clothes. 
But, if 'my' in 'my body' does not signify ownership, what does it signify? 
'My' stresses the special and unique role that a particular material body 
plays for a person. 'My body' means that, of all the different bodies in the 
world, this particular one is specially significant for me, because it is the 
one on which my experiential contact with the world causally depends. 
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This amounts to saying that I obtain information about, and act upon, the 
world through this particular body: its position, for instance, conditions 
what I shall perceive as well as what I can do. 
Wittgenstein says something that is relevant here: "the man who cries out 
with pain, or says that he has pain, doesn't choose the mouth which says 
it" (1969: 68). That is, once he feels pain, he can only express it (if he 
wants to do so) through a particular mouth. There is no range of 
possibilities, from which he chooses the mouth he prefers; nor can he 
express his pain through different mouths on different occasions. This is 
due to the fact that a certain mouth is imposed on him, rather than chosen 
by him. In general, it could be said that our own body is similarly 
imposed on us, and we have no alternative: we interact with the world 
through that particular material body. Such a body is unique because it is 
the only one given to us; because it is the only one on which our 
experiential contact with the world (both at sensory and intentional levels) 
depends. This special relationship between a person and his material body 
could be called 'metaphysical ownership', as opposed to the legal 
ownership that characterizes the relation between a person and his many 
possessions, like his car or his clothes. 
This distinction between legal ownership and causal dependence turns out 
to be crucial in avoiding the previous dilemma; the Cartesian half of the 
dilemma, in particular, can be avoided. First, talk of metaphysical 
ownership should be understood as causal dependence of a person's 
experiences on a particular body. Second, if talk of ownership of body is 
not logically on the same level as ownership of (say) clothes, neither is 
change of body on the same level as change of clothes. Furthermore, our 
body is imposed on us, rather than chosen or changed at will. In 
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consequence, the alleged Cartesian gap between Ego and body is not a 
gap: a special and close connection exists. 
These considerations have important consequences for the terms in which 
the matter at hand is expressed. The question is whether people could 
possibly change their body. But the latter question cannot be asked, 
because there is no choice open to people in the first place; instead, their 
body is something given. Therefore, viewing the problem as an alternative 
between possibility/impossibility of change of body is incorrect: both 
options are based on the mistaken assumption that people own (ie, legally 
own), rather than causally depend on, their body. This line of enquiry, 
therefore, fails to show that the relationship between a person and his 
material body is not definitional. 
Something positive that emerges from the previous discussion is the idea 
that there are two ways in which the notion of a body can be taken: first, 
the body as the link between person and world, that which makes the 
person's experiential interaction with the world possible (in previous 
sections, this was called the sensory/intentional body); second, the body as 
a material entity. Such a distinction appears clearly in the example (A) 
above, the case of a person whose causal interaction with the world was 
dependent on two different material bodies, instead of one; that is, the 
person's sensory and intentional body was instantiated in two different 
material bodies. The case (A), then, makes explicit two levels that might 
be confused in the normal case: the sensory/intentional level of 
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embodiment, and the material level of embodiment. 
Thus, some accuracy can be introduced to the question regarding the 
connection between a person and his body. According to the 
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definitionalist view, people are their material body. Those who defend a 
presuppositional link, on the other hand, refer to the fact that people have 
a sensory and intentional body linking them to the world. At first sight, 
both types of connection seem to be compatible. What remains to be seen 
is whether the relation between a person and his material body is 
definitional. In the next section, a different type of relation will be 
outlined. 
6.3.4. The relationship between a person and his material body 
Is the relation between a person and his material body one of constitution? 
Consider the case of a statue and the amount of clay it is made of. The 
relation between statue and clay is not one of identity, because different 
criteria of identity apply to the statue and to the amount of clay: even 
when the statue no longer exists (perhaps it has been broken), the clay is 
still there. The pile of clay after the breakage is not (the same as) the 
statue, but is (the same as) the clay that made up the statue. Could it be a 
relation of constitution? A definition of constitution could go along the 
following lines: x constitutes y at t if, and only if, x could be a substratum 
of y's destruction (see Doepke, 1982). According to this, the relation 
between statue and clay counts as one of constitution, since the pile of 
clay remains after the destruction of the statue. 
Lowe (1989) has tried to apply this model to the relation between person 
and body. First of all, though, he considers whether living organisms (like 
oak trees) are constituted by parcels of matter. The answer is affirmative: 
the stuff that makes up a living organism can continue to exist after the 
destruction of the organism itself. Thus, since a human being (a member 
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of the species homo sapiens) is a living organism, then human beings are 
constituted by parcels of matter. 
An important feature of the relation of constitution is that it is not a 
contingent relation. If the relation of constitution were contingent, then 
living organisms, although material, need not be constituted by a particular 
parcel of matter (a particular collection of material particles), as opposed 
to a different parcel of matter. But since the relation of constitution is not 
contingent, then, living organisms are essentially material, where an 
essential property is one which an individual cannot lose without ceasing 
to exist. 
Bearing this in mind, and allowing for a distinction between a person and a 
human being, Lowe asks himself whether or not the relation between a 
person and the human being that person is is one of constitution. Consider 
the following argument: 
(1) constitution is a transitive relation; 
(2) constitution is not a contingent relation; 
(3) since human beings are constituted by matter, then they are 
non-contingently material; 
(4) if persons were constituted by human beings, then they 
would be non-contingently material; that is, they would be 
essentially material; 
(5) immaterial persons are possible; 
(6) therefore, persons are not constituted by human beings or by 
matter. 
Lowe's main obstacle for accepting (6) is his endorsement of the 
conceptual possibility of immaterial persons: persons are not essentially 
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material, since loss or lack of materiality does not mean loss or lack of 
existence. However, premise (5) in Lowe's argument need not, and will 
not, be accepted by those who share the sort of considerations offered in 
previous chapters, where arguments against the possibility of disembodied 
persons were proposed. 
A different objection against the view that a person is constituted by his 
material body is that it amounts to analyzing the person into more basic 
components. Thus, persons would lose their status as basic particulars, 
becoming reducible or analyzable into other more basic elements. 
At this point, and although already discussed earlier in this chapter, it is 
worth remembering the distinction made by Strawson between basic and 
non-basic particulars. In order to define what counts as a basic particular, 
two features are stressed. First, no private particulars (such as 
experiences and sensations) can count as basic, because their 
identification (and re-identification) is dependent on other particulars: the 
person whose experience or sensation it is. Second, basic particulars must 
be observable, so that theoretical constructs (like particles of physics) are 
excluded: "it is clear enough that in so far as we do make identifying 
references to particulars of this sort, we must ultimately identify them, or 
groups of them, by identifying reference to those grosser, observable 
bodies of which perhaps, like Locke, we think of as the minute, 
unobservable constituents" (1990: 44). What counts as a basic particular, 
then? Basic particulars are publicly observable objects in the spatio- 
temporal order, such as chairs, dogs or persons; that is, those "things 
which are, or possess, material bodies" (39). 
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According to this, the statue in the example would be a basic particular: it 
is a material body whose identification is not dependent on anything else. 
Would the clay that makes up the statue be a basic particular? No, 
because identifying reference to it depends on the object (the statue) that it 
constitutes. If we ostensively referred to it as 'that clay over there', 
meaning 'that amount of clay', we could still ask 'do you mean the clay of 
the statue? ' (or, to clarify matters, 'I mean the clay of the statue'). 
Therefore, something (like the statue) can be a basic particular 
independently of whether it is constituted by something else. Questions of 
constitution cut across questions about basic particulars. 
A reply to the objection that a person does not count as a basic particular 
if such a person were constituted by his material body is that persons are 
basic particulars because their identification is independent of the 
conceptually previous identification of other objects, not because they are 
not constituted by other elements. That is, persons would still be basic 
particulars even if they were constituted by material elements (material 
body). 
There is still an objection against the view that the relation between a 
person and his material body is one of constitution. It goes as follows. In 
the example of the statue, there is nothing else that makes up the statue 
apart from the clay; that is, the statue is a parcel of matter (clay) with a 
certain shape. In the case of the relation between a person and his 
material body, though, there is more to being a person than just having a 
body: a person has psychological characteristics, too. However, if the 
relation between person and material body was modelled on the relation 
between statue and clay, it would seem as if the psychological attributes of 
the person had been left out. The objection is that whereas constitution 
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exhausts the relation between statue and clay, it does not exhaust the 
relation between person and material body. Therefore, if the former is a 
relation of constitution, then the latter only resembles it to a certain 
degree. 
This objection, however, is not decisively fatal, because the case of the 
statue and the clay has been intended simply as a guide in the discussion, 
not as a perfect model. In this sense, there are many similarities between 
the relation statue/clay and the relation person/material body. One, the 
identity conditions of the person and of his material body are different: 
after death, when there is no longer a person, there is still a body; 
therefore, their relation is not a matter of simple identity. 
Two, identifying reference to the material body of a person is conceptually 
dependent on the person whose body it is (like reference to the clay 
depends on the identification of the statue); in this sense, neither the clay 
nor the material body are basic particulars. Therefore, it is concluded that, 
although it is true that such material bodies as chairs and dogs are basic 
particulars, this does not support the move that persons are not basic 
particulars. Kjaergaard's objection was based on the analogy between the 
identification-dependence of pain on people and the identification- 
dependence of people on their body. However, a more detailed 
examination has shown that, similar to the case of the statue, it is the 
person's material body that depends on the person, and not vice versa. 
Thus, persons are basic particulars, not identical with their material body. 
Before this chapter is finally drawn to an end, it might be worth making it 
clear that the foregoing analysis of the relationship between a person and 
his material body is not intended as a reductive analysis (or even as 
152 
opening the door to a possible reductive approach). It can certainly be 
argued that talk of persons and personal identity at the intentional level is 
in itself enough, and need not be matched by a parallel non-intentional 
level of discussion. The self-sufficiency of the former, as an interpretive 
schema different from the scientific one, is something that will pervade the 
whole of this thesis. Nonetheless, the analysis of the relationship between 
a person and his material body is pertinent at this point as a way of 
showing that Kjaergaard's objection (ie, that material bodies are 
conceptually previous to persons) is mistaken, thus reinforcing the idea 
that persons are categorically distinct from material bodies. 
Furthermore, this discussion of the relationship between a person and his 
material body is the perfect introduction for the following chapter. 
Returning to the necessity-of-embodiment thesis, and after having rejected 
the identification between a person and a material body, a new definition 
of embodiment will now be proposed. As sketched in chapter 4, it is a 
notion that will pay attention to the active involvement of the person in the 
world. More importantly, it will be the beginning of the promised 
reconciliation of the subjective and objective sides of the problem of 
personal identity. 
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Chapter 7 
DEFINITION OF EMBODIMENT 
7.1. DESCRIPTION OF TYPES OF EMBODIMENT 
In the first place, there is what might be called 'normal' embodiment; ie, 
the body that includes all the sensory and motor mechanisms (limbs, eyes, 
ears, and so on) of a normal person. A person who possesses this type of 
body will be called 'the maximally embodied person'. Such a person is not 
just a stipulated entity: it is the actual person in the actual world. It is the 
maximally embodied person because a person who possesses a more 
complete body cannot be found in the actual world 
1. In a different 
possible world, the notion of maximum embodiment may include all the 
elements of a maximally embodied person in the real world plus other 
features (perhaps, a new sense or a greater number of limbs. ) 
Using the above notion as a starting point, other types of embodiment can 
be characterized. In particular, cases of amputation. These cases can be 
defined in terms of the above standard notion: amputated embodiment is 
the notion of a body that lacks one or more of the features that 
characterize 'normal' embodiment. Since such a body can lack one or 
more organs, the notion of amputated embodiment admits of degrees: lack 
of eyes, lack of eyes and ears, paralysis in limbs, and so on. An extreme 
case of amputation might be the paralysed person who also lacks sensory 
perception of the world. The latter could be considered 'the minimally 
embodied person'. (A matter of further discussion will be whether there is 
embodiment in such a condition. ) 
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7.2. TWO NOTIONS OF EMBODIMENT 
Two notions of embodiment emerge from the previous descriptions. The 
first one will be called paradigmatic embodiment (the term is borrowed 
from Shoemaker, 1976), and includes two requisites: sensory and 
intentional embodiment. A person is sensonly embodied if such a person 
is causally connected to his environment, so that the latter produces in him 
experiences which are true perceptions of his surroundings. Analogously, 
a person is intentionally embodied if such a person is causally connected 
to his environment, so that the person's intentions to act produce 
appropriate responses from his body in order to bring about changes in his 
environment. Thus, if a person is both sensorily and intentionally 
embodied, then such a person is paradigmatically embodied. 
Both cases of 'normal' embodiment and cases of amputated embodiment 
(parasitic on the former) are examples of paradigmatic embodiment. The 
paralysed person who is cut off from sensory perception (and perhaps the 
brain in the vat), though, would not count as an embodied person, since he 
lacks both the perceptual and the intentional links with the world. 
According to such an account of embodiment, the minimally embodied 
person is not embodied at all. 
The notion of sensory/intentional embodiment proposed above is 
reminiscent of Merleau-Ponty's notion of the phenomenal body, as 
opposed to the objective body. The body conceived of objectively is the 
physical object, made up of flesh and bone, comprehensible by the natural 
sciences (medicine, physics, etc). The phenomenal body, though, is the 
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body as it is presented in our own personal experience, at the level of 
sensation, perception, and action. It is, for instance, the body we know to 
have been stung by a mosquito, and exactly where, without having to look 
for the bite. For a blind person, for instance, the stick with which he 
'touches' things as he walks about is part of his phenomenal body. 
An important feature of the phenomenal body is that it is not an object, at 
least in the traditional sense of object, like a chair or a fridge. Merleau- 
Ponty offers several considerations in his attempt to show the non- 
objective status of the phenomenal body: 
i. the phenomenal body is always present to us, whereas 
worldly objects are sometimes absent; 
11. the phenomenal body is an affective 'object', whereas 
external things are just the object of my representations: in 
the case of pain, for instance, the phenomenal body is the 
place where I feel the pain, whereas the cause of the pain is 
the external object; 
M. in kinaesthetic sensations, it appears clearly that I move 
external objects with my body, whereas I move my 
phenomenal body directly (I do not move my phenomenal 
body with something else, as if it was an external object); 
iv. in the case of my phenomenal body, I do not have to look for 
it in order to know where it is, unlike external objects (eg, 
where I have been stung by a mosquito). 
That my phenomenal body is not an external object in the world does not 
imply that it is distanced from the world itself; on the contrary, it is what 
opens the person to the world: 
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,, The [phenomenal] body is the vehicle of being in the world, and 
having a body is, for a living creature, to be intervolved in a definite 
environment, to identify oneself with certain projects and to be 
continually committed to them. " (1962: 82) 
"The body is our general medium for having a world. " (146) 
"I become involved in things with my body, they co-exist with me as an 
incarnate subject, and this life among things has nothing in common 
with the elaboration of scientifically conceived objects. " (185) 
Now, this opening of the person to the world through his phenomenal 
body is not the sort of opening available through knowledge. It is not an 
intellectual opening, but a vital one, in the sense that the world available is 
a world of meanings (eg, verbal meanings in speech): 
"A certain experience of touch felt in the upper arm signifies a certain 
feeling in the forearm and shoulder along with a certain appearance of 
; the same arm ... 
" (15 1; emphasis). 
"Whether a system of motor or perceptual powers, our [phenomenal] 
body is not an object for an 'I think', it is a grouping of lived-through 
meanings which moves towards its equilibrium. " (153) 
The second notion is that of biological embodiment: a person is 
biologically embodied if his brain is in the skull of his body, and stands to 
it in certain relationships which do not exclude paralysis, blindness and so 
on (Shoemaker, 1976). According to this notion, the paralysed person 
who is cut off from sensory perception counts as embodied. 
What is the relation between both notions of embodiment? Could either of 
them be said to be primary with respect to the other? Shoemaker offers 
two considerations in favour of the view that paradigmatic embodiment is 
primary. First, the notion of biological embodiment makes sense only by 
comparison with the notion of paradigmatic embodiment. This can be 
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shown in the following way. The notion of biological embodiment is 
based on the identification of the brain as the centre of the person's 
consciousness. The brain has the key functions of controlling and 
organizing the perceptual inputs coming from the environment, as well as 
bringing about appropriate behavioural responses to such inputs, such as 
movement of limbs and articulated speech. Now, the fact that somebody's 
brain may function despite paralysis and perceptual deficiencies (ie, that 
somebody may be biologically embodied) appears intelligible only 
because such a case is understood on the model of other cases in which 
the brain's functions include the control of perceptual inputs and 
behavioural outputs (ie, cases of sensory/intentional embodiment). 
The second reason is derived from the fact that, in normal circumstances, 
cases of paradigmatic embodiment are also cases of biological 
embodiment. For instance, 'normal' people (ie, those who have been 
described as maximally embodied) have their brains inside their skulls, 
standing in certain relationships to their bodies: they are both biologically 
and paradigmatically embodied; they are not just biologically embodied. 
This is the reason why a case of biological embodiment without any 
degree of sensory/intentional embodiment is difficult to find in the actual 
world. It is possible to imagine, and talk about, a paralysed person who is 
cut off from sensory perception, but could such a person actually be 
found? It is also possible to make up a story, and entertain the possibility 
of a world in which a disease paralyses people's limbs and makes them 
deaf, blind and cut off from any kind of sensory perception; such a person, 
however, would have an intact brain, not damaged by the disease, inside 
his skull (Shoemaker, 1976: 112-3). Such a person would have a brain and 
the physiological appearance of a body, although it would not function like 
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one (there would be no movement of the limbs, no perception of the 
world). It would be like a perfect replica of a human being. 2 But, can 
instances of biological embodiment be found in this world? 
An example of biological embodiment might be the person in a comatose 
state: external appearance of a person, but no sensory and/or intentional 
interaction with the world. Or perhaps there is still some kind of 
connection to the world! It has been reported that when people wake up 
from a coma, they claim to have been able to hear something. If this were 
the case, it would not be a case of genuine biological embodiment, 
because a small degree of sensory connection to the world would still 
remain. There are also cases of deeper coma, which last for years, with no 
apparent sign of recovery. In this state, people's eyes are open, and there 
are visible blinks and face twitches, but these are not taken to imply some 
sort of interaction with the external environment. On the contrary, a look 
at these comatose people's EEG (encephalogram) indicates that there is 
not enough activity going on in their brains to suggest that perception or 
purposeful action occur. 
This prompts the question about the functions carried out by the brain of a 
biologically embodied person, bearing in mind that they are not 
perception- or action-related. What counts as an instance of biological 
embodiment may be clearer, if an answer to this question could be found. 
This is the task undertaken in the remaining sections of this chapter. 
159 
7.3. THINKING AND EMBODIMENT 
It could be maintained that the function of the brain is thinking, and that 
thinking can take place in the absence of any sensory or intentional 
interaction with the world; therefore, a biologically embodied person 
could still think. Under the name 'thinking' many different things are 
usually included: "solving problems, remembering, planning what one is 
expecting to do, planning what one is about to say, imagining things, 
considering opinions, making judgements" ('Nervous System', in Gregory, 
1987: 530ff). Some sort of analysis is required here. 
Two different cases of thinking can be distinguished: on the one hand, 
thinking about a philosophical problem; on the other hand, thinking how to 
move a heavy object from one place to another. The former is a mental or 
theoretical exercise; the latter is a practical one. While the former may be 
said to take place in one's head (or, brain), without the involvement of 
anything external, the latter will include such things as measuring the 
distance, weighing the object, trying to lift the object to feel how heavy it 
is, and so on. 
7.3.1. Practical thinking and embodiment 
In relation to this second sense of thinking, it is necessary that the person 
in question be connected to the world: first, he must be able to perceive 
the object, the distance, the obstacles in his path, in order to imagine or 
visualize the alternative ways of carrying out the task; second, he must 
decide which is the best way of doing it, and physically carry it out (ie, use 
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his hands and arms to lift it up, walk carefully minding the obstacles, 
perhaps changing slightly his previously decided route, until he reaches his 
destination). Only when the object has been moved, has the action of 
thinking been accomplished. 
The point of this example is to argue that thinking is not only something 
that happens in the brain, without the need for anything else, so that as 
long as the brain works properly, thinking still takes place. There is a 
sense of thinking according to which the person who thinks must be 
causally connected to his external environment, so that inputs can be 
received from the world and outputs sent back to the world; that is, such a 
person must be sensorily and intentionally embodied. According to this, 
the paralysed person cut off from sensory perception cannot think how to 
move an object from one place to another: on the one hand, he can neither 
perceive the object, nor the distance, nor the obstacles; on the other hand, 
he cannot actually move the object. In a state of biological embodiment, 
then, it is not possible to think in this practical sense. 
It may be objected that the previous account of practical thought is too 
strong, and does not leave room for other more general cases. The 
foregoing description of the steps taken by somebody who intends to 
move an object from one place to another is a very detailed one. 
However, somebody may form a more general intention to do something. 
For instance, a magician could form the intention to move a mountain in 
the abstract, as in a fairy story. He simply intends to do it and the 
mountain disappears, without having to worry about the distance, the 
obstacles, or anything. 
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The reply to this objection will follow a similar line as a point made in the 
discussion of Penelhum's views (see 2.2.3. above). It will be argued that 
general intentions do not make sense unless modelled on more specific 
ones. The idea that a magician can have a general abstract intention to 
move a mountain is intelligible because there are other more specific 
cases, where objects are moved from one place to another through 
intermediate steps. It is because these specific cases are the model that 
the magician's example can be understood, as a case where the onerous 
intermediate steps can be missed out. Therefore, if specific cases are 
primary with respect to the general ones, then the thesis still holds that in a 
state of biological embodiment it is not possible to think in the practical 
sense. 
7.3.2. Theoretical thinking and embodiment 
Could theoretical thinking be possible in a state of biological embodiment? 
It may appear so, since theoretical thinking takes place, as it were, in one's 
head. Working out an addition, or solving a philosophical problem, 
appears to be something that can be done without the causal connection to 
the world required in practical thinking. In support of this, we have the 
example of paralysed people (or people suffering from other sensory 
deficiencies) who get university degrees, and manage to achieve far better 
results than many so-called 'normally' embodied people. Theoretical 
thought, then, could occur in the absence of any sensory and/or intentional 
interaction with the world. 
First of all, it must be observed that paralysed people are not completely 
disconnected from the world, that is, they are not instances of biologically 
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embodied people. They might be unable to move their limbs, but they are 
still sensorily connected to the world; or they might not be totally 
paralysed, so that they can find (unusual) ways of responding to the 
perceptual inputs coming from the world. In this sense, they should be 
regarded as cases of amputated embodiment, that is, as a sort of defective 
paradigmatic embodiment, and not as instances of biological embodiment. 
If this is the case, it cannot be concluded that theoretical thought could 
occur in a state of biological embodiment, simply because there are 
paralysed people who get university degrees. 
An argument will now be sketched in defence of the necessity of a strong 
sense of embodiment (ie, sensory/intentional embodiment) for theoretical 
thinking. Wittgenstein spent considerable time and effort in arguing that 
following a rule requires a community of rule-followers. 
3 A man in 
isolation could not follow a rule, for there would be no criteria of 
correction: correct would simply be what seemed correct to him. 
However, if there is a community of rule-followers, although something 
may seem correct to a single individual, it may not be so. The criterion of 
correction is in the community, not in the individual himself. In this view, 
then, without a community, there would be neither rules, in particular 
linguistic rules, nor meaning, nor language. 
If these arguments could be analogously applied to the level of thought, 
then it could be concluded that a community is required for engaging in 
theoretical thought; that is, without a community of people, there would be 
no rules, in particular rules of thinking, and therefore, no thinking. Since 
biologically embodied people are cut off from the world (both at the 
sensory and intentional levels), they are also cut off from the community 
of people and are, therefore, in isolation. In such a state, then, there 
163 
would be no room left for the notions of rule, language or thought. 
Therefore, paradigmatic embodiment is necessary for theoretical thought. 
The problem with this argument is how far the analogy between language 
and thought can be pressed; in particular, the similarity between linguistic 
rules and rules of thought. An example of the latter are such rules as the 
modus ponens; or, in general, what might be called rationality constraints 
(which may include the law of non-contradiction as well as the idea that 
one typically acts on one's intentions, for instance). Rationality 
considerations constrain the way people think: people do not typically 
hold contradictory beliefs, for instance. In this sense, these constraints are 
rules just as much as linguistic rules are. What is not so clear, though, is 
the connection between rationality constraints and a community of 
thinkers. At the linguistic level, the connection is made through the form 
of life: language and meaning emerge from the shared form of life of the 
community (think, for instance, of the way in which sensation-words 
become meaningful), so that without a community there would be no 
language. Are rules of thought similar to linguistic rules in this respect, or 
are they different in the sense that the same rules of thought may apply to 
different communities with different forms of life? Are Martians, for 
example, subject to the same rationality constraints as we are? 
In a wider context, the problem could be taken to be the relation between 
language and thought. Is it possible to think without language? It is 
obviously the case that people sometimes think without expressing their 
thoughts, but would it be possible to think always without language, or to 
think before one learns a language? Wittgenstein (1963: 329ff) tried to 
show the intimate connection between language and thought. In 
particular, he opposed the view that there is a gap between thought and its 
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translation into language, as if one first had a thought and, then, translated 
it into a language. Speaking of translation, he argues, is misleading here. 
It is not the case that a particular thought is first entertained in some sort 
of neutral way and, then, expressed in English (or Spanish, or any other 
language). Consider the following quote: 
"This case is similar to the one in which someone imagines that one 
could not think a sentence with the remarkable word order of German 
or Latin just as it stands. One first has to think it, and then one 
arranges the words in that queer order. (A French politician once 
wrote that it was a peculiarity of the French language that in it words 
occur in the order in which one thinks them. )" (para 336) 
When first learning a foreign language, like Spanish, pupils are 
encouraged to 'think in Spanish', as opposed to first thinking in English, 
and then make the translation into the other language; on many occasions, 
the latter procedure will fail to deliver an adequate Spanish sentence. It is 
not just a peculiarity of French that the word-order in a sentence is the 
same as the order of thought. Thus, thought is not divorced from 
language. 
In short, then, there is ground to argue in favour of the close relation 
between language and thought. Wittgenstein's arguments at the linguistic 
level could be extrapolated to the level of thought: without a community of 
people, there would be no rules, no language and no thought. People must 
be 'embodied' in the world; that is, sensory/intentional embodiment is also 
required for theoretical thought. 
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Apart from this Wittgensteinian way of understanding the necessary 
requirement of a community as a group of fellow language-users (rule- 
followers), there is also a more 'natural' way of interpreting it; that is, as 
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the causal relations between external objects and the perceiver/thinker. 
As mentioned earlier (see 2.2.1. ), the content of a perceiver's experiences 
comes from the external, objective world, through a series of lawful causal 
relations. Thus, my perceptual experience of a tree is the result of a causal 
link between an objective tree in the world and myself. Similarly, the 
content of a person's thoughts comes from the external world, as a result 
of a causal link (or a series of causal links). For example, my thought that 
there is a tree in front of me is the consequence of a causal relation 
between an external tree situated in front of me, and myself (who, through 
my working visual apparatus can appreciate the state of the world). 
Moreover, the causal link between world and thinker is not only, as it 
were, inwards (from the world to the thinker), but also outwards (ie, from 
the thinker to the world). For instance, after perceiving a tree in front of 
me, I can intentionally decide to pick some apples. What this amounts to 
is the necessity of sensory/intentional embodiment for thought, in general; 
that is, a causal connection between the person and the world both at the 
sensory (inwards) and intentional (outwards) levels. Thinking, not even 
theoretical thinking, could not take place unless in a state of 
sensory/intentional embodiment, for the content of one's thoughts comes 
from the world, and the content of such other mental phenomena as 
decisions and intentions leads to the world. 
7.4. SLEEP AND BIOLOGICAL EMBODIMENT 
The case of the sleeping person as a possible case of biological 
embodiment will now be examined. The sleeping person, it might be 
argued, is not paradigmatically embodied in the sense in which a person 
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who is awake (perhaps the sleeper himself when waking up) is: on the one 
hand, he is not sensorily connected to his environment in the sense of 
having experiences causally produced by external objects (or, at any rate, 
not as often or as intensely as the experiences of the person who is awake; 
some sounds, for instance, may seem to go unnoticed, since he does not 
react to them); on the other hand, he does not act upon the world, either. 
In order to avoid any misunderstanding, it must be made clear that the 
distinction made here is between the person who is awake, who is actually 
paradigmatically embodied, and the one who is asleep, who is not actually 
so, since he is not sensonly or intentionally connected to the world at that 
time. Therefore, if the sleeping person is not a case of paradigmatic 
embodiment, then he might be treated as a case of biological embodiment, 
for his brain is in his skull, standing in certain relationships to his body. 
But, what are those relationships between the sleeping person's brain and 
his body? This section will analyze what goes on in the sleeper's brain in 
order to see whether he could count (while asleep) as an instance of 
biological embodiment. 
One alternative is the idea that, even while asleep, there is thinking going 
on in a person's brain. Malcolm (1959) has criticized this position. He 
distinguishes between thinking and dreaming, and affirms that the sleeping 
person does not think, but dreams. There are two main arguments he puts 
forward in support of his view. According to the first one, there is a 
criterion for dreaming, whereas there is no criterion for thinking. Two 
possible criteria for dreaming are considered. One is the behaviour of the 
sleeping person: if he moves in bed or manifests other types of behaviour, 
then he could be said to be having a dream; if, on the contrary, he is still, it 
should be concluded that he is not dreaming. The other criterion is the 
person's testimony after waking up, that is, the fact that he tells a dream. 
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Lack of dream-behaviour, however, does not establish that the person did 
not dream, since he could well wake up and tell a dream. Therefore, the 
person's report when waking up is the criterion for dreaming; and the 
content of his report is the content of his dream. 
A word ought to be said about what a criterion is. The criterion for 
dreaming is not a definition of what a dream is. It is rather what 
determines whether the sentence 'he dreamt' (or 'he had a dream') is true or 
false. Malcolm's view is that such a sentence is true if the person tells a 
dream when waking up, and false if he does not. Similarly, then, Malcolm 
concludes, there are no criteria for thinking in sleep. There is no way of 
knowing that the sentence 'while asleep, I thought carefully about what 
you said last night and solved the problem' is true. However, the sentence 
'last night, I dreamt I solved the problem that worried you' is true, because 
the person is telling a dream. 
The second argument goes as follows. Thinking requires consciousness; 
that is, the person who thinks must be aware of what he is doing. 
However, a sleeping person is unconscious. Therefore, a sleeping person 
cannot be aware of (the content of) his act of thinking in sleep. Dreaming, 
however, does not require consciousness: "When someone says that he 
dreamt so and so, he does not imply that while he was sleeping, he was 
aware of being asleep or was aware of dreaming" (66). Therefore, it is 
impossible to think while asleep. The experiences had by the sleeping 
person are called 'dreams', which means precisely that they are not the 
kind of experiences had by the awake person (among which might be 
thinking). 
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Malcolm's views on what counts as the criterion for dreaming encounter a 
crucial problem, the fact that it is possible to have dreamt even though no 
story may be told when waking up. Many people find it difficult to say 
what they dreamt about the night before, and even whether they had 
dreams or not. However, scientists studying sleep tell us that people 
dream most nights. If this is the case, Malcolm's criterion turns out to be 
too narrow, unable to account for those cases where people dream, 
although they do not tell a dream after waking up. 
From the analysis of sleep in scientific laboratories emerge new 
considerations about what the criterion for dreaming is. Two different 
periods can be distinguished in sleep: NREM (No Rapid Eye Movement) 
and REM (Rapid Eye Movement) periods. REM sleep is characterized by 
two kinds of components: jerky eye movement, limbs twitches, face 
twitches, middle-ear muscle twitches, and sudden respiratory changes are 
the so-called 'phasic' components; muscle relaxation and penile erections 
are the 'tonic' components. It is currently thought that dream elements are 
injected intermittently with phasic components. Thus, it is argued that the 
occurrence of REM sleep is the criterion for dreaming. One of the 
advantages of treating REM sleep as the criterion for dreaming is that the 
duration of dreams could be measured in physical time: dreaming occurs 
when there is REM sleep, and lasts for as long as the period of REM 
sleep. 
Malcolm, in fact, opposes this view. 
5 What is relevant to the discussion 
in this section (whether or not the sleeping person is an instance of 
biological embodiment) is the fact that having a dream cannot be identified 
with thinking. Dreaming occurs in REM sleep, and not in NREM sleep. 
What is the difference between both periods of sleep? How is the latter to 
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be characterized? In an experiment carried out by Foulkes (see 
Dreaming', in Gregory, 1987: 201-3), different people were woken up and 
asked the question 'what was passing through your mind? ' (instead of the 
more biased one 'what were you dreaming about? '). Those who were in a 
REM period before waking up told a dream, whilst those in a NREM 
period were more vague in the description of their experiences. The latter 
experiences were not dreams, and have been characterized as 'thinking'. 
More experiments have been carried out that confirm this duality of 
experiences in sleep. What is not clear, though, is what this 'thinking', 
present in NREM sleep, involves. 
From the considerations in the previous section, it follows that, since the 
person in a period of NREM sleep is not a case of paradigmatic 
embodiment, he cannot think in the practical or theoretical senses 
mentioned above. So, what is meant by 'thinking' here remains unclear. 
Should it, then, be concluded that the sleeping person (either in a period of 
REM or NREM sleep) is a case of biological embodiment? If the 
description of the sleeping person as not actually sensorily and/or 
intentionally connected to the world is right, that may appear to be the 
appropriate conclusion. However, as in the case of people in a state of 
coma, sleeping people (at least, in some period in their sleep) might still, 
at some deep level, keep their sensory channels of connection to the world 
open; in that case, then, they would not count as clear-cut instances of 
biological embodiment. That they do in fact keep their sensory channels 
to the world open follows from the fact that people wake up when hearing 
the buzz of the alarm-clock, or when abruptly shaken (although, on some 
occasions, they may fail to do so). Consider the following quotation by 
Merleau-Ponty: 
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"It is true that this last link makes waking up a possibility: through 
these half-open doors things will return or the sleeper will come back 
into the world. [... ] In this sense, the sleeper is never completely 
isolated within himself, never totally a sleeper, and ... never totally cut 
off from the intersubjective world" (1962: 164). 
It must also be borne in mind that the dream-experiences occurring during 
sleep are dependent on the perceptual experiences of the awake person. 
The structure of the argument should be familiar by now. The content of 
the dream-experiences is the same as the content of the perceptual 
experiences, and must come from the external world through a series of 
causal links. Therefore, dream-experiences require a strong sense of 
embodiment, which guarantees the possibility of causal relations to the 
objective world. 
7.5. CONCLUSIONS 
1. The inability to find clear-cut instances of biological embodiment is 
symptomatic, because it suggests that biological embodiment is not a real 
type of embodiment. That is, examples can be made up (like the story 
proposed by Shoemaker), but there cannot be real people who are 
biologically embodied, but not sensorily/intentionally embodied. The 
ultimate reason why the sensory/intentional body is primary with respect 
to the biological body is, as Merleau-Ponty suggests, that the person is an 
"incarnate subject", a being existing, or rather living, in the world. 'Living' 
implies the idea of a vital, meaningful, relation that takes place between 
person and world, both at the levels of perception and action. Thus, a 
person who is not sensonly/intentionally embodied, is an impossible 
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notion: a person is necessarily a being-in-the-world, and cannot be cut off 
from the world. The notion of biological embodiment, though, still plays 
an important role, because it helps (by way of contrast) to make the notion 
of sensory and intentional embodiment clear. 
2. An important consequence that follows from the notion of 
sensory/intentional embodiment, as it has been characterized here, is the 
closeness between persons and the world: insofar as persons are embodied 
beings, they are, so to speak, embodied in the world. It is this 
embodiment in the world that, to a great extent, characterizes what being a 
person consists in: 
"The true cogito is not the intimate communing of thought with the 
thought of that thought: they meet only on passing through the world. 
The consciousness of the world is not based on self-consciousness- 
they are strictly contemporary. There is a world for me because I am 
not unaware of myself, and I am not concealed from myself because I 
have a world. " (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 297-8) 
3. Merleau-Ponty has repeatedly affirmed that the phenomenal body is not 
an object, in the way in which chairs, say, are. But, what is it then? The 
answer is clearly stated in the following quotations: 
"I have no means of knowing the human body other than that of living 
it [... ] I am my body, at least wholly to the extent that I possess 
experience, and yet at the same time my body is as it were a 'natural' 
subject, a provisional sketch of my total being" (1962: 198); 
"... the body is a natural self and, as it were, the subject of perception" 
(206). 
"The subject, which takes a point of view, is my body as the field of 
perception and action" (1964: 16). 
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Having rejected the identification of the person with his material body (see 
6.3.4 
. 
), what we are left with now is a notion of the body, the 
sensory/intentional body, which can be identified with the person as a 
subject of experiences. The sensory/intentional body, thus free of the 
mechanistic connotations of the Cartesian approach, acquires a more 
active and vital status. So, when Merleau-Ponty affirms the identity of the 
phenomenal body with the subject of perception (and action), the body 
should not be understood as in the mechanistic account, but as in this 
newer, more lively, characterization. What remains to be done, now, is to 
complement the former with a detailed analysis of this subject of 
perception and action. 
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Chapter 8 
PERCEPTION AND PERCEPTUAL SELF-LOCATION 
8.1. INTRODUCTION 
When the subjective/objective dichotomy in personal identity was 
introduced (see chapter 3), it was suggested that the reconciliation of both 
standpoints was made possible by the consideration of the person as both 
a perceiver and an agent. These two aspects will now be studied in turn 
(starting with the analysis of the person as a perceiver), but the discussion 
will progress towards a more holistic result, in the sense that the person- 
as-perceiver is dependent on the person-as-agent, and vice versa. 
Therefore, if perception and agency are to provide the answer to the 
dichotomy between the subjective and objective aspects of the person, 
they will do so jointly; they should not be regarded as two separate and 
independent solutions. Let us begin with the analysis of perception. 
8.2. THE PERSPECTIVITY OF PERCEPTION 
The role played by perception is relevant to the topic of personal identity 
because it exhibits a feature which, according to many subjective 
approaches, must be met by a serious and adequate account of the person: 
perspectivity. This notion featured prominently in Nagel's attempt at 
reconciliation. However, the idea that our perceptual experience is 
perspectival is a complex notion, and requires unravelling. 
174 
8.2.1. The partiality of perception 
Taking the case of vision as a model, the partiality of perception refers to 
the familiar fact that only one aspect of an object can be seen at a time. If 
the perceiver changes his position, he would see a different aspect of the 
object. The aspect of the object which is seen depends on the position 
occupied by the perceiver; as his position changes, his visual experience 
of the object changes, too. Thus, when something is first shown to us, we 
turn it round in our hands (if it is small enough, like a china vase), or we 
may go round it (as when we are looking at a building from the outside), in 
order to obtain a more complete and accurate perception of it. When we 
become familiar with the object, we can imagine the way it looks, even 
without actually looking at it: the drawing on the other side of the china 
vase, or the columns on the invisible side of the building. In a similar 
manner, what the perceiver hears is also heard from a certain point in 
space, so that if he moves to a different point, the same sound could be 
heard less clearly, or distorted, or perhaps different sounds would be 
heard. 
An element that affects our perception is the orientation of our sense- 
organs. Our perceptual experience not only changes as we move from one 
point to another, but it also varies if our sense-organs change their 
orientation. For instance, if we turn our eyes ninety degrees to the right, 
we would perceive different things, or the same things from a different 
angle. Consider this example of tactile perception: if I stretch my hands to 
the front, I feel the bed; if I then turn my left hand ninety degrees to the 
left, I would feel the cupboard door. Another aspect that affects our 
perception is the fact that, in the case of vision, our eyes must be open for 
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us to have visual experience of the world; in the case of hearing, our ears 
(both external and internal organs) must be free from any impediments that 
may hinder our auditory experience of the world. What these examples 
suggest is dependence of perception on the perceiver's physical organs (in 
general, his body), and in that sense point at the existence of physical 
constraints on the person's perceptual experience of the world. 
8.2.2. The subjectivity of perception 
As well as being partial, perception is perspectival in the sense that it 
takes place from a point of view, the point of view of the perceiver; 
therefore, there is a reference to a subject of perception. The objects of 
perception are presented to the perceiver not only as spatially related to 
each other (the cupboard is next to the fridge, opposite the cooker, above 
the table, and so on), but also as spatially related to him (the cupboard is 
in front of him, the fridge is to his left, and so on). In other words, the 
objects of perception not only form a network of objective spatial 
relations, but are also subjectively located in relation to the position 
occupied by the perceiver. 
The latter has sometimes been expressed in terms of the existence of an 
egocentric map that the perceiver is able to make of his environment. (See 
Evans, 1982: 151 ff. ) The most important feature of such a map is that the 
perceiver is at the centre, and the rest are to his right or left, at the top or 
at the bottom, in front or behind, and so on. This subjective map is no 
different from the map which only reflects objective spatial relations 
between things. When we look at a map of England, we see that Leeds 
and Hull are about fifty or sixty miles apart; if we look again, but try to 
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read it from the position we occupy, then if we are in Doncaster, Hull is on 
the right, whereas if we are in York, Hull is on the left. In other words, 
the egocentric map is the objective map, but with the perceiver placed 
somewhere in it (from his point of view, he is at the centre). 
Talk of an egocentric map is reminiscent of those plans which include a 
cross indicating the place where the person looking at the plan is: the cross 
is the centre, in the sense that the rest (where the road ahead leads, what is 
to the left and to the right, and so on) makes sense in relation to it. The 
same plan can be placed on different spots, as long as the cross is 
accordingly put on different parts of the plan. Similarly, in an egocentric 
map of the environment, things are always in the same relation to each 
other, while the place occupied by the subject/perceiver, and therefore the 
relation of other objects to him, can change. 
This analogy could be pressed a bit further. The plan with the cross is at a 
certain spot in public space, so that it can be used by many different 
people: everybody who sees it can identify where they are, and they all 
have the same idea of what is on their left, right, and so on. Similarly, 
what one perceiver (say, me) sees from the place he occupies can also be 
seen by those people placed at the same point (supposing our perceptual 
apparatus is the same, of course). 
' What this suggests is that my visual 
(auditory, tactile, and so on) experience of the world is not unique and 
private, but open to other perceivers. 'I wish you could have seen what I 
saw', we sometimes say, meaning that the visual experience we had could 
have been had by the other person, too. The subjectivity of perception, 
then, should not be understood as the idea that perception is unique and 
private, but instead, as the idea that perception is common and open to 
other people. As has previously been argued (see 3.3. above), 'common' is 
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not opposed to subjective (or perspectival): my visual experience of the 
fridge in front of me is mine, achieved from the position I occupy (ie, 
subjective and perspectival), but also could have been your visual 
experience if you had been there (ie, common). 
Therefore, perception is promising as far as the reconciliation between 
first- and third-person approaches to personal identity goes. Perception is 
subjective and perspectival, as it is seen from the first-person point of 
view. However, the material constraints on perception (like the proper 
working of the sense-organs), and the fact that a perceiver's experience is 
open to other perceivers (which suggests the idea of a kind) are 
requirements underlined from the third-person point of view. Moreover, 
talk of an egocentric map, as opposed to an objective map, will also turn 
out to be helpful. 
8.3. THE PROBLEM OF PERCEPTUAL SELF-LOCATION 
The problem of perceptual self-location can be expressed in the following 
terms: can I locate myself in the world on the basis of any perception 
provided by my senses? I locate other objects in accordance with what I 
can get from the world through my senses; but can I do so in my own 
case? Furthermore, can I perceive myself (a person) as an element of the 
world, without being reduced to the status of a material object? If the 
problem of perceptual self-location can be solved, the result will prove 
crucial for the bridging of the gulf between the subjective and objective 
aspects of the person: on the one hand, the person will be a subject (of 
perception); on the other hand, the person will emerge as an object among 
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other objects. (The discussion that follows has been greatly illuminated by 
Brewer's paper 'Self-Location and Agency'. ) 
8.3.1. Self-location by acquaintance 
The first possible answer seems to be that I perceive and locate myself as 
I perceive and locate so many other material objects, by perceptual 
acquaintance with them. The notion of acquaintance appears in Russell 
(1985), although he uses it in a very technical sense within the empiricist 
tradition. Thus, he maintains that while the sense-data given in sensation 
are known by acquaintance, the physical objects which cause such sense- 
data are known by description. In other words, we know sense-data 
directly and indubitably, but we know physical objects in a way which is 
mediated and subject to doubt. Therefore, Russell would not agree with 
the first sentence of this paragraph, according to which material objects 
are known by acquaintance. However, and bearing this qualification in 
mind, the notion of acquaintance will be understood here in a less 
technical sense, so that it will be possible to say that one is perceptually 
acquainted with such material objects as fridges and cupboards. 
Thus, the argument goes, I can give the exact position of a cupboard 
because I perceive it (its position) in relation to other objects, and to 
myself, in the world. I can similarly give another person's exact position 
because, insofar as he has material characteristics, he is a material object I 
can see. However, in the case of my own self-location, I am both the 
object perceived and the subject of the perception; therefore, in order to 
locate myself, I would have to be perceptually acquainted with myself-as- 
object as the subject of the perception in question. Unfortunately, 
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although I can partially perceive myself as a material object with corporeal 
characteristics2, I cannot obtain a pure perception of myself as subject. 
Therefore, I cannot be perceptually acquainted with myself (as both 
subject and object), in the same way in which I may be acquainted with 
such material objects as cupboards. 
One reply may be that the dismissal of the possibility of self-location by 
acquaintance has been too rash. It is true that if vision is taken to be the 
model of perception, then since people are not visually acquainted with 
themselves as subjects, it can be extrapolated that they are not 
perceptually acquainted with themselves as subjects. But vision is not the 
only sense people have, or indeed the model of perception as a whole. 
Merleau-Ponty has been reported (Harre, 1991: 94-6) to have maintained 
that the sense of touch is the model of sense perception. He denies that 
there is a radical distinction, in one's own case, between touching and 
being touched, for when one touches oneself, one has only one sensation, 
not two (the sensation of touching, as different from the sensation of being 
touched). Therefore, "in touching oneself, perceiver and perceived are 
simultaneously given to consciousness" (Merleau-Ponty, L'oeuil et 
l'esprit; quoted in Harre, 1991: 96). 
Without having to go as far as affirming the model status of the sense of 
touch, the former example goes some way towards offering an account of 
self-location by acquaintance. On the one hand, the perceiver's own self- 
location is the result of his perceptual (in particular, tactile) experience. 
On the other hand, the perceiver appears, in the process of perception, not 
just as an object, but also as a subject. That is, in touching oneself, 
perceiver (subject) and perceived (object) are contained in the same tactile 
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experience. Therefore, it could be concluded that people can become 
perceptually acquainted with themselves in the process of tactile 
perception. In the next sections, an attempt will be made at providing an 
account of self-location that can be applied to perception in general, not 
just to tactile perception. 
8.3.2. Self-location by description 
An alternative answer could be that I identify myself by description (see 
Brewer, 1992: 20ff): I identify myself with 'the subject of this perception', 
inferring my position in the world as a result. That is, if I am the subject 
of perception P, then my location will be L, whereas if I am the subject of 
perception P', then my location will be L'. This proposal has an advantage 
over the previous one: I am not simply an object with which I am 
(partially) acquainted, but also a subject, the subject of a perception or 
series of perceptions. Nonetheless, there are certain difficulties with this 
proposal. 
The first one is that the self-identification of myself as 'the subject of this 
perceptual experience' makes necessary the fact that I happen to undergo 
such an experience. My experiences are contingently dependent on how 
the world is, and where I am placed at the time of the perception. If either 
the world had been different or I had been at a different place, my 
perception would not have been the same. (If I had been asleep at the 
time, for instance, I would not have had any such perceptual experiences 
at all. ) However, if I identify myself as 'the subject of this experience', 
then I cannot make sense of my experiences being different; that is, my 
having such a particular experience becomes a necessary fact. (In 
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possible worlds terminology, there is no possible world in which my 
experiences would have been different. ) So, I cannot assume as a priori 
and necessary something that could have been otherwise. 
It could be suggested, following Kripke, that the description 'the subject of 
this experience' does not give the meaning of the name T, but helps to fix 
its referent (in the same way in which 'the stick kept in Paris' does not give 
the meaning of 'metre', although helps to fix its referent). In such a case, 
then, it is not a necessary fact that I am the subject of this experience for, 
in the same way in which the stick kept in Paris could have been longer or 
shorter, the subject who has this experience (ie, me) could have failed to 
have it. Thus, I am not necessarily identified with the subject of a 
particular experience, but I can still descriptively self-locate myself as a 
subject. In other words, although the description 'the subject of this 
experience' does not give the meaning of 'I' (because I could have 
undergone different experiences), it still serves to refer to me and, 
therefore, to locate me in the world. 
In order to cope with this sort of reply, a second difficulty must be 
exposed: the self-identification of myself as 'the subject of this experience' 
begs the question, because it assumes what has to be proved, namely that 
perceptual experience is self-locating, that I can locate myself as an item 
in the world in virtue of my perceptual abilities. But if it is presupposed 
that I am the subject of this perception, if this is a premise rather than a 
conclusion, then the solution to the problem of perceptual self-location is 
being postulated rather than arrived at. Furthermore, appeal to the notion 
of reference-fixing description does not avoid this difficulty, for the 
identification of myself with 'the subject of this experience' in Kripke's 
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sense, and therefore my self-location, is also an assumed premise, not a 
conclusion. 
A version of self-location by description might be proposed along the 
following lines (see Evans, 1982). My having the self-locating thought 
that 'I am here' would be the conclusion of two previous premises: 
'Someone is here' and 'I am that person'. The descriptive component 
would appear when trying to make sense of who 'that person' refers to. It 
might be argued that it is 'the person from whom the relevant information 
is being received', where 'the relevant information' is the information 
obtained about the place in which the person is, including an account of 
the person's surroundings, together with his perceptual experiences (what 
is seen, heard, and so on). In such a case, self-location would be the result 
of perceptual information about the person's environment, without making 
such perceptual experiences necessary. 
Nonetheless, the proposal is unsatisfactory. The descriptive identification 
of 'that person' as 'the person from whom the relevant information is 
received' would be correct in certain unusual cases; for example, if there 
was a causal chain linking the subject's brain to someone else's body, so 
that the subject received sensory information from that body, instead of his 
own. In such a case, it would make sense to say that 'I am that person', 
implying that 'I am the person from whom the relevant information is being 
received'. However, 'normal' cases are not like that, because the subject's 
brain is linked to his own body. Therefore, such a descriptive 
identification is totally out of place. On the one hand, if 'I am the person 
from whom the relevant information is received' can be applied to 'normal' 
cases, then the identity statement is trivially true, and the interest of the 
description nil; on the other hand, if 'I am the person from whom the 
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relevant information is received' is meant to capture some unusual 
situation, then it has no pertinence for the solution of the problem of 
perceptual self-location in the majority of ('normal') cases. 
Summarizing, the attempts to solve the problem which have been 
considered (both in self-location by acquaintance and by description) have 
failed. What is needed is an account that (i) elucidates the problem of 
self-location on the basis of the perceptual experience of the subject; and 
(ii) includes an element of self-awareness (the object is also the subject) 
not as a prior identification. 
8.3.3. The Simple Theory of Perception 
What has been called the 'Simple Theory of Perception', or STP (Brewer, 
1992: 23), meets all the requisites. The STP is rather vaguely 
characterized as a "holistically evolving pattern of judgements and 
inferences" (23), from which the subject's location in the world (or rather, 
his own self-location, since the STP works in the first person) is obtained, 
on the basis of his own perceptual experience. Alternatively, and given 
the flexibility of the STP, if the subject's own self-location is presented as 
an input, then his perceptual experience will be obtained as output. 
Consider the following examples. If I have a visual perception of the 
cupboard in the kitchen, and I recognize it as the kitchen cupboard, then I 
can conclude that I am at a certain point p in the kitchen. (An example of 
auditory perception would be the following: if I hear the kids playing in 
the garden, then I must be at a certain point p in space, the exact position 
requiring a more detailed description of the place where the sound comes 
from; perhaps, so many yards to my left and so on. ) The theory also 
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works the other way round: if I am at a certain point p, then what I am 
seeing must be the kitchen cupboard3. Thus, the STP complies with the 
first requirement at the end of the last section, that self-location be the 
result of the perceptual experience of the subject. 
What about the second requirement, that is, that there be an element of 
self-awareness (the object as a subject), which is not the result of a prior 
identification? This requirement should have to account for the 
differences between such other-locating statements as 'the cupboard is in 
front of the fridge' and the self-locating statement 'I am in front of the 
fridge', the similarity being that both of them are objects. 
When analyzing the logical structure of P-predicates, it was said that their 
self-ascription went hand in hand with the ascription of the same P- 
predicate to others; at least, it was argued, one must be prepared to ascribe 
it to others. This was regarded as an application of the Generality 
Constraint, the principle according to which the entertaining of a thought 
is a sum of two abilities: the ability to ascribe different predicates to the 
same subject, and the ability to ascribe the same predicate (not only P- 
predicates) to different subjects. 
Consider now the predicate 'is in front of the fridge'. In order to 
understand the self-locating thought 'I am in front of the fridge', one must 
also understand such thoughts as 'the cupboard is in front of the fridge', or 
'Peter is in front of the fridge'. In all three, there is a relation between two 
objects: cupboard/fridge, Peter/fridge, me/fridge. Peter and I are different 
from a cupboard in that, following a non-reductionist account of the 
person, Peter and I can be ascribed both psychological and material 
predicates: that is, they are subjects as well as objects. But what is the 
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relation between these locating thoughts/statements? The ascription of 
such locating predicates as 'is in front of the fridge' to cupboards and 
myself is part of the following overlapping continuum. I say 'the cupboard 
is in front of the fridge' on the basis of my perceptual acquaintance with it 
(expressing a relation between two objects). Then, concentrating on the 
similarities between a cupboard and Peter's bodily properties, I say 'Peter 
is in front of the fridge', where there is a relation between two objects, but 
not only that for (according to the non-reductionist account of the person) 
Peter is more than just a material object. Finally, due to the fact that both 
Peter and I are persons, 'Peter' can be replaced by 'I', resulting in the self- 
locating thought/statement 'I am in front of the fridge'. 
It is the Generality Constraint that allows this progressive move from the 
locating statement about a cupboard to my own self-location. First, the 
similarity between the cupboard and the material properties of Peter is 
picked out; then, it is the similarity between the person Peter and myself. 
All the time, the Generality Constraint requires that entertaining a thought 
presupposes the ability to ascribe the same predicate to different subjects. 
The difference with the rejected proposal of self-location by acquaintance 
is that here there is no appeal to the person's perceptual acquaintance with 
himself-as-subject; on the contrary, the element of self-awareness is 
provided by the Generality Constraint. Other people, with whom we are 
perceptually acquainted, are subjects in the same way in which I am, and 
the Generality Constraint makes possible the move from the location of 
other people to one's own self-location. 
Two things have been achieved: one, I am similar to other material 
objects, occupying a spatial position in the world; two, I am also similar to 
other subjects -I am a subject of experience. Evans says that 
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"he [the person making a self-locating judgement] must conceive of 
himself, the subject of whom the property is ascribed, as a being of the 
kind which he envisages when he simply envisages someone seeing a 
tree - that is to say, a persisting subject of experience, located in space 
and time" (232). 
The element of self-awareness referred to before is not awareness of 
something internal, a self known by introspection; it is rather the 
recognition of our perceptual experience, together with the Generality 
Constraint. Thus, self-location is linked to the location of others in two 
ways: they are both elements of the world, and they are both subjects. 
Furthermore, the subject appears as a member of a kind, the kind 'person', 
which is identifiable by these two properties: being a subject of 
experience, and being an object in the spatio-temporal world. 
The value of this account lies in the fact that self-location is the joint result 
of, on the one hand, the way the world is objectively (independently of a 
subject of experience experiencing it), and on the other hand, the subject's 
course of perceptions and position in the world. Strawson (1966) talks of 
the distinction, though not opposition, between "a unified objective 
world", and "a single, subjective, experiential route, one among other 
possible subjective routes through the same objective world", constituted 
by the series of experiences belonging to a numerically identical, 
temporally extended, subject of experiences (104). Moreover, the order 
and arrangement of those experiences is not independent from the order 
and arrangement of the objects of which they are experiences, for there are 
causal relations going from the world to the experiences. (This is all well- 
known to us; see 2.2.1. ) This distinction, what Strawson calls 'the 
objectivity condition', is a necessary requirement for the possibility of 
experience (including, needless to say, perceptual experience). 
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Now, this image of the perceiver (in general, the subject of experience) as 
moving about in a public, objective world, through which different 
perceivers can also move, brings to mind the notions, mentioned at the 
beginning of this chapter, of an objective map and an egocentric map. The 
objective map is the map of a public, unified, objective world, with its 
own order and arrangement. The egocentric map is constituted by the 
series of experiences of a particular perceiver, the order of which reflects 
the objective order, although, since it is the experiential route of a 
particular point of view in the world, it also includes a reference to the 
subject, as centre of such a map. 
What is relevant to the present discussion is that the egocentric map is 
made possible at all because the subject of it, the perceiver of that series 
of experiences that constitute the map, is in fact an object located in the 
world. In other words, it is because the subject of experience is himself an 
element of the objective world (objective map) that he can leave an 
experiential trail behind him, so to speak (egocentric map). This is what is 
at the basis of our partial acquaintance with ourselves, as well as what 
allows the move from such other-locating statements as 'the cupboard is in 
front of the fridge' to such self-locating statements as 'I am in front of the 
fridge', with the assistance of the Generality Constraint. 
8.3.4. The incompleteness of this solution 
So far, so good. But was it not stated in the introduction to this chapter 
that the solution to the gap between the subjective and objective aspects of 
the person would be the joint outcome of the consideration of the person 
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both as perceiver and as agent? However, the conclusion from the 
foregoing discussion seems to be that the person as perceiver is enough to 
reconcile such a gap. Is this right? It is indeed right that the analysis of 
perception and the question of perceptual self-location (ie, the self- 
location of the perceiver as an object in the spatio-temporal order) shows 
the path to be followed in the process of reconciliation, but this is only the 
beginning, not the whole answer. To see this, let us return to the notion of 
an egocentric map of the world. 
The egocentric map of the environment (as stated previously) has been 
characterized as that map which the perceiver forms of his surroundings, 
on the basis of his perceptual experience of the world. It is egocentric 
because the perceiver sees himself as the centre, other things occupying a 
position in relation to that centre. There is not, as Russell suggests, a 
visual egocentric map, different from an auditory one, and a tactile one. 
On the contrary, although the egocentric map is formed on the basis of the 
perceptual experience of the world, this does not mean that it is made out 
of sense-data, so that the sense-data received by one sense-organ give rise 
to an egocentric map, whereas the sense-data of other organs produce a 
different map. Instead, the perceptual contact with the world, although 
through various channels (organs of perception), is the contact between 
perceiver and the world, and in that sense the result is a unitary egocentric 
map (in the same way as there is a unified objective world). 
This would have been the whole story if perception were the only level at 
which there is contact between the perceiver and the world, but there is 
also interaction at the level of action. An agent's activity on the world 
requires the prior identification of the objects on which he can act, as well 
as their spatial relation to him. Since I have a visual map of my house, 
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with me sitting in the living-room, I can figure out the route I would have 
to follow to answer the door bell. Had I been in an upstairs bedroom, my 
egocentric map would have been different, and so would have been the 
route to the door. Therefore, the egocentric map of the world is a 
perception- and agency-centred map: it reflects the subject's perceptual 
experience of the world, and it allows exchange at the level of action. 
This is why the treatment of the question of perceptual self-location does 
not give the whole answer: the person, as well as being a subject of 
perception, is a subject of action. If the gap between objective and 
subjective is to be bridged, the latter requires some attention. 
190 
Chapter 9 
INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN ACTION AND PERCEPTION 
9.1. INTRODUCTION 
So far, the self-location of the subject as an object in the world has 
focused on the subject's perceptual experience (according to a set of 
principles in the STP). In this way, a part of the whole world appears in a 
special relation to the subject: those objects that are perceived by him, his 
perceived environment. But, as the notion of embodiment has made it 
clear, that is not the only connection between the subject and his 
environment, because the subject can also act upon the objects perceived. 
This suggests a further argument for considering the subject as an object in 
the world: he acts on the very same objects he perceives. The external 
world is not simply the subject's perceived environment; it is also the place 
where he acts. An account of the subject as agent, then, is needed. 
Before an analysis of human action and the human agent is given in the 
following chapter, an attempt will be made to show the connection 
between the problem of perceptual self-location and the activity of human 
agents. The aim of this chapter will be to make clear the fact that these 
two aspects cannot be separated from one another, in that the 
consideration of the person as an element of the world is a result of both 
his perception and his action upon the world. In order to do this, several 
arguments for the necessity of, and interdependence between, perception 
and action will be put forward, and a possible objection to such an 
interdependence will be considered The result will be a more unitary 
view of the person. 
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Here, the de re characterization of perception and action (see 2.2.1. and 
2.2.3. ) should be kept in mind. It has been argued that objects in the 
external world are constitutive of a person's perceptual experiences and his 
intentional actions. This chapter is concerned with the interdependence 
and integration of both activities. It is not enough to say that a person 
perceives a real external object, or that a person's intentions include an 
object in the world. Rather, one acts on the objects of one's perceptions; 
that is, the object of one's intentional action is the same object that has 
been perceived. Conversely, the object of one's perceptual experiences 
can become the object of one's intentional action. For instance, I see a pen 
on my desk, and reach out for it, where the same object (a particular pen) 
is constitutive of both my visual experience and my intentional action. It 
is this integration that is central to the unitary account of the person 
defended here. 
9.2. THE NECESSITY OF PERCEPTION 
A person sees, hears, or generally, perceptually experiences the world (or 
rather, his environment), and then acts in accordance with the perceptual 
inputs received. In this sense, perception is not only an end, but the means 
to something else. In other words, without perception there would be no 
action. Action should be understood in the sense of intentional action, as 
opposed to mere senseless movement, like the sudden jerks one 
experiences before falling asleep, or sneezing. Examples of intentional 
action are moving one's arm to reach for a book, moving one's head when 
someone else calls out one's name, playing chess or getting married. 
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It is a feature of intentional action that it requires awareness of events (and 
objects) in space and time (visual perception of a book in front of us, 
auditory perception of one's name being called out, and so on), which is 
acquired in the process of perceptually experiencing the world. Therefore, 
the performance of intentional actions demands a causal perceptual link 
between objects and events in the world, and the perceiver. In turn, once 
the perceptual experience is obtained, there are both causal and 
constitutive (de re) relations between the objects of our perception (for 
instance, the book in front of us), and the action performed (reaching out 
for that same book). 
An objection to the above account could be posed in terms of the actions 
of very young children. It could be argued (O'Shaughnessy, 1980: 4ff) that 
babies make movements (eg, the kicking of their legs) which do not seem 
to require previous perceptions. This is based on the alleged fact that 
recently born babies are said to possess the organ for vision, but lack an 
object of vision. This can be more clearly understood by comparing newly 
born babies with older children. The fact that the latter have an object of 
perception can be seen, for instance, in their act of crawling: when infants 
crawl, they do so to get an object they perceive. In the act of crawling, 
infants show that they are perceptually aware of their environment, and 
respond to certain stimuli. Newly born babies, however, do not show 
such responsiveness to stimuli; there is no bodily action that serves as the 
basis for the attribution of an object of perception to such babies. 
Therefore, it is concluded that newly born babies lack an object of vision. 
To this objection, two replies could be made. First, it could be said that 
such movements as the newly born babies' leg-kicking are simply non- 
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intentional actions, and therefore do not present an obstacle to the 
necessity of perception for action, since the thesis being defended here is 
that intentional actions require previous perceptions. 
Second, the idea that children lack an object of perception has been 
questioned (Burns, 1982: 33) thanks to the results of different 
psychological experiments. In one of them, some two-week-old infants 
were able to distinguish their respective mums' faces from a stranger's face 
(see Carpenter, 1974). From that kind of experiment, it has been 
concluded that newly born babies not only have an ability to see, but also 
have an object of perception. Furthermore, this piece of evidence 
reinforces the thesis that intentional actions require perceptions which are 
appropriate to them. Thus, it can be shown that children's perceptions 
affect the way they act, that there is a direct relation from the object of 
perception to the external object onto which the action is directed: the 
recognition of a familiar face brings about a different reaction from the one 
produced by a stranger's face. 
9.3. THE NECESSITY OF BODILY ACTION 
Apart from the subject's perceptual link to the world, there is also a link at 
the level of bodily intentional action. The body makes the mediation 
between the subject's decisions or intentions and the carrying out of such 
plans. Normally, when I have the immediate intention to hit my brother, 
my body reacts in such a way that the action of hitting my brother is 
carried out. The function of my body is twofold. First, it distinguishes me 
from the external world by immediately reacting to my will, desires, and 
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so on, whereas other objects offer a resistance to be changed, which is 
only indirectly overcome by applying my own body to them. Second, my 
body makes my acting upon the world possible. 
Moreover, at a more basic level, my body is a precondition for the whole 
process of perception and intentional action: what is my perceived 
environment, and in consequence, the setting of my intentional action, 
depends on where my body is placed. As the position occupied by my 
body changes, so does my egocentric space. 
The notion of the subject's egocentric space has appeared before. It is 
constituted by the subject's perceptual environment, which is also his field 
of action. The subject does not only perceive an external world, from 
which knowledge is obtained, but also has desires and intentions that 
result in a change of his environment, implemented through his body (eg, 
he reaches out for the book in front of him, or moves his head when his 
name is called out). First, the subject perceives the world through his 
sensory mechanisms, gaining information about it; then, the subject 
manifests desires, which result in intentional bodily actions to satisfy such 
desires, thereby bringing about a change in the subject's environment (his 
egocentric space). Bodily action, then, ties the subject to the world. Such 
a tie, however, should not be suffocating. That is, the subject's 
environment is not pre-fixed: as the subject changes his position in the 
world, his egocentric space, the setting for his bodily action, varies as 
well. 
A problem with this initial characterization of the link between perception 
and action is that there appears to be too neat and clear-cut a gap between 
the subject's perceptual experience of, and his bodily action upon, the 
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world. In particular, perception appears to be a strictly passive affair, 
whereas the subject's active involvement only concerns his capacity for 
action. However, it can easily be shown that perception is active. 
Consider, for instance, the different bodily movements (of the head, or of 
the eyes) involved in the visual perception of something round, as opposed 
to something flat. Similarly, consider the different movements of one's 
limbs (arms and hands) present in the tactile perception of a two- 
dimensional surface, or a three-dimensional volumetric object (an essential 
part of the perception of the latter is the recognition of corners, absent in 
the perception of the former). 
Moreover, it is now commonly acknowledged (against the characterization 
of perception as strictly passive) that expectation plays an important role 
in perception. Sometimes, a certain utterance is not understood because 
one does not expect to hear anything like that. My experience is that 
when English speakers in this country say something to me in Spanish 
(usually, a monosyllable, or just a couple of worlds), I do not understand 
them, precisely because I do not expect anybody here to talk to me in a 
language other than English. 
What emerges from these considerations is a view of perception as active, 
not passive. However, this is not the sort of evidence which supports a 
strong interdependence between the person-as-perceiver and the person- 
as-agent. Further arguments will now be proposed. 
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9.3.1. The epistemological argument 
It has been consistently pointed out that behaviour is the evidential basis 
for the attribution of mental life to other people. Since we cannot have 
direct access to other people's mental states (thoughts, desires, 
perceptions, intentions and so on), the only possibility for the ascription of 
mentality relies on the behaviour people show. Language is an aspect of 
such an evidential basis: we know that somebody thinks that the meal is 
nice because he tells us so. Similarly, we know that somebody has seen a 
£10 note because he picks it up. In general, physical action reveals 
mentality. 
Examples can be found not only among people, but also in the animal 
kingdom. We see the cat around at lunchtime and say that Elsa, the cat, is 
waiting for her dinner. If we pour some milk in a bowl, we would say that 
Elsa has seen the milk if she goes to the bowl and drinks it. (I do not 
intend to discuss theses cases in detail, since many different considerations 
may arise. This is intended as just another way of illustrating the necessity 
of physical action for the ascription of mental life. ) 
9.3.2. The argument from solidity 
Does the notion of a purely passive perceiver make any sense at all? This 
is not a question about whether there can be individual cases of perception 
which do not require the person's active involvement; or whether the 
active involvement of the subject is comparatively large or small in the 
whole of the perceptual process. It is not, either, a question that could be 
answered by appealing to certain psychological experiments, like the one 
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conducted by Held and Hein (see Hamlyn, 1978) using animals. In this 
experiment, some kittens were allowed the freedom to move around in 
their environment, whereas others were kept in a box which was moved 
around by the experimenters. The conclusion drawn was that the former 
group of kittens had a better knowledge of their environment than the 
latter group, underlying the success of certain conditions (particularly, 
interaction with the world) in the learning process. These are empirical 
questions, whereas the issue here is whether action is necessary for 
perception. 
Hamlyn (1978,1990) has tried to show that the perception of certain 
qualities of objects (particularly, impenetrability or solidity) requires 
action. His argument goes as follows: 
(1) solidity (ie, the impenetrability of an object to pressure or 
other forms of touch) involves a causal aspect; 
(2) the causal notion of solidity and the notion of a solid object's 
identity go together; that is, an object occupies a position in 
space which cannot be occupied by a different object at the 
same time; an object can only move to unoccupied spaces 
where there are no other objects, etc; 
(3) the link between causal principles and the identity of physical 
objects could not be understood without our own personal 
experience of causal interaction with other objects. In this 
sense, we are like other physical objects. From youth, we 
grow up accustomed to the fact that we cannot walk through 
a closed door, although we can walk through if the door is 
open. Here, the role played by our body is essential. We, 
because of the solidity of our body, can enter into causal 
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contact with other physical objects: we can push something 
(or somebody) out of the way, and we can also be pushed; 
(4) therefore, the argument concludes, perception of the objective 
world (as a world of physical objects) requires our interaction 
with it; that is, it requires that we, as bodily beings, act upon 
other physical objects. 
An implicit assumption in Hamlyn's argument is that perception is 
concept-dependent, that is, "that we cannot be said to perceive anything 
unless we have a concept of the object of perception as an object 
independent of ourselves" (1970: 163; my emphasis). According to this 
model, perception does not consist in receiving neutral and pre-conceptual 
information (usually referred to as 'sense-data'), which is later interpreted 
in one way or another by the perceiver (these three lines are interpreted as 
a triangle, this pattern of colours and shapes as a house, and so on). On 
the contrary, that perception is concept-dependent is the opposite of a 
view of perception as the gathering of pre-conceptual information. Thus, 
in perception, objects are presented to the perceiver as a triangle, or as a 
house. When the object of perception is presented as a pattern of colours 
and shapes, instead of as a house, it is because the object is not recognized 
(as a house) by the perceiver, like in abstract paintings. However, this 
does not support the interpretationist model, for even in the latter case the 
information obtained in perception is concept-dependent: what is seen is a 
pattern of colours and shapes. What is even more important for present 
purposes is that the objects of perception are conceived of as independent 
entities: a house, a triangle. 
With this in mind, the point of the argument can now be seen. Bodily 
action is necessary for perception because in order for us to perceive solid 
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objects as such (ie, as physical solid objects), we require a certain 
conceptual background (that physical objects occupy a position in space, 
that they are causally related to other objects, and so on) which is obtained 
from personal experience (premise 3): we, as physical solid objects, also 
occupy a position, and are causally connected to other objects. This 
personal experience of acting upon other objects is a necessary requisite 
for our perception of the physical world. Or, as Hamlyn himself puts it: 
"A perceiver must be an agent 
possibility of the would-be 
understanding necessary for 
(1990: 106) 
too; otherwise, there would be no 
perceiver attaining the conceptual 
perception of a physical world. " 
9.3.3. The argument from touch 
A further argument for the interdependence between action and perception 
could be proposed by considering the person's sense of touch. This is a 
very complex sense, through which many different properties of objects 
are apprehended. One of those properties is warmth: we put our hands in 
the bathwater to test its temperature. However, the properties which are 
relevant to the present argument are those related to spatiality; that is, 
those properties which inform us about the spatial qualities of an object, 
namely texture, shape and solidity. By sliding our hands over a surface 
we know whether it is smooth, rough, bumpy, creased, wrinkled, etc. By 
feeling an object in our hands we find out about its shape: round, square, 
conic, etc. 'Solidity' refers to the resistance given by the object: although 
both a soft toy and a stone offer a certain resistance to our touch, the 
former's resistance (to be deformed) is considerably smaller. Although all 
these properties are relevant, it is the latter that is most pertinent to the 
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argument that follows; particularly, the fact that objects (whether they are 
soft toys or stones) offer a certain resistance when touched. This quality 
has led some people to say that touch is the primary sense, since it tells us 
about a world of physical reality: 
"Touch, and not sight, is primitively the most authoritative of the 
senses, the natural criterion of physical reality, just because acting upon 
objects necessarily involves touching, the contact of my body with the 
resisting body that is not my own. " (Hampshire, 1959: 48) 
The argument from touch (O'Shaughnessy, 1980, vol II) goes as follows: 
(1) perceiving is the singling out of items in physical space, and 
therefore requires an awareness of space; 
(2) awareness of space and the spatial properties of things comes 
through tactile perception; 
(3) tactile perception involves a capacity to manipulate objects; 
(4) such a capacity is based on experience: manipulation of 
objects demands knowledge of what it is like to be an object 
among other objects; 
(5) therefore, perception depends on our personal experience of 
acting upon other objects. 
What the argument is saying is that perception of the spatial qualities of 
objects (particularly, perception of their solidity) is achieved by tactile 
manipulation of them; and that such manipulation takes place because we 
causally interact with them. The latter means that the use of the sense of 
touch involves movement: we cannot feel the smoothness of a surface 
without running our hand over it (this is the idea, previously mentioned, 
that perception is active). But, what is more important is that it suggests 
that perception is possible because we think of the world as an active 
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whole, because we think of ourselves as actively engaged in the world of 
physical objects, exchanging contact with other physical objects (they 
offer resistance to our touch, and we offer resistance to their contact). In 
other words, tactile perception is not only active perception, but 
perception in action. Consider the following quotation by Macmurray 
(quoted in Paul, 1961: 164fn): 
"I can only become aware of anything tactually by doing something to 
it. Tactual perception is necessarily perception in action. To touch 
anything is to exert pressure upon it, however slight, and therefore, 
however slightly, to modify it. [... ]A man may be born blind and yet 
grow to know the world he lives in and to direct his activities by this 
knowledge... But is it possible to conceive a human being who never 
possessed a tactual sense? " 
Perception in action refers to the idea that perception can be properly 
comprehended only in the context of an active world, in a world where 
people conceive of themselves as agents, the world (or better, their 
environment, their egocentric space) being their stage. In this sense, the 
proper understanding of people as perceivers is dependent on an 
understanding of them as agents. 
A special case of perception in relation to which the necessity of the sense 
of touch has been acknowledged is visual depth. Berkeley argued that the 
eye is a two-dimensional surface, and can provide information only about 
two-dimensional properties of things. In consequence, he defended the 
view that the perception of distance takes place through touch, by feeling 
the objects and their relative positions. O'Shaughnessy, discussing the 
case of newly born babies, has supported this idea: 
"we identify depth perception through identifying act capacities. For 
visual depth is a reality only to those who have integrated their visual 
fields and motor powers. " (1980: 8) 
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Macmurray's quotation, though, appears to suggest a stronger thesis: there 
could not be a human being lacking a tactual sense, since the latter is 
intrinsically linked to the possession of a body, and people are necessarily 
embodied. In other words, since persons are embodied beings, lack of the 
sense of touch would amount to lack of being. 
However, it might be argued, this position is too extreme, for the argument 
relies too heavily on the fact that people have limbs (and particularly, 
hands). That is, there could be human beings who have had both their 
arms amputated, and, in such a case, it would be more difficult to argue 
that they are able to feel the smoothness of a surface, or the conic shape of 
an object. In such cases, the notion of people without a sense of touch 
seems to get a foothold. Therefore, the thesis that embodied people 
necessarily have a tactual sense is more questionable. 
It could be replied that, although perception of shape and texture in the 
human case is very much dependent on the possession of arms and hands, 
perception of solidity, the resistance given by other objects, on which our 
conception of them as physical entities is based, could still be achieved in 
the absence of limbs. We are aware of the presence of an object in front 
of us when, in a dark room, we bump into a table, even though it may hit 
our legs or our abdomen, not our hands. In this sense, the close link 
existing between embodiment and perception of the solidity of physical 
objects can still be defended. Moreover, the dependence of persons-as- 
perceivers on the consideration of them as agents can be maintained, for 
perception (of solidity) requires the active engagement of the person in the 
world. 
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9.4. OBJECTING TO THE INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN ACTION AND 
PERCEPTION 
The interdependence between action and perception could be objected to 
if it could be shown that a person can be divided into two centres (one of 
perception, and one of action), working independently of each other. This 
would be the case, for example, if people were able to observe their own 
actions, as they observe other people's actions, for in that case it may 
appear that there are two independent centres in the person: one of them 
controlling perception, and the other one controlling action. But, can they 
really do this? Can they engage themselves in two different simultaneous 
activities: acting and observing how they act? Can they observe their 
actions from the outside, that is, in the way they observe other people's 
actions? 
9.4.1. Two examples 
The question of people's observation of their own actions can be 
approached either from a first- or a third-person point of view. As an 
example of the latter (a similar example can be found in O'Shaughnessy, 
1980: 32), consider the case in which a person suddenly undergoes the 
following strange experience: he hears himself saying something he did 
not want to say (perhaps, a swear-word; perhaps, a comment out of place), 
as if he were not really saying it, but as if he were just listening to what he 
was saying. (In a way it is like the situation in which a mother feels 
embarrassed after her little son has said something inappropriate or rude to 
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a boring neighbour. ) Such a person knows about what he is saying only 
by hearing his own words as if they were coming from outside (as if he 
heard someone else speaking). In such a case, it could be argued, one 
seems to observe one's actions from a third-person point of view. 
A different case is that in which one does not claim to be undergoing 
strange experiences, but simply tries to observe one's own actions as one 
performs them. This is the case of the basketball player who tries to 
concentrate on the different movements of his legs, arms, and the co- 
ordination between them, as he approaches the opposite basket. Instead 
of running with the usual quasi-automatic movement of arms and legs, he 
attempts to observe the way his body moves (as a teenager who is being 
taught how to improve his game observes his coach or his favourite 
players). This case could be taken to be an example of a first-person 
observation of one's actions. In what follows, both types of cases of 
observation of one's own actions will be discussed. 
9.4.2. The third-person point of view 
What can be said of the case in which a person hears himself speaking, as 
if somebody else (not himself) is speaking? Such a person claims not to 
be aware of what he is doing, expressing surprise when it happens. He 
insists that he lacked experience of agency, that he only found out about 
what was going on by listening to his words. 
Perhaps a closer look at his description of the experience may help. Does 
he describe the situation in the way another person would, that is, from a 
third-person perspective? Perhaps he makes comments on the inflexion of 
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the voice, how he stopped for a few seconds before uttering the last 
sentence, how determined the words sounded, and so on. That is, perhaps 
he describes his action in the same way in which someone else might have 
done it. In that case, he could be said to have 'observed' his action (his 
utterance/performance) in much the same way in which someone else did. 
The latter is supported by the element of surprise mentioned above. When 
one intentionally does something, one is not surprised at, nor does one find 
out about, the occurrence of the action. However, the person in our 
example claims to have been surprised when he found out about what was 
happening. (Notice that the expression 'what was happening', and not 
'what he did' is preferred, because there is a suggestion that he did not 
really do anything, that what happened was not up to him. ) 
Against the suggestion that such a person was not himself the agent is the 
fact that the words came out of his mouth, and therefore, it must have been 
him who did it. It could be further observed that, under normal 
circumstances, people's utterances come out of their own mouths, not 
someone else's mouth. However, the latter point will not suffice, for it is 
clear that this is not a normal case. 
With this sort of example we are at a loss about what to say: does the 
person utter those words himself? Is it his action? It seems as if we lack 
the conceptual baggage needed to achieve a clear understanding of what is 
going on. Nonetheless, this should not be too worrying, for this is only an 
imaginary extreme case, and there is no guarantee that understanding it 
will shed light on the more usual cases. So, let us concentrate on the 
latter. 
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9.4.3. Observation of our own actions 
Can a basketball player observe his own actions, in the same way in which 
a teenager observes his favourite players' actions? The initial answer 
seems to be undoubtedly negative, for observation requires a detached 
point of view as in the latter example, in which somebody (a teenager) 
observes somebody else (player). According to this, observation of 
oneself is impossible, for one person does not occupy two different points 
of view at the same time. But this begs the question, for it presupposes 
the matter in hand, whether a person is in fact the sum of two different 
control centres, one for perception and one for action. 'Observation of 
one's own actions' should not be interpreted in this question-begging way. 
Another example is the following. While typing this essay, I can try to 
concentrate on my typing (that is, how I hit the keys, the movement of my 
hands, the tilt of my head from the screen to the keyboard), not from an 
agent's point of view (as an agent, I would be interested in writing my 
ideas clearly, without mistakes; ie, I would be interested in the goal of my 
physical activity), but from an observer's point of view. The difference 
between observer and agent seems to be that the observer concentrates on 
the movements made, not paying so much attention to the end of the action 
itself, whereas the agent sets his eyes on the final aim of his action. 
Obviously, people could be interested in the observation of the physical 
movements, and not in the end of those movements. Therefore, people 
could be observers without being agents. Therefore, the alleged 
interdependence of action and perception is undermined. 
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As with the example of the teenager who observes his favourite players' 
game, in the case of the basketball player observing his own actions there 
are two different simultaneous intentional actions involved: one, the action 
of playing, and two, the action of observing action one. So, is it possible 
to perform these two different intentional actions at the same time? In 
general, is it possible to do more than one thing simultaneously? And if 
so, is the unity of consciousness threatened? Perhaps, it could be argued, 
it is possible to do more than one thing at the same time because there is 
not just one control centre in the person. But before this possibility can be 
assessed, let us examine the examples at hand. 
Sometimes, we do two things simultaneously: for instance, we walk while 
talking to somebody else. (This is similar to when we walk while 
observing other people's actions. ) Also, we hear and see different things 
at the same time. But can we talk and write simultaneously about two 
different topics? (Similarly, can I observe your actions closely while 
writing an essay? ) We were confronted here with several different kinds 
of example. The fact that we can, and do, see and hear different things 
does not pose a problem, since it is non-interestingly true that, if our visual 
and auditory mechanisms are in good working condition and not 
obstructed by any impediments, we receive different visual and auditory 
inputs most of the time. However, the matter under discussion is 
concerned with actions in which there is bodily activity involved, ie 
writing, talking, walking, etc. So, let us concentrate on these. 
Regarding the latter, why is it the case that certain actions can be 
performed simultaneously (namely, walking while talking to somebody 
else), whereas others cannot (namely, talking and writing about two 
different topics)? It could be suggested that in the former, no great deal 
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of attention is required at least in one of the actions (walking does not 
demand all our attention, and something else can be done at the same 
time); in the latter, however, attention is required in both actions (writing 
an essay can only be combined with doing something else in which a great 
deal of mindfulness is not needed, like chewing gum). Should it be 
concluded, then, that the problem is centred on the amount of attention 
necessary? This way of presenting the problem is unclear, for it suggests 
that it can be reduced to a quantitative question: the amount of attention 
involved. This approach, though, can be shown to be mistaken. 
It is a mark of our physiological make-up that we can only apply our 
sense-organs in one direction at a time: we have to move our heads to see 
what is going on behind us, we have to move our hands to touch what is 
on the left- and what is on the right-hand side. Similarly, we can only 
focus our attention in one direction. This is not a quantitative fact, but a 
fact about what human beings are like. In other words, there are 
physiological constraints on the sort of actions that can be performed 
simultaneously. I can chew gum and write an essay, but I cannot hammer 
in a nail and write a letter, since I have no hand left to do it (consider the 
case in which hammering a nail requires two hands, one holding the nail, 
and the other, the hammer); the latter is physically impossible. 
Nonetheless, this is not the whole story. Again, the main concern here is 
the analysis of intentional bodily actions; therefore, the agent's intention 
must be an important factor. The action of typing an essay can either be 
described as such (ie, the typing of an essay), or as the movement of the 
fingers in such-and-such a way, accompanied by the movement of the 
head, and so forth. The action is the same, although under two different 
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descriptions. The former is the typical description given by an agent; the 
latter is more likely to be provided by an observer. 
The agent's characterization of his action is crucial. What to an external 
observer may appear as an arbitrary series of bodily movements is 
described by the agent as a unitary action. The second description (the 
movement of fingers, head, and so on) is not appropriate because it does 
not reflect what the agent is doing. That is, the agent is not just moving 
his fingers and head in a certain way, but typing an essay. As a matter of 
fact, he does not have to move his fingers in that exact manner in order to 
type the essay. (Think of the different movements made by an expert 
touch-typist and a beginner. ) On the other hand, there could be exactly 
similar movements that would not count as the typing of an essay, namely 
a monkey mimicking a person. Therefore, not all cases in which different 
movements are made must be regarded as the doing of different things, for 
in some cases different movements are in fact one single action. 
Furthermore, what in certain contexts may be treated as separate actions 
can on other occasions be unified as a single action. A typical example is 
conducting an opera. 
An opera conductor is supposed to do several things at the same time: 
listen to the singers, introduce the music, stop instruments from playing, 
and so on. In this case, all the different activities are unified under a single 
intentional heading: all the activities are directed to the conducting of the 
opera. This can be made obvious by re-describing the different actions in 
those terms: he listens to the singers in the execution of their roles in the 
opera, he introduces the music at the precise moment in the context of the 
opera, and so on. The opera conductor is above all concerned with the 
end of his movements and actions: that is, he acts as an opera conductor. 
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If he just concentrated on the means (how beautifully the singer sings, or 
how appropriate the music is) as an observer (as somebody in the 
audience, perhaps), then all the different activities would not be unified in 
a single action (and, probably the result would be failure). All the 
different activities added together do not constitute a different action, 
unless they are all directed towards a single unified goal, unless unified 
under an intention, the agent's intention. 
Not all actions can be unified in the same manner, though: for instance, 
talking and walking is something I can do simultaneously, as two different 
actions. Nonetheless, from the agent's point of view, one of them 'takes 
over' the other: he may describe what he is doing as talking to a friend 
(while walking), or conversely as going for a walk (while talking to a 
friend). Therefore, the agent's own description of what he is doing makes 
one action primary. In this sense, although different actions are 
performed, it is the agent's description of what he is doing that 
characterizes his intentional bodily activity. 
In other cases, like talking and writing about two different and unrelated 
topics, the agent can neither unify them as a single action, nor can one of 
them be said to take over. In this case, then, it is said that those two 
actions cannot be done at the same time. 
Now, how does this affect the observation of one's own actions? In some 
cases, our human make-up prevents us from acting and observing at the 
same time; I cannot, for instance, observe your actions closely while 
writing an essay. On other occasions, observation is a necessary 
ingredient of an action; how can I paint a portrait of you without looking at 
your face? Yet in other cases, I can observe myself or other people while 
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doing something else, as when I stare at others (or myself in a mirror) 
while walking. Therefore, in a loose sense, we can all observe our own 
actions. However, when observation is thought of as an intentional, 
attention-requiring, action, then, like other intentional actions, the former 
seems to demand the whole of ourselves. But if the hypothesis of the dual 
control centre in the person is to have any relevance, it is the latter sense 
of 'observation' that is needed; that is, a person should be able to engage in 
the intentional observation of something (eg, what you are doing), while 
intentionally doing something else (eg, writing an essay). The latter would 
amount to the intentional doing of two separate and unrelated actions (ie, 
not unified under a single heading, and neither of them 'taking over' the 
other). But then, the hypothesis of a perceptual centre, different from a 
centre of action, is self-refuting, for observation has become one of the 
person's actions. That is, the hypothesis that there could be a perceptual 
centre, independent from a centre of action, which would in turn 
undermine the interdependence between action and perception, cannot 
even take root. On closer inspection, it turns out that perceptions are in 
fact actions, and that there are no 'pure' perceptions as such. Therefore, 
there cannot be a 'pure' perceptual centre, different and independent from a 
centre of action, for all perceptual activity is precisely an action. In the 
next section, the latter will be connected to a unitary view of the person. 
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9.5. THE UNITY OF THE PERSON 
9.5.1. Criticism of the unity of consciousness 
Nagel (1975) has questioned one of the pillars on which people's 
understanding of themselves rests, "the idea of a single person, a single 
subject of experience and action" (227). He bases his scepticism on the 
results of certain experiments on split-brain patients, that is, patients 
whose cerebral hemispheres have been divided. The central piece of 
evidence is summarized by Nagel when he affirms that "in these patients 
there appear to be things happening simultaneously which cannot fit into a 
single mind: simultaneous attention to two incompatible tasks, for 
example, without interaction between the purposes of the left and right 
hands" (239). He refers to a particular patient, to whom two different 
words ('pencil' and 'toothbrush') were independently shown in the two 
different visual fields, each connected to the corresponding cerebral 
hemisphere; when asked to look for those objects with both hands, his 
hands seemed to engage in the search with total independence from each 
other, so that the right hand picked up a pencil and discarded it, while the 
left hand searched for it; and the other way round with a toothbrush. This 
case suggests that each cerebral hemisphere can control purposeful 
behaviour, even in isolation from the other hemisphere. 
The picture is complicated by the fact that these people experience no 
behavioural disadvantage outside the laboratory where these tests are 
carried out; that is, their daily life, their contact and interaction with the 
world, is just as successful as any normal person's, showing no limitations 
at all. "If the patient is permitted to touch things with both hands and 
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smell them with both nostrils, he arrives at a unified idea of what is going 
on around him and what he is doing, without revealing any left-right 
inconsistencies in his behaviour or attitudes" (238). 
Nagel's scepticism stems from these two conflicting facts: on the one 
hand, the fact that the split-brain patients' two cerebral hemispheres work 
quite independently under laboratory conditions suggests that there might 
be two minds; on the other hand, the fact that they show no abnormality or 
inconsistency in their daily life indicates that there is only one mind. It is 
this dilemma that leads Nagel to conclude that "there is no whole number 
of individual minds that these patients can be said to have" (241), and by 
extrapolation it "should cause us to be sceptical about the concept of a 
single subject of consciousness as it applies to [non-split-brain people]" 
(242). 
According to Nagel's account, the subject of consciousness is identified 
with the possessor of a mind, and the mind, the seat of consciousness 
(and, therefore, personhood), with its physical basis, the brain. This 
Nagelian view has, in fact, already been discussed and rejected (see 
chapter 4). Then, it was argued that possession of a brain is neither 
sufficient nor necessary to be a person. Instead, it was suggested that the 
materiality of the person should be understood in terms of the notion of 
sensory and intentional embodiment. The latter will prove helpful here, 
too. It is significant that split-brain patients experience no difficulty in 
carrying out the tasks of daily life. Like non-split-brain people, they can 
successfully interact with the world. In this sense, they can be said to be 
sensonly and intentionally embodied. Then, it can be argued that Nagel's 
attempt at explaining the materiality of the person in terms of his physical 
brain is mistaken. Furthermore, Nagel's dilemma was born out of such an 
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attempt. However, if the approach is incorrect, then the dilemma is not 
well founded, and Nagel's scepticism about the unity of consciousness 
does not follow. 
As a matter of fact, the proper understanding of the unity of consciousness 
has already been hinted at. The practical unity experienced by split-brain 
patients in their daily life holds half the answer, for it suggests that in their 
active involvement in the world people are unified. The unity of 
consciousness is not speculative or theoretical; it is a practical unity. 
Split-brain people can carry out any daily task just as well as non-split- 
brain people. That is, when they are regarded as normal agents in the 
world, they are just as able and unified as anybody else. 
The other half of the answer is to be found somewhere else, in the proper 
understanding of the subject of consciousness. 
9.5.2. The person as essentially active 
There is a long-standing tradition in philosophy which regards the person 
as a subject of thought and experience. Consideration of the view of 
certain authors will make this clear. Descartes's famous definition of 
himself is "I am a thinking thing". Hume, reacting against Descartes, 
denied that there is such a thing as a substantial self, but such a denial is 
precisely the denial of a subject of thought and experience: he could never 
catch himself without a perception, and he could never catch anything but 
the perception (that is, he could not catch the subject of the 
perception/experience). Kant, in his criticism of Hume, proposed the 
transcendental unity of apperception as indicating the formal conditions of 
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personal identity; he stressed that there cannot be unowned experiences, 
and that particular experiences belong to particular persons. But, in a 
way, the framework within which he works is the same as Hume: the 
transcendental unity of apperception applies to the self as subject of 
thought and experience. 
The predominant view that emerges is one where the person is regarded as 
essentially passive; it may even be said that the person is a contemplative 
being. The balance may be redressed by paying attention to the person as 
agent. If the person is an agent, then he is not just a contemplative being. 
If he is essentially an agent, then he is essentially active. 
In favour of the latter is the fact that the question 'what is person P doing 
at Of is always pertinent. Such an answer as 'nothing' is not so much a 
counter-example of the view that people are essentially active, as a short 
formula for something like 'nothing worth talking about' or 'mind your own 
business'. Even when people are just thinking, seeing, hearing, or 
otherwise perceptually experiencing the world, they are still doing 
something (see Taylor, 1963). What this amounts to is the idea that 
people are, above all, agents. Even qua subjects of thought and 
experience, people are agents. Thus, an adequate account of people 
requires a change of emphasis from the unity of consciousness, understood 
as the unity of the subject of thought and experience, to the unity of 
agency. Adapting Kant's famous remark, what characterizes people is not 
the transcendental unity of apperception, but the transcendental unity of 
agency. 
' 
A qualification of the latter statement is needed. Although Kant talked 
about the unity of apperception as that which unifies people's experiences, 
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it must be observed that he did not neglect the active aspect of the person. 
Moving from his discussion of theoretical reason to the characterization of 
practical reason, he emphasizes the rational, free nature of people. By 
making their own decisions, Kant says, people escape the natural order 
and emerge as active beings, as agents. Thus, the move from the unity of 
consciousness to the unity of agency is in no way an anti-Kantian move: 
Kant himself provided the ground for it. 
Consideration of the person as essentially active succeeds in showing that 
the objection considered above fails: there cannot be two independent 
control centres in the person (one of perception, and one of action), 
because the person is essentially an agent, and the treatment of him as a 
perceiver is subsumed under his treatment as an agent. It also helps to 
show not only that perception needs action (ie, what has been called 'the 
necessity of bodily action' in the text), but that perception is itself the 
person's activity. Thus, the thesis defended above that perception is active 
can now be more clearly understood, once it is regarded as one of the 
activities of the person. What remains to be shown is that the sort of 
activity that best marks the essential nature of the person is intentional 
bodily action. This is the topic of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 10 
HUMAN ACTION AS BODILY ACTION 
10.1. INTRODUCTION 
The strategy for the following chapter is to provide an account of human 
action which is closely linked to the necessity-of-embodiment thesis: the 
thesis that human action is primarily a bodily action will be defended. 
Furthermore, and following from the conclusion arrived at in the previous 
chapter, according to which the person is essentially active, it will be 
argued that consideration of the human body as body-in-movement is 
primary with respect to the idea of a resting body which, now and then, 
acts. Those actions where the notion of body-in-movement is best 
exemplified are bodily skills. As a result, the person/agent will emerge as 
an object, an element in the world, but also as a subject of action 
10.2. WHAT COUNTS AS HUMAN ACTION? 
The first thing to do is to specify what is meant by 'human action', setting 
the limits of what is going to be the subject of this enquiry. Not 
everything a human being does counts as human action in the 
philosophically interesting sense of this phrase. The method of this 
preliminary approach will consist in a comparison between pairs of 
sentences: one of which will be a case of human action. Thus, certain 
features of human action will appear. The pairs of sentences are as 
follows. 1 
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(i) Human action vs natural event or process 
(I) I caused a fire 
(2) a bolt of lightning caused a fire 
The difference between both sentences is that the former makes an 
essential reference to an agent (whether it is something done deliberately 
or accidentally), whereas the latter does not. Sometimes, such reference is 
implicit, as in 
(3) a burning cigarette caused a fire; or, 
(4) the bomb exploding killed a man. 
In both (3) and (4), we could ask 'who did it? ', and an answer would be 
available (an arsonist, a terrorist, whether they are known or unknown). 
Thus, (3) and (4) would become, respectively, 
(3') a burning cigarette dropped by A caused a fire; and, 
(4') the bomb set off by B killed a man. 
In (2), however, the question does not make sense: the fire was not caused 
by a person, but by a natural event. The grammatical structure of (2) is 
similar to that of (3) and (4), but philosophical analysis shows a deeper 
disparity. 
(ii) Human action vs bodily movement 
(5) I raised my arm 
(6) my arm rose 
Both sentences have in common the movement of a part of the body. The 
fact that they are different can be shown because (6) could happen, for 
instance, if an object going upward hit my arm and made it rise; in that 
case, it was not me who raised it. The important relation between both 
sentences is that (5) entails (6), but not vice versa; that is, that I raised my 
arm entails that my arm rose, but that my arm rose does not entail that I 
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raised it (it could have been hit by an object, or somebody else could have 
moved it for me). The second sentence will not count as a human action, 
but as a bodily movement. This group will also include hiccoughs, 
coughs, twitches, reflexes, and so on. 
(iii) Human action vs passion 
(7) I sat down (due to tiredness) 
(8) 1 fell down (because I slipped on a banana skin) 
The contrast between these two sentences is sometimes put in terms of 
what the agent himself actively does, as opposed to what happens to him: 
only the former are cases of human action. Among the things which 
happen to the agent are the involuntary bodily movements mentioned in 
the last paragraph: hiccoughs, coughs, reflexes, etc. This should not be 
taken to imply that the distinctions in (ii) and (iii) are the same, for in (ii) 
the fact that human actions involve a bodily movement is stressed, 
whereas in (iii) the emphasis is put on the active involvement of the agent. 
This feature of human action was expressed by Reid (1970; also, Lehrer, 
1989) by saying that people possess active power, that is, a power to 
perform actions. Thus, if I have the power to raise my hand then I also 
have the power not to raise it. However, I do not have the power to 
hiccough (in a genuine way, not just pretending to hiccough), or the power 
not to do it (as far as hiccoughing is concerned, it is usually the case that 
the more we want to stop it, the worse it becomes). This power is 
understood as real efficient causation: that is, as people initiating changes 
in the world. 
(iv) Intentional vs non-intentional action 
(9) I fired a gun 
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(10) 1 fired my neurons 
This is the difference between something I do intentionally, voluntarily 
and/or consciously (like firing a gun), and something I do unintentionally, 
involuntarily and/or unconsciously (like the firing of my neurons, if indeed 
this is a correct description of the physiological processes involved in the 
firing of a gun). Even if the latter (together with the movement of certain 
muscles and other things) is necessary to fire a gun, it is something I do 
not do, because it is not (part of) my intention in firing a gun. Thus, 
intentionality emerges as a key element of human agency. 
A related case is that in which I do something deliberately which 
necessarily involves doing something else accidentally. Thus, my action 
of correcting a student's essay (something I do intentionally) necessarily 
involves my spoiling the neatness of the pages with my corrections (the 
latter being something I do accidentally). If I was asked what my 
intention was, I would say that to correct the student's essay; spoiling the 
page, although necessarily involved in my intentional action, is not 
something I do (since action is intentional action). 
Davidson, in a paper called 'Agency' (1980: 43-61), has criticized this 
distinction between what the agent does and the physiological processes 
necessarily involved in the action. He defends that the latter are also 
actions of the agent. In order to understand why, it must be explained that 
he distinguishes between the action and the description of the action. An 
action can be described in different ways. For example, one and the same 
action could be described as 'the killing of a person', 'the act of self- 
defence against an attacker', or 'the stabbing of an enemy'. Similarly, my 
action of firing a gun could be described as 'the firing of a gun' or 'the 
firing of my neurons leading to the firing of a gun'. Therefore, since both 
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descriptions refer to the same action, and the former is clearly an action of 
mine, then so is the latter. Thus, the physiological processes involved in 
the performance of an action are part of the action itself, and not 
something else, different from the action, that causes it. 
Against this line of argument, it could be replied that the contrast between 
sentences (9) and (10) reflects a widely accepted distinction between what 
the intention of the action is and what is necessary to bring it about; ie, 
between intentional (description of an) action and the natural conditions of 
agency. The firing of a gun requires certain physiological processes, but it 
is the former, and not the latter, that the agent intends to do. The 
physiological processes can be said to be done by the agent, but only in a 
non-intentional sense; it is intentional action that concerns us here. 
In short, then, human actions are actively and intentionally carried out by a 
person, as opposed to what happens in nature (natural events or 
processes), and what happens to people (namely, such involuntary bodily 
movements as hiccoughing or slipping on a banana skin). Is there a 
feature according to which the difference between actions and happenings 
can be more accurately stated? Is there something lacking in cases of 
happenings that distinguishes them from cases of action? The answer to 
these questions is parasitic on the model of human action that is defended. 
In the following two sections, two different general approaches to human 
action will be considered in some detail. 
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10.3. MODELS OF HUMAN ACTION: THE NATURALISTIC APPROACH 
10.3.1. Basic actions 
Such actions as raising one's arm or moving one's leg have been taken to 
be the proto-examples of human action. The reason appears to be obvious 
and forceful enough to some philosophers: if moving (a part of) one's body 
is not something that can be done intentionally by a person, what else 
would be a better candidate? Danto (1970) calls them 'basic actions', and 
offers the following definition: 
"When an individual M performs a basic action a, there is no event 
distinct from a that both stands to a as cause to effect and is an action 
performed by Al So when M performs a basic action, he does nothing 
first that causes it to happen. " (257) 
Raising one's arm qualifies as a basic action because there is nothing else 
that a person must do in order to move his arm. Not all actions are basic, 
but at least some of them must be so: 
"If there are any actions at all, there must be two distinct kinds of 
actions: those performed by an individual M, which he may be said to 
have caused to happen; and those actions, also performed by M, which 
he cannot be said to have caused to happen. The latter I shall designate 
as basic actions. " (256) 
The reason why there must be some basic actions is to prevent an infinite 
regress of causation. Actions relate to other actions as cause to effect, so 
that in order to produce a certain effect, there must have been a previous 
cause. This cause is in turn the effect brought about by a previous cause, 
which in turn is also the effect of a yet previous cause, and so on. There 
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is, then, the danger of an infinite regress from effects to causes and to 
further causes. In order to stop the chain of causes, it is argued, there 
must first be an action that is not itself caused, that is, a basic action. 
Therefore, basic actions are a necessary aspect of human action. 
However, the existence (and necessity) of basic actions is not only 
reached as the conclusion of a philosophical argument. On the contrary, 
Danto maintains that "we all know, in a direct and intuitive way, that there 
are basic actions, and which are basic ones" (261). This is supported by 
the fact that basic actions are not acquired, but rather constitute the 
standard equipment for action. In the human case, for instance, moving 
one's arm and moving one's leg are part of the repertoire of basic actions 
for the normal person, while moving one's hat is not. A paralysed person, 
on the other hand, is negatively abnormal in that moving his arm is not part 
of his repertoire of basic actions. (Similarly, a positively abnormal person 
would be one who could do as a basic action something that the normal 
person could not do. ) 
10.3.2. Purposive actions 
Richard Taylor (1970) has also offered an analysis of basic actions. 
Taylor agrees with Danto that a simple act (a basic action) is one that does 
not require the performance of any other act, but he adds a new element: 
"while a simple act, like moving one's arm, need not be purposeful, a 
complex act, such as moving a stone with one's arm, of necessity is 
purposeful. " (276) 
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The notion of purpose is explained by comparing the following two 
statements: 
(11) I move my hand, causing a stone to move; and, 
(12) 1 move a stone with my hand (by moving my hand). 
The difference between them is that in (11) I move my hand, but the 
movement of the stone is unintended, whereas in (12) I move my hand 
first in order to move the stone. In other words, (11) is a simple act, 
whereas (12) is a complex one, because the movement of the stone 
requires the previous movement of one's hand. Since not all actions are 
basic, an account of the role of purpose in human action is needed. This 
necessity can be seen in two ways. Firstly, an adequate account of (12) 
makes it plain that there is an implicit reference to a purpose: I moved my 
hand in order to move the stone. Secondly, the notion of purpose accounts 
for the difference between intended and unintended effects of one's 
actions, like the unintended (11) and intended (12) movements of the 
stone. While the movement of the stone is part of one's intention in (12), it 
is not soin(11). 
Therefore, Taylor's account, whilst acknowledging the distinction between 
basic and non-basic actions, incorporates the purposive aspect of human 
action, which is an advantage over Danto's account. This allows the 
possibility of making finer discriminations between apparently similar 
situations. Both in (11) and (12), the same external bodily movements 
take place (a hand moves, which in turn causes the movement of a stone), 
but the purposes or intentions of the agents and, therefore, the actions they 
perform, are different. 
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The element of purpose in human action is further explored by Charles 
Taylor (1964). With an anti-behaviourist motivation in mind, he 
distinguishes two aspects of human action: on the one hand, there is 
something (called the 'goal') brought about in action; on the other hand, the 
agent's purpose is to achieve such a goal: 
"the distinction between action and non-action hangs not just on the 
presence or absence of the corresponding intention or purpose, but on 
this intention or purpose having or not having a role in bringing about 
the behaviour. " (33) 
It is not enough that the agent intends to move the stone, but such an 
intention must bring about the agent's behaviour. This is proposed in order 
to distinguish between those cases where one has the intention to do 
something, but just before doing it one accidentally brings it about, and 
those cases where the action follows from one's intention to do so. An 
example of the former is the case where someone forms the intention to 
move a stone (by using his hand), but just before doing it, he moves his 
hand clumsily with the effect that the stone moves. This case is different 
from the one where the movement of the stone is a result of the intention 
to move the stone. 
Intentionality, therefore, is the feature that distinguishes actions from non- 
actions. Intentionality is acting with a purpose, not any purpose, but the 
one given to his behaviour by the agent himself. An intentional 
description of an action is the description of the agent himself (from a 
first-person point of view), with the goal of his action in view. The active 
involvement of the agent is seen in that it is not sufficient that the action be 
appropriate for the goal; he must also believe it to be so, as manifested in 
his intention. 
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10.3.3. Causally and teleologically basic actions 
Some philosophers (Hornsby 1980a, 1980b) have argued that the term 
'basic action' is in fact ambiguous between causally basic actions and 
teleologically basic actions. Let us explore the former notion first. 
Some actions are related to each other in a causal way, so that doing a 
certain action a causes a different action a'; a is, then, causally more basic 
than a'. For instance, I can cause myself to telephone a friend by 
summoning up an image of him. In this example, summoning up an image 
of my friend is causally more basic than telephoning him. 
Danto seems to have been thinking of the causal relations among actions, 
and therefore, his definition of basic actions could be taken to be a 
definition of causally basic actions. However, if that is the case, such 
bodily movements as moving one's hand could not count as the proto- 
example of basic action, or even as a basic action at all. Somebody could 
say 'I moved my hand by contracting certain muscles', where the action of 
contracting certain muscles causes the movement of the hand. Moving 
one's hand, or generally speaking, bodily movements, are not basic 
actions, for a different action could be found that causes them. The latter 
cause-action could be a physiological action (or, if talk of descriptions as 
opposed to actions is preferred, an action described in physiological or 
neurological terms), like the contracting of my muscles. It is difficult to 
see what might count as a basic action in this causal sense: perhaps only 
certain happenings in the brain, or perhaps 'tryings', 'willings', 'attempts', 
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and so on. In any case, it is clear that if bodily movements are to be basic 
actions, a different account of basicness is required. 
The characterization of teleologically basic actions stems from the idea, 
suggested by Danto and others, according to which basic actions are those 
which the agent does directly, without doing anything else previously. In 
this context, the agent's beliefs and desires make a difference. A 
teleologically basic action is, therefore, characterized as follows: if agent 
A wants D and believes that to get D he must do action a, which in turn 
requires action a', then he will do a'; action a' is, therefore, teleologically 
more basic than action a. 
Teleologically basic actions are those actions that escape the agent's 
beliefs in terms of means and ends. Examples of teleologically basic 
actions are bodily skills, like typing the letter 'p' or tying one's shoe laces, 
where no beliefs about what one is doing (movements of muscles, and so 
on) are involved at the time of acting. An experienced touch-typist, for 
instance, could explain, if asked, what are the movements that she makes 
in order to type 'p', by such beliefs as the movement of her right hand in 
such-and-such a way are not conscious beliefs entertained by her when 
typing 'p'. In the case of somebody who is learning to type, though, beliefs 
about the movement of one's right hand in relation to the keyboard are 
present when typing 'p'. Therefore, typing 'p' is not a teleologically basic 
action for the latter person. Hornsby stresses this distinction by saying 
that 
"The kinds of action in an agent's repertoire that are basic for him are 
those which he knows how to do, and knows how to do otherwise than 
on the basis of knowing how they are done by him. " (1980b: 84) 
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Bodily skills fit the mould, for they are examples of things one knows how 
to do, without knowing how they are done, that is, without knowing the 
neurophysiological processes involved. Consider asking a child how he 
rides his bike: he might have no idea of the processes involved, nor does 
he have to know. 
The importance of bodily skills in the whole of our actions will become 
clearer shortly (see 10.5. ), when it is argued that they have a primary role 
to play in our relation to the world. Moreover, the latter picture in terms 
of teleologically basic actions matches the previous characterization of 
intentional action as de re. Neutral bodily movements (in the way in 
which Danto appears to conceive them), are not basic; on the other hand, 
bodily movements like the typing of 'p', or the moving of one's hand 
towards point p in space rather than p', are basic in our understanding of 
intentional action, for the latter reveal an awareness of spatial position and 
of external objects that makes the agent an element in the world. Neutral 
bodily movements, like the raising of one's hand in the abstract, are 
secondary with respect to those other bodily movements and skills in 
which the external world is a constitutive (de re) part. 
10.3.4. Concluding remarks 
So far, there has been a progressive elaboration of an approach which 
views such actions as raising one's hand (in general, intentional 
movements of one's body) as the proto-examples of human action. The 
inclusion of a teleological aspect has introduced some important variations 
on the original starting point, although still within what might be called 'the 
naturalistic approach'. 
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The label of 'naturalistic' comes from the fact that there is a close 
connection between human actions and the actions of other animals: both 
human beings and animals can perform such actions as raising one's arm 
or moving one's leg. (Compare, for instance, 'Peter raised his hand' or 
'Peter killed a man' with 'The tiger raised his head' or 'The tiger killed a 
monkey'. ) The introduction of a teleological aspect is not sufficient to 
mark off human actions, though, since animals can also display purposive 
behaviour, namely when a tiger chases after a monkey. Should an account 
that separates human actions from the actions of other animals be 
preferred to the naturalistic approach? Let us consider such an account. 
10.4. MODELS OF HUMAN ACTION: THE INTENTIONAL APPROACH 
10.4.1. Rejection of the naturalistic approach 
Carlos Moya (1990) has rejected the naturalistic approach in the following 
way. 'Jones raised his hand' differs from 'Jones's hand rose' in that the 
former is an action which logically involves the latter (a happening), and 
not vice versa (see 10.2. (ii)). It follows that if the former is true, then so 
is 
the latter, whereas the latter can be true without the former being so. For 
instance, Jones's hand can rise because of a spasm or a nervous twitch, in 
which case it is not true that Jones raised his hand. Therefore, there must 
be something present in Jones's raising his hand, and lacking in the mere 
rising of his hand, which makes the former an action. What 
does Jones 
add to the bodily movement that is the rising of his hand? How 
does 
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Jones bring about such a bodily movement? There are three possible 
solutions: 
i. Jones raises his hand by doing something else previously, 
namely a mental act of willing or trying; 
11. Jones raises his hand by way of a previous physical cause, 
namely a physical trying; 
iii. Jones himself is the cause of the rising of his hand. 
The three solutions, Moya goes on, are unsatisfactory. The first one gives 
rise to the problem of interactionism: how do mental causes produce 
physical events? The second one cannot be accepted because it reduces 
the genuine question of human agency to a mechanistic causation of 
events. The third alleged solution is not a solution at all: it simply states 
that there is something special about human agency, namely that human 
agents can initiate changes in the world, without explaining how it 
happens. 
Moya believes that these problems can only be overcome by rejecting the 
naturalistic approach altogether. He concedes that the account of basic 
actions suggests something true: that human beings (and certain animals, 
too) have a natural ability to move their limbs, and that they can direct 
their behaviour in a spontaneous way towards a certain goal. Nonetheless, 
these natural conditions of agency, although necessary, are not sufficient 
to provide an account of human agency. 
Nevertheless, there are other examples of human action in which their 
irreducible human character (that is, excluding the actions performed by 
non-human animals) can be adequately emphasized. That is the case with 
casting a vote, making a promise, or signalling for a left turn while driving. 
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These actions will be called 'meaningful' actions. Their initial attraction is 
that they make no room for a distinction that parallels the one between 
'Jones raised his hand' and 'Jones's hand rose', and therefore, avoid the 
difficulties of the naturalistic approach. 'Jones made a promise' is no 
different from 'Jones's promise was made': if the former is true, then the 
latter is true; and the opposite also holds, since a promise having been 
made implies that someone has made it. 
10.4.2. Acting as rule-following 
At first sight, a common feature of these sorts of actions is their social 
aspect; that is, the fact that a certain process of learning and socialization 
has taken place. What has been learnt is a set of practices and rules that 
govern the correct performance of those actions. In signalling for a left 
turn, for instance, a certain knowledge of the Highway Code is necessary. 
This aspect of human action has led some philosophers, such as Melden 
(1970), to compare human action to the act of playing games, suggesting 
that 'playing chess' in fact offers a perfect example of what human action is 
like. The important point of similarity, it is argued, is that there is a set of 
practices and procedures, learnt by habitual repetition, that give rise to a 
rule which is followed by those who share a common form of life. 
Introducing the idea of rule-following stresses that human actions are 
normative; that is, human actions can be correctly or incorrectly 
performed, in the same way in which there are correct and incorrect moves 
in chess. It must be noted that following a rule is different from acting in 
accordance with a rule, as when someone who does not know the rules of 
chess makes a correct move by chance. 
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The advantage of this account is that it helps to pick out 'pure' human 
actions, as opposed to the actions of animals. But, can the social and 
normative aspects of human action be put together with the previous 
proposal about purposefulness? 
10.4.3. Intention and intentional action 
It has been maintained that animals show intentionality when, for instance, 
they chase after their prey; the intention or purpose of their chase is to get 
the prey. Human beings are also intentional: when they signal for a left 
turn they intend to turn left; or when they bid at an auction, they intend to 
purchase a certain object. What is the difference, if any, between both 
types of example? The latter group of examples reveals a stronger sense 
of intentionality in that they imply a commitment to future actions: when 
one signals for a left turn, one commits oneself to turning left; and when 
one bids at an auction, one commits oneself to paying for a certain object. 
If one fails to turn left or to pay for the object at the auction, one is subject 
to criticism for not complying (correctly) with one's intention. 
Thus, a crucial feature of such actions as making a promise or bidding at 
an auction is their intentionality, understood as a commitment to future 
actions. Could this feature be what distinguishes actions from 
happenings? Could it be said that actions are intentional whereas 
happenings are not? Certainly, making a promise is an intentional action, 
and even necessarily so: making an unintentional promise would be the 
same as not making a promise at all. But, how about the case in which 
someone is playing with a gun and accidentally pulls the trigger with the 
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undesired result that he kills somebody? He cannot be said to have killed 
the other person intentionally, although it is an action of his (not just a 
happening). In this case, it could be argued that, even if his action is not 
intentional under the description 'killing somebody', it is intentional under 
the description 'playing with a gun'. Happenings, on the other hand, are 
not intentional under any description; for instance, sneezing. Therefore, it 
can be inferred that "a certain piece of behaviour is an action if, and only 
if, it is intentional under some description" (Moya, 1990: 53). Or, in 
Davidson's words, "a man is the agent of an act if what he does can be 
described under an aspect that makes it intentional" (1980: 46). 
What characterizes, then, an intentional action? Consider the following 
definition given by Moya: 
"a particular activity or piece of behaviour of A is an intentional action 
(under the description D), if, and only if, in performing that activity or 
behaviour, under that description, A follows correctly a rational 
intention of his or hers. " (130) 
Three elements emerge here. First, in performing an intentional action one 
is following a plan or intention, not simply acting in accordance with an 
intention. Second, one is following it correctly (normative aspect of 
action). Third, the intention must be rational itself, as opposed, for 
instance, to the intentions formed by a madman. 
The first element has already been discussed in connection with Melden's 
theory. At an auction, scratching one's nose may count as making a bid 
for a certain item. Now, if I do not know this (perhaps it is the first 
auction I have ever been to), I may scratch my nose because it is itching, 
not because I intend to bid for an object. The latter action is an example 
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of acting in accordance with a rule, not a case of following a rule or 
intention. 
The second element, the nonnative aspect of action, will be explained 
further. Moya treats intentions as similar to promises and decisions (as 
opposed to previous treatments of intentions in relation to wants or 
desires). If I decide (or promise) to do something, I typically do it; I could 
change my mind, but there must be a reason for it. The same 
consideration can be applied to intentions. Although promises to 
somebody else are public, while intentions are private commitments, 
neither the former nor the latter can be broken without a reason, even one 
with such a minimal content as 'I did not like doing it' or 'I could not be 
bothered'. "In having an intention I commit myself either to make (if I 
think I will be able) or to try to make (if I do not think I will be able) its 
content true. " (138) 
The rationality element of intentional action is made manifest in the fact 
that, if intentions are systematically broken, then one can start to doubt 
whether the person in question understands what an intention is. It also 
emerges from the facts that one cannot intend what one knows to be 
impossible, and that one cannot intend and not intend the same thing, 
under the same description, at the same time. What this leads to is the 
idea that attribution of intentional action goes hand in hand with the 
attribution of a system of beliefs and desires, ie, a mind. This rational and 
holistic character of human action has been stressed by Moya in the 
following passages: 
"Intentions can exist only in the wider context of a mind. " (61) 
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"Intentional states are essentially a network, a whole system. They are 
not discrete, separate items: the existence of one of them has necessary 
implications for the existence of others. " (64) 
10.4.4. Concluding remarks 
This account of intentional action incorporates the idea, expressed by such 
authors as Charles Taylor and Richard Taylor, that there is a purpose 
(teleology) in human action. At the same time, it provides a way of 
distinguishing between the spontaneous and natural teleology of non- 
human animals, and the intentionality of human actions. The former are 
intentions in a weak sense, whereas the latter are intentions in a strong 
sense2: "we can say of a dog that runs after a ball that its intention is to 
catch the ball, but we cannot say of it that it has now the intention to catch 
the ball in two days' time" (67). The reason is not that animals do not 
have an intuition of time (notice that certain birds are faithful to their 
partners for life, or that some animals collect food for the coming winter), 
but rather that they are unable to commit themselves in that sense of 
'commitment' which involves a complex network of beliefs and other 
propositional attitudes, as well as language and a highly sophisticated 
process of socialization. 
Therefore, on this approach, the key element is that human actions are 
intentional, in the sense of involving a commitment to the future. 
Furthermore, actions also have a rational and normative aspect. What 
distinguishes actions from happenings is, then, that actions are intentional 
under some description, whereas happenings are not. 
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10.5. THE PRIMACY OF BODILY ACTION 
The two approaches to human action outlined above have stressed 
different features: the defenders of the naturalistic approach place such 
bodily actions as bodily movements in the centre of the picture, whereas 
the defenders of the intentional approach not only criticize the centrality of 
such actions as the raising of one's hand, but also underline the importance 
of 'pure' meaningful actions (like the casting of a vote, or getting married) 
that are outside the scope of non-human animal behaviour. What theory, if 
any, is right? In this section, it will be argued that both of them fail to 
provide an exhaustive account of human action, for they presuppose a 
certain view of the body that is mistaken. 
Consider the action of going for a run. In running, one does not just move 
uniformly in one direction: one may have to lengthen or shorten one's step 
so as not to squash a snail, twist to avoid bumping into somebody else, or 
stop abruptly at a road junction if there is a car coming. Such actions as 
lengthening one's step, twisting or stopping abruptly can only be 
understood in a wider context in which people, quite literally, act against 
the inertia of their bodies: if one did not lengthen one's step, the snail 
would be squashed; if one did not stop in time, one would be run over by a 
car. Similarly, consider the case of the ballet dancer who turns her body 
round and round, until she stops and starts turning in the opposite 
direction: she is also acting against the inertia of her body's movement. 
The importance of these examples is that they make human action 
inseparable from the possession of a body. The human body tends, of its 
own nature, to behave in a certain way, according to the laws of physics. 
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What people do when acting is to try to modify such a natural tendency, to 
somehow interfere with the natural behaviour of their bodies: for instance, 
they act so as to prevent their bodies from continuing to move in a certain 
direction, at a certain speed, etc. Human action is, therefore, an 
intentional acting against the natural movement of the human body. In this 
sense, it could be argued, human action is primarily bodily action. 
Nonetheless, this way of arguing for an account of human action that is 
primarily bodily is not, perhaps, the most appropriate one. It is based on a 
view of the body as the material body, which, as has been seen above (see 
chapter 6), is not crucially central to the account of persons proposed here 
(the relation between person and material body was tentatively analyzed in 
terms of constitution, although other people may prefer to talk of 
supervenience). In this sense, the primacy of bodily action will now be 
defended in a way that pays the necessary attention to the 
sensory/intentional body. 
The human body is not only that which can be directly controlled by the 
persona, but that through which people get in contact with the world: the 
body is people's door to the world. The latter means not only that people 
perceive the world from the position occupied by their body, but more 
importantly, that their body makes the world accessible as a world for 
action. From this, an argument can be constructed in favour of the 
primacy of bodily action. But, in order to see how this could be the case, 
the nature of such a body must first be explained. 
The examples of human action proposed by the defenders of the 
naturalistic approach (namely, raising one's arm or moving one's leg) 
convey the impression that the human body is primarily a resting body 
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that, now and then, performs a movement. This is further supported by 
their talk of basic actions; that is, the proto-examples of human action are 
to be found in those actions that cause other actions, without being caused 
themselves, as if the chain of action began with them, and before there 
was only inactivity. In this sense, when I stretch my hand in order to 
move a stone, what happens is that I initiate a completely new and isolated 
movement (or chain of movements) of my body, as if up until then my 
body had been totally idle. 
The intentional approach, on the other hand, insofar as it emerges as a 
critique of the former (ie, as an attempt at dealing with the problems 
arising from the fact that such basic human actions as 'Jones raised his 
hand' logically involve a happening, that Jones's hand rose), also inherits 
the model of the body as a resting body. The intentionality that 
characterizes 'pure' human actions is what brings about the movement of 
the body. Thus, when I signal for a left turn, for instance, I suddenly 
initiate a movement in my left arm; if I had not formed the intention to turn 
left, my body would have remained inactive. 
This view of the body as primarily passive agrees with (and perhaps 
follows from) the idea that the human body is a mechanical device which, 
like other machines, only works when switched on, or otherwise operated 
from the outside. Computers, for instance, do not do anything unless the 
user gives them the order to do so (eg, by pressing the 'enter' key). If the 
human body was just like a computer, then it would have to be activated 
from outside, perhaps from the mind. But, it is precisely this mechanistic 
view of the body that is being resisted here. In this sense, as previously 
discussed, the body has been characterized as a sensory and intentional 
body, that is, as a body in active contact with the world. Now, a passive 
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body could not actively exchange information with the world; only an 
active body can successfully do so. 
Merleau-Ponty, who appreciated this fact very well, proposed the familiar 
distinction between the objective and phenomenal bodies. It could be said 
that, while the objective body is a fixed, permanent (and even 'dead') 
object, the phenomenal body is a live organism, in the sense that it actively 
interacts with the world. Consider what he says in this respect: 
"my body appears to me as an attitude directed towards a certain 
existing or possible task" (1962: 100; my emphasis). 
"Consciousness is in the first place not a matter of 'I think that', but of 
'I can'. [... ] In the action of the hand which is raised towards an object 
is contained a reference to the object, not as an object represented, but 
as that highly specific thing towards which we project ourselves, near 
which we are, in anticipation, and which we haunt. " (13 7-9) 
It has already been mentioned that the world open to the person is a world 
of meanings, as opposed to a world of represented objects. In this sense, 
one of the meanings of the world (perhaps, the central one) is that it is a 
task to which our intentions are projected. The world is centrally a world 
for action. Therefore, a proposal against the model of the human body as 
a resting body, in that the human body is primarily a body-in-movement, 
an essentially active body, will now be put forward. The latter is the 
natural correlate of the idea, suggested at the end of the last chapter, that 
people are not passive, but essentially active beings. Furthermore, the 
resting body is parasitic on the body-in-movement: periods of rest or sleep 
are a physiological need for carrying out future activities. 
Once it is fully acknowledged that the body is an active body, it can be 
seen that it presents the person with a world which is best characterized as 
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the stage, the setting of people's life. Thus, the proper way to regard the 
world is not as a finished and completed object, but as an ever-changing 
place, changing precisely because of people's impact on it. That this is, in 
fact, the way we see the world can be appreciated in that people go about 
their business every day; that politicians promise to change the world; that 
a key ingredient of people's own self-image is their profession, that is, that 
which captures their relation to the world. Borrowing Heidegger's phrase, 
it can be said that the world appears to us to be "ready-to-hand", not just 
ready-to-eye; that is, the world is the place where people develop their 
potential, the place with which they are actively involved, not just a place 
they lazily contemplate, as a spectator watches a play. People are not 
spectators: people are actors. (See Taylor, 1993. ) 
The world, then, ceases to be simply an objective world, and becomes the 
person's egocentric space. The latter has been characterized so far mainly 
as the person's perceptual environment, although it was suggested that 
there is an agency-centred egocentric map of the world. The sense of this 
can now be fully understood: the person's surroundings take on a special 
meaning as things to be done, as possible tasks, as the scenario for 
agency: 
"The word 'here' applied to my body does not refer to a determinate 
position in relation to other positions or to external co-ordinates, but 
the laying down of the first co-ordinates, the anchoring of the active 
body in an object, the situation of the body in face of its tasks. " 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962 : 100) 
The existence of an egocentric map of the world is, then, possible because 
the person occupies a position in the objective world. The latter does not 
simply mean the space occupied by relation to other objects, although it 
presupposes it, but instead refers to the fact that the world and its objects 
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cease to be mere objects for representation, and become vitally linked to 
the person, both at the levels of perception and, above all, action. 
The importance of the fact that the body-in-movement opens the person to 
the world can hardly be understated. Merleau-Ponty, in fact, realized how 
fundamental such a knowledge of the world is: 
"our bodily experience of movement is not a particular case of 
[theoretical] knowledge; it provides us with a way of access of the 
world and the object, with a 'praktognosia', which has to be recognized 
as original and perhaps as primary. " (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 140; my 
emphasis) 
The originality of such knowledge consists in the fact that it is essentially 
personal and unique: an experienced basketball player has achieved, 
thanks to his skilful jumps and twists, a knowledge of the world that will 
bear little resemblance to the knowledge possessed by a disabled person. 
Since each person's body possesses different abilities, this practical 
knowledge of the world will differ from person to person. 
Furthermore, it is primary with respect to (that is, precedes, and makes 
possible) theoretical knowledge. Our human development from helpless 
babies to fully grown adults is made possible by our ability to do such 
everyday things as reaching and grasping, coordinating our eye and hand 
movements, or speaking a language. These are all skills, obtained by 
constant reinforcement of success stories: when a child stretches his hand 
to touch something, he may first fail to reach the object in question, but by 
constantly trying he will eventually succeed; then, he will repeat the 
movement until it becomes second nature. Once these simpler bodily 
techniques are mastered, the child may engage in more complicated 
activities that involve using things as tools to do other things, like using a 
242 
spoon to carry the food from plate to mouth. Thus, the foundations are 
laid for the development of other more important skills, eg learning a 
language. Therefore, certain 'simple' bodily skills have to be mastered by 
the child, before he can go on to learn a language; equally, more 
specialised theoretical knowledge is dependent upon such language 
acquisition. These bodily skills are the way in which we refine our link to 
the world: "Habit expresses our power of dilating our being in the world, 
or changing our existence by appropriating fresh instruments. " (Merleau- 
Ponty, 1962: 143) 
In short, it can be concluded that human action is primarily bodily action. 
The fact that people show their active power in the process of intentionally 
acting against the natural behaviour of their bodies has been rejected as a 
decisive reason. Instead, it has been suggested that it is through their 
bodies (in particular, through the possession of both common and personal 
bodily skills) that people open themselves to the world. Not only more 
complicated actions like the opening of a parachute, but also such abstract 
skills as working out a sum in one's head, are dependent on the acquisition 
of 'simpler' bodily skills such as reaching and grasping, and using other 
objects as tools. Such 'pure' human actions as getting married, not only 
require knowledge of a language so as to say 'yes, I do' (a mere nod of 
one's head might be good enough), but also the understanding that by 
saying those words (or nodding one's head) one is in fact doing something 
else, namely getting married. That is, getting married presupposes that 
things, words, or movements of the head are 'tools', instrumental for the 
performance of other actions. These considerations lead to a view of the 
body as essentially active (the body-in-movement thesis): without such an 
active interaction with the world, the 'simpler' bodily skills would not be 
mastered, and the foundations for the future performance of other actions 
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would not be laid. It is in this sense that the naturalistic and intentional 
approaches, as characterized above, have been found inadequate: they 
lack a proper understanding of human action as primarily bodily, for 
without the body as a door to the world, there would be no intentional 
action. 
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CONCLUSIONS: 
THE MINMAL ACCOUNT 
At first sight, it may appear that an answer to the question 'what is a 
person? ' could not be provided without considering the many different 
discourses in which the concept of a person occurs. Since Aristotle's 
definition of man as a political being, the social, moral and political 
dimensions of the person have occupied central stage in the understanding 
of people: what is the relation between an individual and society as a 
whole, what is the right attitude towards other people, what is the relation 
between an individual and the State, etc, have been pressing questions in 
philosophy. More recently, from a feminist perspective, it has been 
argued that an account of what a person is is not independent from the 
masculine/feminine polarity, and in that respect the body (in particular, the 
person's sexual traits) plays a fundamental role. 
From both these perspectives, a general objection to the foregoing 
exposition of the identity of a person could be posed. On the one hand, it 
could be said that an account of the social dimension of the person is 
missing. On the other hand, it may be added, although there is a lengthy 
treatment of the bodily condition of people, there is no emphasis on their 
sexuality. To the extent to which these crucial aspects are left out, it may 
be argued, the former exposition is, to say the least, incomplete, perhaps 
even radically flawed. 
However, these two objections fail to seriously damage the core of the 
argument in the previous pages. The fact that these two aspects have not 
been discussed at all does not imply a deliberate omission, in the sense 
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that they have nothing to offer to an account of personal identity. On the 
contrary, it is from the basic view of people as both subjects and objects, 
transcending the first-person/third-person dichotomy, that an adequate 
account of people's sexuality, and of their social dimension, can be given. 
In this sense, the previous exposition is a minimal account, providing the 
basis for a subsequent development of people's sexuality, as well as their 
social nature. 
It could be objected, though, that the latter should not be regarded as just a 
plus on top of the minimal account, but as part of the minimal account 
itself; that is, that the right conception of people requires that their 
sexuality and/or their social dimension be considered to be at the centre of 
what people are. In answer to this objection, it is argued that both the 
sexual and social aspects can be elaborated from the minimal account in a 
direct manner. In other words, in the minimal account lies the possibility 
of a development of the role of people's sexuality, as well as their social 
character. Let us examine the latter in some detail. 
A central theme in the previous chapters has been the bridging of the 
subjective/objective dichotomy in the treatment of personal identity. 
Thus, it has been powerfully argued that people are elements of the world, 
of the objective order: the necessity-of-embodiment thesis, together with 
the primacy of bodily action, have contributed to this. However, it might 
still be said that this talk of people as elements of the objective world fails 
to explain an important difference between such objects as chairs and 
tables, and people. In other words, the former are objects in a different, 
more literal, sense of the word than the latter, but this is not properly 
reflected by talking of people as objects in the world. 
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Such a difference could be highlighted by considering something crucial to 
our understanding of people as elements of the world: their relationships 
with other people. To put it bluntly, people engage in personal 
relationships, whereas chairs and tables do not. Furthermore, such 
relationships as being a parent, being the boss, or being a member of the 
local cricket team, may be a prominent feature of the way one sees 
oneself, that is, of one's self-identity. 
The fact that people establish personal relationships with their fellow 
human beings is, in fact, an acknowledgment of the subjective side of the 
person. Strawson (and Evans, too; see 6.2. above) has argued that the 
ascription of certain P-predicates to oneself is logically linked to the 
ascription (or possibility of ascription) of those very same predicates to 
other people. That is, the ascription of some P-predicates to oneself 
presupposes the recognition of other subjects, to whom those predicates 
could also be ascribed. In other words, there is an acceptance of the fact 
that people are subjects among other subjects. The latter is the basis from 
which personal relationships unfold: people engage in personal 
relationships with those beings who resemble them as subjects. Therefore, 
the development of personal relationships offers a new argument for the 
bridging of the subjective and objective aspects of the person, whilst at the 
same time making clear what it means for a person to be an element of the 
world. People are elements of the world because they are able to form a 
network of social relationships with other people. People are, therefore, 
social beings. Although these sketchy considerations have not been part 
of the exposition in the main text, they do follow from the nuclear ideas 
discussed there. That is, the basis has been provided, even if the detailed 
process of argumentation is missing. 
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The social dimension of the person can also be shown to follow from the 
minimal account in connection with this quotation: "all meaningful action 
is for the sake of friendship" (Macmurray, quoted in Kjaergaard, 
1970: 173). Macmurray has proposed that the starting point of modern 
philosophy be shifted from the Cartesian Cogito, the 'I think', to the 
consideration of the person as an active being, the 'I do'. In this sense, 
human action occupies the centre of the picture: that people are agents is a 
constitutive, not just a consequential, aspect of our understanding of 
persons. That people are agents is not something that simply follows from 
their essential thinking nature; people are essentially agents. In this 
context, the sense of the quotation above is that human action is 
purposeful, and its purpose is quite simply the enhancement of personal 
relationships. Therefore, the essentially active character of people is not 
separable from their social dimension: "persons", says Macmurray, "are 
constituted by their mutual relation to one another. 'I' exist only as one 
element in the complex 'You and I' " (quoted in Kjaergaard, 1970: 169). 
Once again, the basis for these considerations is already present in the 
minimal account: particularly in the characterization of human action as 
intentional, and in the attention paid to the active character of persons. In 
short, then, the minimal account has the basic ingredients required for the 
inclusion of other aspects of people not explicitly discussed, like their 
social nature. 
Incidentally, consideration of the person as taking part in a complex web 
of personal relationships helps to bring out a feature which has so far been 
neglected, the notion of responsibility. When discussing Locke's forensic 
notion of a person, it was said that people were responsible agents. The 
responsible character of people, though, has not played a crucial role in 
the minimal account. However, the latter could be enriched by arguing 
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that people's responsibility is primarily towards other people, with whom 
they engage in personal relationships. Furthermore, insofar as personal 
relationships are lacking or diminished in certain groups, like animals or 
children, who do not possess a strong sense of intentionality as 
commitment, then responsibility will also be lacking, or its attribution to 
them limited. In short, the minimal account, austere as it is, can 
potentially be supplemented with richer additions. 
These basic ingredients will now be reviewed, as a way of summarizing 
the achievements of the minimal account. Firstly, on the objective side of 
the subjective/objective dichotomy, the notion of the body has been under 
intense scrutiny. In particular, the defence of the notion of 
sensory/intentional embodiment should be regarded as an attempt at 
freeing the body from the mechanistic connotations inherited from the 
Cartesian model. Thus, the emphasis has been on the body as a 'live' 
entity, actively exchanging information with its environment, as opposed 
to a body that automatically, and blindly, reacts to the orders given by the 
person. Following Merleau-Ponty's distinction between the objective and 
the phenomenal body, the difference with the mechanistic position is that 
in the latter the body is thought of in purely objective terms (ie, as the 
subject-matter of physics or medicine), whereas the sensory/intentional 
body, like Merleau-Ponty's phenomenal body, is thought of as a sort of 
organism, a live intermediary between the person and the world, which 
conditions not only the knowledge the person obtains from the world, but 
also his possibility of acting upon it. 
This view of the body as the objective body of the natural sciences was 
referred to in the introduction as 'the mechanistic conception of the body'. 
The latter has been resisted by proposing a more organic view of the body, 
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which attends to the position of the person within the world as a whole. 
Incidentally, an alternative criticism of the mechanistic conception of the 
body could be suggested in terms of an analysis of desires. Desires, 
particularly the so-called 'blind desires', are thought to automatically ensue 
from the person's physiological needs, without rational intervention. If this 
view could be resisted, then a critique of the body as a mechanical device 
would follow suit. The elaboration of this argument, though, will have to 
wait. 
It is on this non-mechanistic view of the body that the necessity-of- 
embodiment thesis has been based. People are necessarily embodied in 
that they possess a sensory/intentional body that connects them to, and 
gives them a perspective onto, the world. It is from the perspective of 
their body that people perceive, and act upon, the world. Were they to 
lack such a perspective onto the world, as in the nightmare of the brain in 
a vat, they would not be persons. 
Secondly, on the subjective side of the dichotomy, and so as to prevent an 
over-objectification of the person (that is, an identity of the person with a 
material body), it has been maintained that people are subjects. 
Furthermore, it has been sustained that the understanding of people as 
subjects requires a non-reductionist approach, according to which people 
are neither an embodied mind, nor a mindful body, nor a sum of mind and 
body. On the contrary, the concept of a person is primitive with respect to 
those of mind and body. The latter means, on the one hand, that the 
concept of person is not reducible to those of mind and/or body, and on 
the other hand, that the former is conceptually prior, that is, that our 
understanding of persons precedes our understanding of an embodied 
mind or a mindful body. In other words, the Cartesian model has been 
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reversed: Descartes started from the notions of mind and body to reach 
that of a person, whereas it is now proposed that the starting point should 
be the concept of person itself. 
Following Kantian insights, the person has been characterized as a subject. 
Thus, a person as subject is that irreducible and non-eliminable entity to 
which mental experiences and bodily characteristics are equally and 
necessarily ascribed. Due to the subjective status of the person, talk of the 
unity of a person (both at the psychological and bodily levels) is possible: 
different experiences and bodily features, at different times, are all 
ascribed to the same subject; they are all part of the same person's history 
because he is the same subject. 
Thirdly, having thus separately exposed the objective and subjective sides 
of the person, a possible way of bridging the subjective/objective divide 
has been proposed. In fact, two notions have played a very valuable role: 
those of perception and action. Perception appeared to be suited to the 
job because the person is not only the subject of his own perceptions, but 
also an object to be perceived (he can see himself, touch himself, etc). 
Thus, a solution to the bridging of the subjective/objective divide seemed 
possible in connection with the 'Simple Theory of Perception', whereby 
people can locate themselves in the world as a joint result of their 
perceptual experience of the world, together with their awareness of their 
status as subjects. People not only regard themselves as objects 
positioned in the world, and therefore, susceptible to being perceived, but 
also as objects that are subjects. 
However, such a proposal turned out to be an incomplete solution, for 
perception and action are so interdependently linked with one another that 
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a one-sided answer, where action was left out, could not be successful. 
This is the reason why an extensive study of human agency was needed. 
Two main theses resulted from that analysis: one, that human agency is 
primarily bodily; and two, that the person as a subject of action is primary 
with respect to the person as a subject of perception (or a subject of 
thought and perception). The first thesis meant a re-assertion of both the 
non-mechanistic view of the body, and of the necessity-of-embodiment 
thesis, since it appeared that the body was involved in the core of the 
person's active relation to the world: human action is bodily because 
people open themselves to the world through their bodies. A relevant 
conclusion following from the thesis that the person is above all a subject 
of action is that the question about the unity of the person could finally be 
settled: as mentioned above, the person is united in so much as he is a 
subject, but not just any sort of subject, a subject of action, or rather, an 
agent. 
Fourthly, the move away from the Cartesian approach to personal identity 
has been completed. It was suggested in the introduction that one of the 
underlying themes of this work was the attempt to overcome the Cartesian 
model which has for so long dominated philosophical discussions of the 
person. This has been achieved on several fronts: one, the person is not a 
sum of mind and body, but conceptually primary with respect to the latter; 
two, the embodied nature of the person has been properly stressed, for 
instance, in the primary character of bodily action; three, the view of the 
body as a mechanical device has been definitely abandoned; and four, the 
unity of the person does not depend on his being a thinking being, but on 
his essentially active nature. 
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Concerning the essentially active character of persons, something not yet 
mentioned should be borne in mind. It appears that if people are 
essentially active, then people's identity cannot be determined once and 
for all. Moreover, insofar as they are active beings, they control what they 
make of their lives and, therefore, of their identity over time. This idea 
could be supported in different ways. Consider the following three 
examples. One, people form short- and long-term plans and projects, in 
the light of which their present behaviour can be understood: a mark of 
people's actions is that they can be placed within the framework of a 
certain project. But, in making these plans, people also make their own 
life. Think, for example, of the adolescent who decides to enter medical 
school, of the young woman who becomes a nun: these are dramatic 
decisions, plans, that will radically affect the course of their lives. 
Two, consider the case of personal relationships, which form a central 
ingredient of people's life: somebody may regard his being a father (or his 
being the boss) as something nuclear in his own self-image, so that if he 
was to lose his son (or his company), he would feel he was not himself, as 
if he was a different person altogether. Thus, when people engage in 
personal relationships, they are directly contributing to the making of their 
life. Since people engage in different personal relationships in their 
lifetime (from being a son, to being a husband, to being a father, etc), they 
are somehow correspondingly changing an important part of their own 
self-identity. 
Three, people's beliefs are also an important part of their life: serious 
changes in people's convictions bring about critical changes in their life 
This is the case, for instance, with the move from a life based on firm 
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Pious convictions to a life devoid of faith in religion; or the case of the 
husband who suddenly learns that his wife is cheating on him. 
In short, then, the point is that people's identity is not fixed at the 
beginning of their lives. In the same way in which children develop, 
physically and psychologically, towards adulthood, people's identity (what 
they think of themselves as well as what others think of them) evolves, 
too. This, however, is not a reductio ad absurdum of the minimal 
account, for the latter only indicates the chief elements that a philosophy 
of personal identity must accommodate, whereas the point about personal 
evolution does not contradict any of them. Furthermore, the fact that 
people evolve is a corollary from the active character of persons, one of 
the central components of the minimal account. It is in this sense that 
Merleau-Ponty's quote at the beginning of this thesis should be 
understood: "consciousness is in the first place not a matter of 'I think 
that', but of 'I can' ". The latter can be taken to mean that, insofar as 
people are essentially active, their own identity is conditioned by their 
active nature. 
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NOTES TO THE MAIN TEXT 
Notes to Chapter 1 
(1) The authors examined in the following discussion consider a 
disembodied person as one who has previously been embodied, not one 
that lacks a body from his origin. Since the former is intuitively more 
possible than the latter, it is hoped that criticism of the former will also 
serve as criticism of the latter. 
(2) This argument owes a great deal to certain essentialist accounts about 
the role of scientific discoveries in philosophy (particularly, questions of 
meaning and modality); see Kripke (1980) and Putnam (1975). 
(3) The "may" in the main text should be taken with a pinch of salt, for if 
it turns out (as some people may want to argue) that science teaches us 
that embodiment is a necessary property of persons, then disembodied 
perception and action is ruled out, in accordance with Kripke's previous 
point. However, this complication may be ignored. 
Notes to Chapter 2 
(1) The following considerations apply both to vision and hearing, 
although only the former will be explicitly mentioned most of the time. 
(2) Is it right to use 'he' and/or 'she' to refer to disembodied persons? Our 
present criteria to distinguish male from female people are bodily criteria. 
Since a disembodied person has no body, such a distinction would appear 
to be out of place. However, it could be argued that by the disembodied 
person's character (manifested in behaviour), the distinction male/female 
could be sustained. (See Gillet, 1986: 380. ) 
(3) The following considerations can similarly be applied to the sense of 
taste . 
(4) Huby (1976) has defended the existence of mediumistic 
communication. She proposes a distinction between microcosms and 
persons. In cases of mediumistic communication, what happens is that a 
different microcosm (other than the usual one) possesses the medium's 
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body. That is, different microcosms can inhabit the same body at different 
times. She adds that we should not be put off by the apparent clash with 
our scientific way of looking at things, because microcosms do not follow 
scientific laws. 
(5) Even in cases of after-images, what is seen is a bright light that is 
caused by the previous normal vision of something in the world. For 
instance, the bars of a window seen against a bright sky can later be 
observed (after-image) as floating in the ceiling with the drift of the eyes. 
(6) A counter-example could be the so-called 'lucid dreams', where the 
sleeping person realizes, while dreaming, that what he is experiencing is a 
dream, and it is not reality. Could such a person give his exact location, 
while sleeping (and, therefore, while lacking perception of the world)? In 
any case, that is not the normal case, and it is not a fatal objection to the 
point made in the main text. 
(7) A difficulty here is whether communication with disembodied people 
is possible. Cases of mediumistic communication, where disembodied 
people talk through an embodied person's (the medium's) mouth, have 
been put forward as positive evidence. Those who reject that this is 
possible have questioned both the amount of evidence available, and its 
reliability. Here, it will simply be pointed out that the controversy has not 
yet been solved, and that there is a prima facie case for doubting the 
possibility of mediumistic communication. In the meantime, the onus to 
present conclusive evidence is on those who claim it to be possible. 
Notes to Chapter 4 
(1) However, he adds that angels may have knowledge of real essences 
and "it is certain his Maker has" (III, VI, 3). The discovery of real 
essences simply escapes limited human capacities. 
(2) See Wilkes (1988) for a detailed description and discussion of one 
case of multiple personality, that of Miss Beauchamp. According to the 
records of Dr. Prince, the psychologist who treated this case, there seemed 
to be different persons, within the same body, at different times. One of 
the ways of recognizing the existence of more than one person is the 
observation of their actions, often manifesting distinct (and even 
contradictory) character traits. It would appear, then, that more than one 
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agent were involved, and that each agent did not accept responsibility for 
the actions of the others. 
(3) Nonetheless, this does not amount to the consideration of a person as 
a social construct, ie the idea that society conventionally decides what a 
person is. The naturalistic component built into the concept of a person 
prevents such a move by establishing that people are an element of the 
natural order. 
(4) This is only a rough example, since many different organs form the 
eye. A more detailed account would include other elements. 
(5) To what extent could we do without our heart or lungs in a normally 
working body? 
Notes to Chapter 5 
(1) Quotes of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason refer to a translation of the 
B edition by JMD Meiklejohn. 
(2) The notion of commitment, and its relation to intentional action, will 
be further explored in a later chapter. 
(3) It is a matter of some controversy whether or not Wittgenstein held a 
version of the NO-theory or, indeed, what his view of the person was. 
This will not be discussed here. Certainly, Wittgenstein's remarks on 
personal identity are various and complicated, and their explanation would 
require a whole new thesis. Thus, and for argument's sake, it will be 
supposed that he maintained an eliminativist thesis. 
(4) Or more precisely, identification-free knowledge is (1) not 
identification-dependent, and (2) based on a way of gaining information 
from objects. This second restriction is introduced in order to exclude 
knowledge that is not information-based, which is relevant in the context 
of Evans's discussion, although it could be ignored here. 
(5) This now seems a rash assumption. The full force of the question of 
self-location on the basis of the information we gain about ourselves 
(including our body) will be addressed in a later chapter. 
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Notes to Chapter 6 
(1) As well as M-predicates, those P-predicates which do not ascribe 
states of consciousness (like 'is going for a walk'), and some P-predicates 
which do ascribe states of consciousness (Strawson mentions, for 
instance, 'is in pain'), could be ascribed to animals. Therefore, Strawson's 
account could be modified to accommodate animals. 
(2) This special class of P-predicates Shoemaker calls them P*- 
predicates. P*-predicates are instantiated in such a way that knowing that 
they are instantiated in that way is equivalent to knowing them to be 
instantiated in oneself (1984b: 16). This is the origin of the phenomenon of 
immunity to error through misidentification, discussed in the previous 
chapter. 
(3) Descartes's view of the connection between mind and body, 
underlying the division between person and body has been oversimplified 
here. Descartes himself realized that the relationship between a person 
and his material body was very close and intimate. (See Coady, 1982-3. ) 
Nonetheless, this oversimplification may shed some light on certain 
aspects of the Cartesian position. 
(4) The possibility of such examples as (A) is not under scrutiny here. 
Those examples are relevant because they help to determine what is meant 
by body (namely, sensory and intentional body, as opposed to material 
body). 
Notes to Chapter 7 
(1) What can be said of those cases in which babies are born with an 
uncommon number of limbs, for instance? Would they not count as the 
maximally embodied persons? The solution might be hinted at by the 
name those cases receive: cases of defective birth, that is, physiologically 
abnormal cases. 
(2) The problem would be one of attribution of personhood. If such a 
body did not show any outer intentional behaviour or any sign of 
perception, what grounds would there be to consider it a person? What 
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difference would there be between such a body and a stone, for instance? 
Would the person-like external appearance be enough? Certainly, a 
sculpture of a person looks like a person, but it is not one. 
(3) At least, according to one interpretation of Wittgenstein's work, 
exemplified by Malcolm (1986,1989). 
(4) Rorty (1992) has proposed a different argument for the close 
connection between the body and intellectual thought. She suggests that a 
medically healthy body (a sound maintenance system) is correlative with 
reliable scientific knowledge (a sound information system). In this 
context, both bodily sensations and emotions play a crucial role, for they 
are oriented to both the maintenance and the information systems. For a 
different argument in favour of the connection between the body and 
theoretical knowledge, see also Johnson (1991). 
(5) First of all, Malcolm argues that a dream is not an event like many 
other physical events (such as thundering or sleeping), and therefore there 
is no duration of dreams in real time. Second, he maintains that if REM 
was the criterion for dreaming, then two inadmissible consequences would 
follow: one, that people should have to be informed whether they dreamt 
or not; second, that people could be mistaken about having dreams. 
Notes to Chapter 8 
(1) This idea may need some qualification: what about the painter who 
sees a richly coloured environment, or the musician who hears more tones 
than the average person? Could it be said that while we all receive the 
same sensations, only some of those (more in the case of the trained 
painter or musician) have a perceptual content? How important a role 
does our past experience play in perception? 
(2) The perception of our own bodies is patchy: we do not usually see 
most of our heads; if we do (as when we are facing a mirror), we do not 
see our backs. On the other hand, the interior physiological workings of 
our bodies usually escape our perceptual experience (with perhaps the 
exception of the noises coming from our stomach, or the uncomfortable 
sensations of a sore muscle). 
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(3) It must be stressed that both examples only apply in normal 
circumstances, that is, excepting cases where the subject's brain is linked 
to someone else's body, or other abnormal situations. 
Notes to Chapter 9 
(1) For a criticism of Parfit's reductionist view of the person that follows 
from this shift of emphasis from the unity of consciousness to the unity of 
agency, see Korsgaard (1989). She argues that Parfit's conclusions do not 
square well with the conception of people as agents. 
Notes to Chapter 10 
(1) The analysis that follows in the main text bears certain similarities to 
the one proposed by Rescher (1970), although there are also important 
differences. Rescher, for instance, distinguishes between action (like 
looking at or listening to) and termination (like seeing or hearing); only the 
former, he says, count as human actions. However, I shall treat both 
seeing and looking at as cases of human action. 
(2) It is true that not all human actions involve a strong intention. For 
instance, when somebody readjusts his position while driving because he 
does not feel too comfortable, he does not have to form a previous 
intention including some sort of commitment to future actions. 
(3) This way of talking, as if the body were different from the person, 
should not be suspicious of dualism: at this stage, it should be clear that it 
is only a way of talking. 
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